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### **Proportionality of the Minister's Candidate By President in the Government System in Indonesia**

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#### **Abstract**

This study aims to explain how democratic the Indonesian state is in selecting the President's aide. This study employs a case-based, legislative, and comparative approach to normative legal research. Also, the authors use descriptive analysis methods to explain historical events, compare candidates across cabinets, and draw conclusions using deductive methods, which means it explains the problem's general nature before addressing specific issues. This study shows that the ministerial candidate system in Indonesia is exclusive, based on party elites and party leaders appointing ministers. In Indonesia, ministerial candidates are chosen based on a large political element. The political element is unbalanced with democratic principles like transparency and equality in public office. This research can be used to create regulations for political parties both internally (Organizational Regulations) and externally (Laws) by changing the exclusive system of candidacy. Moreover, the presidential or party leader election was followed by a national convention attended by all party members from each region to elect the minister candidate. Researchers have never investigated this research before, as evidenced by no similar discussion. This study examines

the proportionality of the President's ministerial candidacy system in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the President appoints the Minister as his assistant. It becomes a problem when non-democratic methods are used to select ministers. So, at least, the supporting political parties provide the best candidates, not only in terms of proximity but also in terms of ability.

### **Keywords**

Ministerial Candidates; President's Prerogative Rights; Presidential System; Political Parties

### **Introduction**

Democracy is one of the fundamental systems that places equality and transparency in all levels of state activities. The view of democracy towards a system has principles that are universally guiding principles in carrying out the meaning of democracy. That principle according to Robert. A. Dahl, quoted by Muntoha in his journal entitled "Democracy and the Rule of Law" states, Democracy as a political idea contains 5 (five) criteria, namely: Equal suffrage in determining binding collective decisions; Effective participation, namely equal opportunities for all citizens in the collective decision-making process; Disclosure of the truth, namely the existence of equal opportunities for everyone to provide an assessment of the running of political processes and governance logically; Final control of the agenda, namely the exclusive decision for the community to determine which agenda should and should not be decided through the government process, including delegating that power to other people or institutions that represent the community; Coverage, which is the coverage of the community covering all adults with the law (Muntoha, 2009, p. 380).

These criteria will be applied differently according to the government system adopted in the country (Noviati, 2013, p. 335). In a presidential system of government, especially in Indonesia, the whole process of policymaking comes from the executive, because the presidential system prioritizes the role of the president or leader as head of state as well as state operator or head of government who runs the government from various sectors, both from social, cultural aspects, economics, politics, and law (Hadjon, 2011, p. 176). One of the efforts in making the policy, the president was assisted by several ministers, namely under Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution in Chapter V concerning the Ministry of State that: "The president is assisted by state ministers, the ministers are appointed and dismissed by the president. Each minister is in charge of certain affairs in government. Formation, amendment, and dissolution of state ministries."

"The State Ministry hereinafter referred to as the Ministry, is a government apparatus in charge of certain affairs in government." The president has the constitutional power to form ministers, according to this article. The president has the authority to form and structure the country from all fields (Hadjon, 2011, p. 166). According to the article, the minister has the authority to take care of one

competency in constitutional matters. This means the minister has absolute power to make policies based on his consideration, and he is considered king in the fields he manages, such as politics, law, and the economy. So, in a hierarchical relationship, the minister is fully accountable to the president, whose image is directly linked to the people's sovereignty. It becomes a problem when non-democratic methods are used to select ministers. In addition to closeness, supporting political parties provide the best candidates in each governmental matter. Because if chosen solely on proximity, ministers will issue inappropriate policies and even act corruptly (Ridwan, 2003, p. 586).

These policies and behaviors can be seen in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's United Indonesia Cabinet Volume 2. The United Indonesia cabinet has 34 ministries in charge of various tasks. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and political parties affiliated with Democrats as the winning party in the 2009 presidential election selected 34 ministries with an average of 15 ministers (Presidential Decree Number 84/P of 2009 concerning the Formation of the United Indonesia Cabinet II).

