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### **SUHARTO'S RULE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEO DARWINIST BIOPOLITICS FOR THE PERIOD 1965-1971**

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#### **Abstract**

This article seeks to prove that the Neo Darwinist Biopolitical perspective can be used to analyze Suharto's rule in the period 1965-1971. The methodology used is qualitative in the form of a literature study which is used to support a new theoretical explanation of a phenomenon under study. The data used is taken through various books, journals, documents, newspaper news, both available offline and online. Researchers assume that various secondary data on Suharto's rule in the research period are available quite a lot. In order to explain Suharto's power using the Neo Darwinist Biopolitical theory, the researcher asked three research questions. First, how Suharto built power between 1965 and 1968 is associated with the concept of bonding, coalition formation, and dyadic hierarchy. Second, how Suharto's efforts to dominate national politics are associated with the concept of reproducing power in complex hierarchies, and inclusive fitness mechanisms. Third, why Suharto's asymmetrical dominance of the various political hierarchies that existed allowed him to create a political obedience that allowed the 1971 elections to support his power to ensure the predictability of the species. The novelty of the article is that in developing his power, Suharto was different from Sukarno, who in the biopolitical point of view, Suharto tended to absorb (absorb) the various complex hierarchies that existed into his power while Sukarno tended to centralize power with the focus was to defeat the political forces that opposed him frontally. Another finding is that the authoritarianism developed by Suharto was an automatic choice (default option) and caused the state to avoid anarchy due to the continuous competition between political forces such as the Sukarno era

#### **Keywords**

Biopolitics, Neo Darwinists, Suharto, Domination, Submission, Power

## Introduction

Sukarno came to power on the basis of a balance of political power.<sup>1</sup> Some Islamic forces half-heartedly support it, others oppose it.<sup>2</sup> The leadership and masses of nahdlatul ulama (NU) in rural areas were involved in a dispute with the PKI masses due to the interpretation of agrarian reform (*landreform*).<sup>3</sup> The upheavals surrounding Sukarno's presidency were largely triggered by conflicts that resulted in ideological tensions between political forces.<sup>4</sup> The opposition stems primarily from the paradoxical Nasakom doctrine.<sup>5</sup> Religious groups turned out to be difficult to coexist with communist groups.<sup>6</sup> In the early half of the 1960s, conflicts between the PKI mob against the NU mob and the Indonesian Muslim Shura' Assembly (Masyumi) were rife.<sup>7</sup> Although NU is willing to be a pillar of Nasakom, their willingness is more forced than supportive.<sup>8</sup> The idea of *landreform*, which was interpreted unilaterally by the PKI, became increasingly aggressive towards santri landowners (affiliated with NU and Masyumi) as well as *priayi* (affiliated with the PNI).<sup>9</sup>

In addition to *landreform*, other PKI campaigns such as *Ganyang Kabir* and the eradication of the *Seven Village Demons* have also disturbed rural communities<sup>10</sup> and encouraged the NU, Masyumi, and PNI mobs to engage in various physical clashes with the PKI mob.<sup>11</sup> The dispute over plantation arable land in the name of the *landreform* program followed by unilateral PKI action

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<sup>1</sup> Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" *Asian Survey*. 1964. Vol. 4, No. 9 (Sep.) pp. 1058-1070, p. 1059

<sup>2</sup> J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy." 1961. *Australian Outlook*. 15:3, pp. 260-279. p.262-3.

<sup>3</sup> Olle Tornquist, *Destruction of the PKI*. Translator: Harsutejo. Depok: Bamboo Community, 2017. pp. 159-176. Selo Soemardjan wrote that the problem *Reform* this is also suspected to be derived from its lack of anticipation Court *Reform* in overcoming the turmoil that arose due to the interpretation of the Basic Agrarian Law compiled by the government, with the PKI as its main supporters. See Selo Soemardjan. *Landreform in Indonesia*. 1962. *Asian Survey*. Vol. 1, No. 12 (Feb.) pp. 23-30, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> To date, the main reference to ideological rivalry in Indonesia of the 1960s is based on Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> If Nasakomil added military force then became Nasakomil, a proposed term J.A.C. Mackie. See Mackie, "English..." *Op. Cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>6</sup> Remy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism*. Translated by Jeremy Desmond. Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2015, pp. 212-214.

<sup>7</sup> Justus van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia." *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Apr., 1958), pp. 49-63. p. 57-8.

<sup>8</sup> Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia." 1957. *Far Eastern Survey*. Vol. 26, No. 8 (Aug.) pp. 113-124., p.115-6.

<sup>9</sup> Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism." 1969. *Indonesian*. No. 8 (Oct.) pp. 1-20. p. 11-18.

<sup>10</sup> Ernst Utrecht, "Class Struggle and Politics in Java." 1972. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*. 2:3 pp. 274-282., p. 274.

