Independence of Judicial Power in The Problems of The Period of Constitutional Judge in Indonesia


  • Afdhal Mahatta
  • Satya Arinanto


Independence of power, constitutional justice, periodization, politician.


Amendments to the Constitutional Court Law (UU) No. 7, 2020 The third amendment to the Constitutional Court Law No. 24, 2003, abolished the obsolescence of Constitutional Judges. However, your formulation does not provide a solid basis for why the legislature has switched from the periodization to the 70-year age limit. Doing so can jeopardize the quality of constitutional judges who have a sincere understanding of national administration and who have a politician-like character. This investigation uses a normative legal investigation method by investigating the main norms of law. The results of this study show that the changes in norms during the tenure of the Constitutional Judge are carried out with minimal thinking, lack of scrutiny, and a relatively unfair process. Apart from that, the third amendment to the Constitutional Court Act significantly expands the consequences of extending the severance period instead of the term division without improving or changing the initial choice, especially during the term of office of the Constitutional Judge. It was also pointed out that it was. The stage of the Constitutional Judge. We conclude that the development of the judicial independence system in the

Constitutional Court was partially and narrowly interpreted by the revision of the Constitutional Court Law, only by changing the term of judges and by periodicizing the terms of judges.