It can be seen that ministerial policies are often out of line with inappropriate regulations or regulations. For example, the policy of Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Denny Indrayana states that a moratorium or temporary suspension of remissions will not affect the Correctional Law Number 12 of 1995 or Government Regulation Number 28 of 2006 concerning Terms and Procedures for the Implementation of the Rights of Inmates (Hendratno, 2013, p. 522). Jero Wacik, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources did the same thing by eliminating fuel subsidies. In fact, many of the ministers who were recruited on the basis of political closeness were even involved in corruption scandals (Tempo, 2017). A similar case also occurred in the era of President BJ Habibe's administration, namely Akbar Tanjung as Minister of State Secretary who issued a policy of purchasing groceries for the poor.

This puts pressure on democratic pillars like authorities and political parties. Although the presidential candidate's coalition of political parties influences the selection of the ministerial candidate, so do other factors such as the interests and lobbying of each person or party who helped his presidential candidate win the election. This is due to the lack of a ministerial selection law and the president's selection process being opaque. The 1945 Constitution only specifies that the president appoints and dismisses ministers without specifying criteria or procedures. After that, the researcher wants to see how post-reform political parties use the proportionality system of ministerial candidacy to select a suitable candidate to be proposed to the President as his assistant, and assess how democratic the election of ministerial candidates in Indonesia.

### **Literature Review**

Political Recruitment Gender, Race, and Class in The British Parliament (Noris & Lovendoski, 1995). This paper discusses the process of political

recruitment in the British parliament. This article describes how the party selection team selects parliament candidates. This behavior shows how certain perceptions still exist about women and ethnic minorities, resulting in discrimination in the party's selection process for parliamentary candidates. This becomes a discussion to see the perceptions underlying the process of a candidate who registers to become a member of parliament from a particular party (a prospective legislative candidate). There is discrimination in the selection of candidates for elections. The results of several studies are still insufficient to prove discrimination. Although party discrimination has increased among researchers. Instead of relying on direct evidence from candidates, the authors propose using indirect evidence from selection team actions and direct evidence from party criteria. Norris and Lavenduski sought some of these things to prove party discrimination.

The Pattern of Recruitment of Candidates for Legislative Members (CALEG) from the Golkar Party for the DPRD of Central Java in the 2014-2019 Period (Prasojo, 2019).

This article discusses the Golkar Party's legislative recruitment strategy. The Golkar Party, an election veteran, did not appear to be sloppy in its political recruitment. A candidate for DPR-RI, Provincial DPRD, or Regency/DPRD Regencies/the City of Golkar Party must meet the criteria set forth in the Golkar Party Central Leadership Decree Number: KEP-227/DPP/GOLKAR/I/2013. Assertiveness, dedication, discipline, loyalty, and impeccability (PD2LT) are also criteria. Meet the legal requirements. The above criteria are not the only ones that Golkar Party candidates must pass to advance in the election. The next filter is the Procedure for Determining the Golkar Party Legislative Candidate List. The Central Java Golkar DPD party's recruitment process is mixed. To be nominated as Candidates for Provincial DPRD Members, all functionary cadres who have participated in the functionary orientation organized by the Golkar Party DPP or Provincial Golkar Party DPD for the period 2009-2015 must sign a willingness form. From this point, the party selects by not giving the willingness form to all members of the functionary cadre, even if the cadre is willing. Aside from analyzing the DPP's recruitment strategy, an interview was conducted to learn more about the Golkar Central Java DPD's recruitment strategy.

## **Methods**

This research uses normative legal research. Normative is not only limited to positive or statutory regulations, but normative legal research is a scientific research procedure to find truth based on scientific logic from the normative side. The approach used is a case approach, a legislative approach, and a comparative approach. In this case, the author examines by combining existing policies with cases that have occurred and comparing the patterns of recruitment of ministers during the post-reform presidential period. In the analysis of this study, the authors used a descriptive analysis that explained historically and compared candidates in

several cabinets and concluded with a deductive method, meaning that it explained the general nature of the problem then it would lead to concrete problems.

## **Results**

### **The Existence of Political Parties in Indonesia**

The development of political parties in Indonesia can be classified into several periods of development, with each era having different characteristics and ideologies, namely: The Dutch colonial era, the Japanese colonial era, and the era of Indonesian independence. During the Dutch colonial era, it was called the first period of the birth of political parties in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies). The birth of the party marked national awareness. At that time all organizations both socially-oriented such as Budi Utomo and Muhammadiyah, or those with religious and secular ideologies such as the Islamic Union, PNI and the Catholic Party, played a part in the national movement for an independent Indonesia (Labol & Ilham, 2015, p. 11).