<sup>11</sup> Mass identifying with parties based on flow. In Bali there are PSI villages, PNI villages, or in Java and Bali there are "kompak NU" or "kompak PNI" villages which means that other party members are not welcome to operate there. See Ernst Utrecht, "Class Struggle...", *Op. Cit.* p. 277-8.

encouraged the TNI-AD to take an aggressive stance in politics.<sup>12</sup> Approaching October 1965 the conflict between the TNI-AD and the PKI intensified, while Sukarno tried to continue to strengthen his position by supporting the PKI to overcome the growing influence of the TNI-AD.<sup>13</sup> Sukarno's fragile power base then collapsed triggered by the G30S/PKI and Suharto began his rule (Aydin, 2020; Bakan, 2020).

Suharto's role in Indonesian politics was strengthened by the issuance of the March 11, 1966 Warrant (Supersemar). General Soeharto's position was also strengthened by the Army Seminar II in Bandung, which outlined the concept of Dwifungsi ABRI, political stability, and economic development. Suharto's presidency also received the support of various anti-PKI and US civilian political forces.<sup>14</sup> The most real base of General Soeharto's power was in the TNI-AD. However, the military corps cannot be a contestant of the Elections (Bezwan, 2021).

Pemilu's delay gave Suharto time to reproduce power. In addition to ensuring that Sekber Golkar was under his domination, he also reorganized the armed forces.<sup>15</sup> After that, he took advantage of the functional group program that had been implemented since the Sukarno era. This kind of assumption is revealed in an analysis of General Soeharto's political behavior which is explained as follows:

"... the strengthening of Suharto's power was carried out in a subtle manner and as much as possible had a constitutional and juridical basis. It is this caution and vigilance of his allegedly a great influence on his ability to devise a comprehensive, detailed and complex strategy ... It puts forward norms, views of life, good and bad standards, right and wrong, beautiful and not beautiful, to bureaucratic procedures and patterns of behavior ... this is done *out of a violent way*."<sup>16</sup>

The description of Suharto above for one hand explains the behavior driven by environmental factors (*nurture*) over Suharto's rule. However, there is an aspect of "violence" that is *nature* in human power in general, and Suharto in particular, which needs to be explained specifically. Therefore, it is interesting to discuss power related to the combination of elements of *nature* and *nurture* in Suharto's political behavior in controlling Indonesian politics.

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<sup>12</sup> Justus van der Kroef, "Peasant and Land Reform in Indonesian Communism." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*. 1963. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar.) pp. 31-67., p. 54.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Ebon, "Indonesian Communism: From Failure to Success." *The Review of Politics*. 1963. Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan.), pp. 91-109. p.104.

<sup>14</sup> John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and the Suharto Coup*. Translator: Hersri Setiawan. Jakarta: ISSI & Hasta Mitra, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> David Reeve, *Golkar Lost History: Roots of Thought & Dynamics*. Translator: Gatot Triwira. Depok: Bamboo Community, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Nice Takwin, Niniek L. Karim, and Hamdi Grandiose, *Soeharto The Elixir of Intelligence and a Visible Childhood: A Study of the Relationship between Soeharto's Personality factors and Political Behavior*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2001. pp. 27-8. Italics by the author article.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Thus, it is necessary to find a perspective that can explain the problem of domination, the creation of Suharto's dominant hierarchy. Sebab, this article chooses to use the biopolitical perspective.<sup>17</sup> Key in understanding Biopolitics is the concept of survival of the most adaptable party (*survival of the fittest*) of Charles Darwin modified by Biological scientists known as Neo-Darwinists.<sup>18</sup> In the political science field, Biopolitics is now divided into two major currents as described in Figure 1 *Two Branches of Biopolitics*.




Figure 1 Two Branches

There are two Biopolitical groups, with which one group utilizes the findings and research techniques of Neo-Darwinist biologists to analyze political symptoms, while the other group utilizes Michel Foucault's philosophy to deduce government influence, both regulation and action they, on the biological condition of citizens.<sup>19</sup> Biopolitics in this article falls into the first category, which is to use various research results of Neo-Darwinist biologists in analyzing political behavior.

In Neo-Darwinist Biopolitics (hereinafter referred to as Biopolitics only), the interaction between the concepts of Biology and Politics is most commonly explained through the concept of neurobiology, namely the *Interactive Brain Model*

<sup>17</sup> The term Biopolitics was first used in 1938 by Morley Roberts. The first political scientist to use was Lynton Caldwell in 1964. On the sponsorship of ipsa in 1975 a group of scientists led by Albert Somit presented *paper* Titled *Biology and Politics*. Organizationally, the center for biopolitical studies was founded Thomas Wiegale in 1980 in *Northern Illinois University* named *Center for Biopolitics* through funding *Scaife Foundation*. This study center organizes master's and doctoral programs in Biopolitics. See Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines Jr., *Biology and Political Science*. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 6-8.

<sup>18</sup> Concept *survival of the fittest* was indeed popularized by Charles Darwin. However, the person who first discussed the concept was Herbert Spencer in his work *The Synthetic Philosophy* (1886). See Farizqa Ayuluqyana Putri, "What Is Survival of the Fittest and Its Meaning in the Theory of Evolution" December 21, 2020. Retrieved from <<https://tirto.id/apa-itu-survival-of-the-fittest-dan-maksudnya-di-teori-evolusi-f8oZ>> June 27, 2021 at 14:02.

