Rent-seeking and mining policy in Indonesia is an interesting discourse. One of the problems with the coal mining policy in Indonesia is the dualism of licensing policies between the central and local governments. This study aims to reveal the interest in rent-seeking practices carried out by mafia networks through this policy dualism loophole. Interest in rent-seeking is understood through the role relations between actors using the rent-seeking by Khan and Parker and the Elite Laswell-Mills and Schumpeter theory with the Patron-Client community modelling by Scott. This study argues that there are complexities and anomalies in relations between actors in the practice of rent-seeking relationship anomaly Client occurs because of more persistent ties in the Patron-Client due to familial relationships that form relationship patterns triangle and a linear individual. Using a qualitative method with a non-positivist approach, this study seeks to reveal the dynamic meaning of understanding social relations between actors. The research approach used is a case study, namely an exploratory case study of the practice of rent-seeking coal mining policy in East Kalimantan Province from 2009-to 2014. The actors' roles and relations form a mafia network by taking advantage of governance weaknesses and proximity to the authorities. Strong patron-client mafia network rent-seeking is at 6 points, namely: (1) The rent-seeking for regional licensing, (2) The rent-seeking for province licensing mafia network, (3) The rent-seeking Forestry licensing, (4) Mafia network rent-seeking mining permits, (5) Mafia network rent-seeking institutions surveyor, and (6) Mafia network rent-seeking for regional political business.