The early presence of political parties reflected a national desire for Indonesian independence. This movement by several parties continued after the People's Council was established. The National Faction led by M. Husni Thamrin, the PPBB (Bestuur Bumi Putera Employees Association) led by Prawoto, and the Indonesische Nationale Groep led by Muhammad Yamin. Outside the People's Council, a joint political party is being formed.

The Indonesian People's Committee (KRI) was founded in 1939 by GAPI (Indonesian Political Association), a coalition of national parties, MIAI (Islamic Council), a 1937 coalition of Islamic parties, and MRI (Indonesian People's Assembly), a coalition of labor unions. During the Japanese occupation, only Islamists were allowed to form the more socially active Masyumi party. During Indonesia's independence (from 1945), political parties emerged. So, back to the party system. Masjumi, PNI, NU, and PKI became major political parties in 1955. From 1950 to 1959, political parties were very important in state life (Labol & Ilham, 2015, p. 20). When political parties fail, the cabinet fails. As a result, growth is slowed. The July 5th Decree ended parliamentary democracy. During this guided democracy, the president's role grew while the role of political parties shrank. NASAKOM was represented by NU, PNI, and PKI.

During the Guided Democracy era, the PKI was clearly more prominent, especially during the 30 S/PKI Movement in late September 1965. Then Indonesia entered the New Order, with more freedom for parties than during Guided Democracy. A new political power organization, the Golongan Karya emerged around that time. In the 1971 general election, Golkar won the party, followed by NU, Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Association), and PNI (Labol & Ilham, 2015, p. 20). In 1973, a fusion of political parties simplified the party. The United Development Party was formed by NU, Parmusi, Sarikat Islam Party, and Perti (PPP). The Indonesian Democratic Party was formed by the Indonesian Christian

Party, the Catholic Party, the Murba Party, and the IPKI Party (Indonesian Independence Supporters' Association). Thus, until the 1997 election, Indonesia had only three political power organizations. After the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the multi-party system continued until the 2004 elections (Labol & Ilham, 2015, p. 20).

At first, the functions and roles of political parties in Western countries were elitist and aristocratic. Function and role in the sense of defending the interests of the aristocratic group against the demands of the king, but in its development then the role is extended and develops to various walks of life. This is partly due to the need for widespread and equitable support from all sections of the community. Thus there was a shift from an elitist role to a broad and populist role (Subakti, 1992, p. 114). Parties serve four functions according to political scientists. The role of political parties in political communication, socialization, recruitment and conflict management (Subakti, 1992, pp. 163-164). Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp state that political parties influence voting patterns, political recruitment, and policy formulation (Meny, Yves, & Knapp, 1998, p. 103).

These four tasks are linked. Parties are vital in articulating societal political interests. Political parties' ideas and policies should reflect these diverse interests. Then ideas and policies are promoted in hopes of influencing or becoming official state policy. As such, political communication is the exchange of political information between the government and the public. The community's political aspirations are absorbed, processed, and channelled by political parties (Asshiddiqie, 2016, p. 408).

Political parties are a political phenomenon that is currently undergoing political socialization. Political education conveys this process. The introduction of political parties' programs to the public by political parties. Thus, the public is expected to vote for these parties in general elections.

Parties help recruit candidates. The party is legitimately formed and selects state leaders (Asshiddiqie, 2016, p. 408). Others, like the House of Representatives, are chosen indirectly by the people. Of course, parties can't fill every position. A political party cannot hold professional or other non-political positions (Asshiddiqie, 2016, p. 408). Political parties must directly or indirectly recruit state/local officials. This time, the party's role in recruiting is critical. Parties regulate and manage community conflicts in addition to recruiting (conflict management). As previously stated, people's values and interests often clash and compete. Conflicting ideologies, programs, and policies can channel divergent interests (Asshiddiqie, 2016, p. 408).

In other words, the party acts as a regulator or conflict management (conflict management) that channels various interests through the institutional channels of political parties. Thus, in the Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp categories, conflict management is linked to party integration. The party combines and integrates diverse interests to best influence state political policies (Meny, Yves, & Knapp, 1998, p. 124).

