Principal-Agent Relations in Electronic-Based Budgeting Planning in the City of Yogyakarta

Abstract

This study aims to explain the principal-agent relationship in an electronic-based local budgeting planning system in the city of Yogyakarta. This relationship is colored by the opportunistic behavior of electronic-based planning actors. The method used is a qualitative approach with data collection techniques through interviews, observation, E-FGD and review of document data and analyzed using the Miles and Huberman models. The research results found are the agency relationship between the people and the legislature and the agency relationship between the executive and the legislature. Society is in a position of principal and legislature as agent and executive as agent and legislature as principal. This relationship frames various interests that are trying to be achieved by looking at the opportunities that exist and are manifested through opportunistic behavior. Therefore, electronic-based budgeting planning in the City of Yogyakarta cannot be separated from the interests and behaviors that benefit each actor.