Candidate selection is one of the typical functions of political parties, according to Richard S. Katz. Not only because selecting candidates for elections is one of the functions that distinguish political parties from other organizations that seek to influence election results and government decisions. The function is specific because the nominated candidates influence the public perception of the political parties (Katz, 2001, p. 7). In general elections, the party candidates are more often the public's face of the party. So party members must vote on candidates.

## **Discussion**

### **Determination of Ministerial Candidation by Political Parties**

The constitutional narrative of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has explicitly stated that Indonesia is a constitutional state (Article 1 paragraph (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia). In the concept of state based on rule of law, the rule of law is a doctrine that requires the distribution of power or separation of powers because too much power of one branch is very dangerous in the contours of the state based on the law (Soemantri, 1993, p. 31). In the context of the executive branch of power, control is exercised by a president as in Article 4 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states: "The President of the Republic of Indonesia holds governmental authority according to the Basic Law."

According to the article, a president is the head of state and has full power to govern Indonesia (Manan & Harijanti, 2014, p. 89). State ministers in the president's cabinet can assist with administrative tasks. Chapter V, State Ministry The 1945 Constitution adds: "The President appoints and removes State Ministers. Everyone has specific responsibilities. Restructuring and dissolving state ministries" The President can appoint and dismiss the Minister, so he can elect his aides for one term (Fuady, 2011, p. 172). So the President's ministers are fully accountable to him. The State Ministry is also based on the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution (Article 17 paragraph (4)). In addition, it regulates the Minister's appointment and dismissal (Article 1 number 1 and 2 of Law Number 39 Year 2008 concerning State Ministries). Regulations governing ministerial appointment and dismissal have not diminished the President's spirit or legitimacy.

In Chapter V Appointment and Dismissal of the Minister Article 22 of Law Number 39 the Year 2008 concerning the State Ministry stipulates that the requirements to be elected to occupy the position of Minister are Indonesian citizens, loyal to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, ideals of the Proclamation of Independence, have never been imprisoned with the maximum threat 5 years.

The formulation of the limitation provisions is very well understood because the central position of the minister occupies a strategic position in a presidential government. An overview of the existence of a ministerial position can be seen from a dogmatic and realistic view (Fajri, 2015, p. 4). The dogmatic view departing



from the appointment of a minister is the prerogative of a president. However, it should be in a presidential government system if the ministerial position should be filled by professionals rather than filled by politicians who are concurrently ministers (Araujo & Silva, 2006, p. 6). Cabinet doctrine that contains professionals is commonly referred to as *zaken cabinet* or *professional cabinet*. Filling out ministerial posts that prioritize capability aspects is the main key to the success of the executive government. Because the responsibility for implementing and administering the government is borne by the minister and then respond to the President. Therefore, someone who will be appointed as a minister should have the technical and professional qualifications to lead the implementation of government tasks based on the principle of meritocracy (Asshiddiqie, 2006, p. 62).

Meanwhile, some view that the appointment of ministers is a realistic policy that must be taken by the President to establish a vote in parliament to be in line with government policies. The election of ministers who have political access to parliament is intended to make it easier to make decisions to ratify a policy in the form of a law (Fajri, 2015, p. 4). Not only that, but such policies are also related to the constitutional authority of the House of Representatives for budgeting and oversight of government programs (Jennings, 1969, pp. 265-267).

During President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's cabinet recruitment, a pattern of realistic and political appointment of ministers can be detected. SBY's cabinet preparation process incorporates both political and professional expertise (Hanan, 2014, p. 187). This was done to maintain a large political coalition and smooth his cabinet's agenda. Despite the criticism, SBY appears to be trying to make a breakthrough by combining political and professional officials. As a result, the cabinet was long-lived, as the DPR made no significant efforts to obstruct its policies. The SBY government's "kinship politics" has become a hallmark, with the cabinet dominating coalition formation. Technical ability is only a minor factor in filling the minister. Other factors include ethnicity, region, gender, and, most importantly, political party affiliation. This approach manifests in cabinet posts, so that appointment is always based on consultation with political party leadership (Hanan, 2014, p. 187).

The same principle can be applied to the recent direct presidential and vice-presidential elections. It was not possible to separate the political considerations from the appointment of ministers due to the coalition of parties supporting the government. High political pressure has made the President appear powerless in appointing ministers (Ismail, 2009, p. 50). A President must consult and seek approval from the leadership of political parties that support the government.

The gradual relationship between the holding of elections, the formation of coalitions and the appointment of ministers, seems to have been polarized in the same phenomenon. Cheibub also explained that the opportunity to organize the formation of a coalition government before it was represented through the distribution of seats in the legislature. In his illustration, Cheibub said if the impact of the legislative elections that distribute seats to many political parties, and the



conditions persisted, then it could be found the opportunity to observe the so-called situation to form a coalition (Cheibub, 2007, p. 70).

In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla were nominated by several coalition parties. In support of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla, many party cadres influenced cabinet composition (Detik.com, 2009). As a Golkar Party cadre, Jusuf Kalla was influenced by the Democratic Party, the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party, the Crescent Star Party, the United Development Party, the National Mandate Party, the National Awakening Party, and the Prosperous Justice Party.

In Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second term, In 2009-2014 SBY won the Presidential Election, but with less political power (minority president) (Haris, 2011, p. 3). SBY's lack of political support forced the party coalition to win the presidential election (Isra, 2014, p. 131). Ministerial seats were given up by the Democratic Party (PD), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and United Development Party (PPP). After a "thin coalition," SBY formed a "fat coalition" with Golkar. As a result, a large coalition government was formed (Haris, 2011, p. 3).

Unlike Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla in 2014. Joko Widodo and the bearer parties agreed during the campaign to form an unconditional coalition and appoint ministers from outside. The way ministers are chosen has changed. Announced when the working cabinet's ministers. There are 16 ministers in the Jokowi government, appointed by a coalition of political parties (Presidential Decree 121/P/2014 on the Formation of Agriculture and Work Cabinet 2014-2019).

This went on until President Jokowi-JK reshuffled his cabinet (reshuffle). They included the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-S), the Nasdem Party (PKB), the Hanura Party, the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), and the United Development Party (PPP). The cabinet shuffle occurred on July 27, 2016. The reshuffle allegedly included new ministers from Golkar and PAN. PAN-RB Minister Asman Abnur and Golkar Party Minister Airlangga Hartarto. The Nasdem party has appointed ministers alongside the new coalition parties. Thomas Lembong was replaced by non-political party leader Enggartiaso Lukito (Maharani, 2016). A third cabinet reshuffle volume repeated it. President Joko Widodo replaced Khofifah Indar Parawangsa with Idrus Marham, a social minister. Idrus Marham was soon implicated in a Riau PLTU corruption case. As the Golkar party's second presidential nominee, Idrus Marham was appointed social minister. Because his party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), did not support Jokowi's presidential nomination in 2019, Asman Abnur resigned as Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucracy Reform (Mansur, 2018).

Ministerial candidates in the Jokowi-JK era are exclusive, as evidenced by "transactional" political nuances. The focus on politics rather than capability continues. The party coalition automatically fills strategic minister positions. It was also linked to President Jokowi's 2019 presidential election nomination. The Working Cabinet of Jokowi indirectly helped secure future political party support for Jokowi.

In the final days of government, ministerial and party duties became increasingly muddled. As many as 15 ministers from the Jokowi era campaigned for President Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election. This process certainly disrupts a minister's main task, which is to lead his ministries. This is a side effect of choosing ministers based on political proximity. Politically elected ministers' policy output also has a significant impact. Many policies adopted are anti-people and only serve the interests of groups and political parties. Moreover, the appointment pattern based on party bearers can cause discord between the president and the minister. Faced with ministers from the opposing party, the president's power seemed to wane. Due to these practices, the president and his ministers felt a lack of perception and discomfort.

In every era of Indonesian government, the pattern of ministerial promotion became political jurisprudence. It is difficult to eliminate such matters because the presidential and vice-presidential nominations have a minimum threshold of 20%. In the end, the Presidential Threshold forced many parties to join the coalition. The direct election mechanism requires reciprocity and the distribution of ministerial seats to the bearer's party elite.

### **Proportionality of Ministerial Candidate by the President**

Candidate selection and political recruitment are two methods used by political parties to recruit candidates for public office. Political recruitment is done to individuals or groups who are appointed and active in politics. "...the process of enlisting individuals or groups into active political roles" (Czudnowski, 1975). Meanwhile, candidate selection is to choose the best candidates for public positions (Czudnowski, 1975, p. 228). This candidate selection mechanism is now used to meet democratic demands such as women's representation in parliament and racial and religious recognition because it prioritizes ability and quality (Kunovic & Paxton, 2005, p. 505; Noris & Lovendoski, 1995).

This system is divided into two rules that are used to select candidates for public office. Firstly, all citizens and party members have equal rights in the fight for public office (citizens and party members are equal) and secondly, only a few people or groups can become candidates (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 20; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008, p. 127). The methods for selecting candidates are as follows: (Hazan and Rahat, 2010)

**First**, candidacy, namely; a). age limit (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 24), b). Requirements for members of political parties (C, 2007).; c). Additional requirements; d). Incumbency (Gallagher & Marsh, 1998, p. 249). **Second**, Selectorate. In the second dimension, it is chosen, not chosen (selectorate). The more inclusive the selection mechanism, the more open the system will be because voters consist of party members, elites, and chairmen. The more exclusive, the elite and the party's general chairman will vote directly (Kennedy, 2009, p. 696; Arena & Nicoletti, 2014). The ability of the elite and the party chairman to judge which candidate is the right to be elected from the party is the consideration to be

elected. As stated by Best and Cotta, the selectorate choose candidates based on their electoral success, ideological fit, and practical function for the electorate, as well as their expected loyalty to the selectors' implicit and explicit expectations. Because the selectorate must both recruit and sell candidates to voters, the relative weight of factors varies. A selectorate's electoral support market share may be less important than expected loyalty or ideological fit.

Furthermore, Hazan and Rahat provide an overview with 5 kinds of selectorate systems, namely: (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, pp. 35-36):

- 1) The more inclusive the selectorate is, then all political party members have the same opportunity to act as voters or can determine candidates.
- 2) At the highest inclusiveness, political party members have the right to follow the process to become candidates for public office in any sector.
- 3) In a balanced position of selectorate between inclusive and exclusive, party members can follow the process of selecting candidates and determined by the party members themselves, but still based on the decisions of the elite or the party leader.
- 4) In the highest exclusivity, the electorate wants candidates to be elected directly by the political party elite or general chairman.
- 5) The more exclusive the electorate, the election is only determined by a handful of people.

Voters or voters in their distribution of types of voters in terms of an inclusive and exclusive system, namely: (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, pp. 39-40):

- 1) Non-partisan: allows voters to choose candidates from any party.
- 2) Blanket primaries: here voters are given a list of names of candidates from all parties and can vote. In non-partisans and blankets, voters are not entitled to give affiliation statements to the parties whose candidates they choose.
- 3) Open Primaries: the level of inclusiveness is less than the previous one, ie voters can vote, but only in the same party.
- 4) Semi-closed primaries: voters declare they are affiliated with which party only on election day or allow independent candidates to tell them which party they support.
- 5) Closed primaries: voters are registered based on affiliated parties and the party will choose candidates from those determined by affiliated parties.

*Third*, party members. A party oligarchy decided by the elite and the general chairperson cannot exist if party members are included in the selection of candidates (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 41). Thus, party members voting for candidates will increase transparency and accountability of public officials. In the exclusive system, party leaders and political party elites choose candidates for public office, not party members.

*Fourth*, the party elite is in determining candidates for public office. When it comes to rearranging the internal democratic values of political parties to make them more transparent to the public. Political party elites usually have the same

authority and influence as party members and voters. In an exclusive system, the role of political party elites in electing public officials is very large because their influence in political parties is very large. They are also highly electable in the eyes of the community. " (Hazan & Rahat, 2010)

*Fifth*, the party chairperson, the role of the party chairperson in determining the candidates is necessary to be held individually by the party leader himself. Most parties have implemented a policy of all decisions being made by the party leader (single party leader) (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 47). In an inclusive system, the chairman has equal rights with voters and party members, whereas in an exclusive system, the party leader is the sole determiner of candidate selection.

*Sixth*, decentralization. In general, Hazan and Rahat (2010) define decentralization as: "the extent to which the national level influences candidate selection, as opposed to the weight of the regional and/or local levels." We will argue that centralization is not limited to territorial issues, but also includes non-territorial issues like gender and minorities. Or, in general, is where the election is held, namely in the center or in the area. Because political parties have a hierarchical relationship between regional and national parties. Understanding this decentralized dimension can help candidates of any age or gender.

System relations are exclusive. The more central the electoral system is in public office, the more exclusive it is, and vice versa. Decentralization has two meanings in candidate selection: territorial and social (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 55). So long as it does not conflict with party principles and still aligns with the central party's goals, the branch's hierarchical relationship is considered a territorial dimension with special legitimacy to determine candidates for public office in their territory. "For example, it ensures representation for representatives of groups that are not defined territorially, such as trade unions, women, minorities, or even subgroups within these groups," say Hazan and Rahat (2010, p. 58).

Non-territorial decentralization can be found in a variety of representative concepts of the party, for example, the Islamic party will attract cadres who are ideologically Islamic as well, or the youth party that takes its cadres are young cadres too. The party leadership should provide more democratic progress towards the candidacy system. These advances include: First, the loss of the practice of presidential or absolute leadership by elites and party leaders. Second, to increase the professionalization of the elite and party chairmen not to elect candidates centrally with people who are close to party elites alone. Third, increase public funding to finance political party activities (cartelization) so that they are not trapped in the practice of money politics (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 40).

The overall dimension of decentralization is closely related to the hierarchical relationship between the central party and branch parties in different regions. The problem is that often the decision that has been determined by parties in the region to determine the candidate is then cancelled unilaterally by the central party because of very anonymous considerations. Even though the regional party knows more about the political situation that is developing in the region.


An inclusive system is more introduced to a decentralized system or the centralized authority for candidate selection, while a more exclusive system usually requires the election of candidates for public officials to be chosen centrally by the center held by elites and party leaders. This is also in line with the opinion of Hazan and Rahat that the logical consequence of the centralization of power to elect candidates, there will be a rebellion on the party in the region to the party at the center (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 42).

*Seventh*, appoint and voting system appointees are chosen by the party general chairman, while votes are cast by all party elements. Party systems vary in terms of appointment and voting, but some combine both (mixing system) (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 73). Even more, in the candidate selection, several important points need to be considered by political parties in the system of candidacy seen from the democratic dimension, as explained by Hazan and Rahat, namely: (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 87) participation, representation, competition, responsiveness.

This viewpoint is linked to the concept of representation in candidate selection, which requires political parties to be responsive and accountable to their voters (Eulau & Karps, 1977, pp. 242-246). Because this will influence voter perception of future public office candidates. "The rep responds. So he's not a free agent. He represents a 'constituency'" (Fiorina, 1974, p. 122).

These points show how political parties must run a good political system as an initial filter for political party cadres to become public officials. The concept seeks a credible system for every element of the candidate selection process, from the candidate to the constituents. The inclusive election includes voters and party members, whereas the exclusive election only includes party representatives and party elites as voters who can nominate ministers. The scheme explains that the more voters and party members participate in an inclusive election, the more inclined to an exclusive election (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 150).

On the one hand, political stability requires evenly distributing seats to the presidential party that wins the election (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 151). However, from a democratic perspective, the method of selecting exclusive public officials is not representative of the value of democracy based on equality. For this reason, there are several methods and suggestions given by Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat in three-stage candidates, namely (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 174):



In the first stage, the candidate must clear the selection committee to be

considered for the ministerial position. The party leader and the party elite select the minister during the screening committee stage. Then, selected parties' agencies filter based on ministerial criteria. This can include rejecting incumbents or candidates who break the law or ethics. The final stage of the exclusive electoral process will lead to democratic elections, where the candidate is chosen by the party members themselves. Because the party is seen as a bridge to power, it has the right to choose ministerial candidates based on the party's ideology and interests, as well as the community's support (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 175).

### **Conclusion**

The ministerial candidate system in Indonesia is exclusive because it is based on a system of determination by political parties over the selection of ministers which is very closed and based on an appointment system by party elites and party leaders. The closed election does not provide transparency of the criteria and the candidate's ability to become a minister. The election of ministers carried out by political parties produces ministers who are not experienced in making policy. The determination of ministerial candidates in Indonesia is not proportional, because the political element in determining ministerial candidates is very large. The political element is not balanced with the principles of democracy such as transparency and equality in achieving public office. The proportional form in determining ministers can be seen from the balance of political and democratic elements that exist in ministerial election procedures such as the procedure for selecting candidate criteria, everyone's participation in selecting candidates, and openness to the candidate selection process.

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