<sup>19</sup> **Draw 1** made for gives a second overview two Biopolitical groups.

of Behavior, proposed by Robert H. Blank and Samuel J. Hines as presented in Figure 2.<sup>20</sup>




Figure2 Interactive Brain Model of Behaviour

Source: Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines, Jr., *Biology and Political Science*. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 85.

In the scheme in the context of such neurobiology, it is stated that the control center of the behavior of living beings is the brain. In order for the brain to continue to develop, it always requires constant stimulation from the environment. Without sensory inputs and intellectual challenges from the environment, the natural potential (*nature*) of the brain will not develop optimally. In addition to requiring environmental stimulation, brain development is also controlled by natural factors (*nature*) which are genetic.

Genetic factors related to the innate element (*innate*) blueprint are found in the *Deoxyribonucleic Acid* (DNA) of the species. Neo-Darwinist biologists disagreed with Charles Darwin because they assumed that the physical features and properties of genes would change when interactions with the environment occurred.<sup>21</sup> The result of the interaction between genetic factors (genotype, which maintains *nature*, is closed but not sterile environmental influences) and the environment (phenotype, which is open to the environment but cannot be separated from genetic factors) acts as a natural trigger for the actions of living beings, in particular large primates both *Homo Sapiens* and non *Homo Sapiens*.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines, Jr., *Biology and Political Science*. London: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 83-5.

<sup>21</sup> This is the difference between Charles Darwin and the Neo Darwinist Biologist. Darwin in his time had not analyzed the problem of genetics, while the Biologo-Darwinists had used population genetics to reinforce Darwin's theory of evolution.

<sup>22</sup> As a result of the influence of these two aspects, living beings show mixed behavior between aspects *Nature* at once *nurture*. Therefore, the nodes blank and Hines, the brain is the main mediator whose function depends on aspects of the genotype and phenotype.

It was this study of Blank and Hines that later served as the basis for biopolitical analysis around the initial triggers of human political behavior.<sup>23</sup>

Still in the explanatory flow in terms of the idea that the brain is the center of the behavioral regulator of action, Arnold M. Ludwig also explained that the flow of political information processes within the brain, specifically occurs within the limbic and hypothalamic systems.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the neocortex structure,<sup>25</sup> the limbic system is the most ancient part of the structure of the human brain and is equally shared by all mammals:

*"... politics seems to be the one most rooted in primitive primate behavior ... the striving for political power seems fueled more by secretions from man's nether parts – his gonads and adrenal glands – as well as activity from within the limbic system and hypothalamus, the most ancient parts of the brain, all of which deal with such instinctive responses as fight-or-flight, territoriality, aggression, sex, and survival ... many would-be rulers seem to rely more on cunning, courage, physical prowess, deception, and power tactics to ascend the social hierarchy and gain ultimate power ... becoming a ruler requires no special academic training ... or superior intellect... that is why charisma, oratory, manipulation, and intimidation are often more important than wisdom, special expertise, and administrative experience."*<sup>26</sup>

Politics as an action is among the oldest behaviors driven by brain structures that are also the oldest. Politics is concerned with the various instinctive responses of individuals in order to maintain their lives within a group. Many rulers achieve power through the instinct of acting in the form of courage, cunning, deception, and tactical power, so as to be able to seize power.<sup>27</sup>

In the context of Suharto's behavior, from a biopolitical point of view, General Soeharto after the G30S/PKI can be assumed to be more courageous and manipulative in acting than other high-ranking officers who were influential at that time, including Nasution. Kendati Nasution could have been individually more intelligent, conceptual, and more intellectual, but he did not act much in the critical moments post October 1, 1965. The process of managing information in General Soeharto's limbic system seemed to work more dominantly, so he dared to face the most dominant political individual (*alpha male*) at that time, namely Sukarno,

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<sup>23</sup> Motivational studies *innate* and aspects *Nature* human behavior is referred to from Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. See Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Human Ethology*. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. The study was first published by Transaction Publishers in 1989.

<sup>24</sup> Arnold M. Ludwig, *Kings of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002, p. 4-5. In particular the gonadal and adrenal glands.

<sup>25</sup> The neocortex is the result of more advanced evolution of the human brain, other large primates are not as advanced. Neocortex is concerned with science (information gathering, problem solving, and reasoning) or art (creative expression, intuition, and various special skills), including culture. Studies describing superiority *Homo Sapiens* resulting from the fusion *Nature* and *nurture* can be seen in Yuval Noah Harari, *Sapiens*. Translator: Yanto Mustopha. Mold 1. South Tangerang: Alvabet, 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Arnold M. Ludwig, *Kings...*, *Op. Cit.* p. 4-5.

<sup>27</sup> In the study, Ludwig in the already mentioned book, analyzed the political behavior of the 1941 rulers before coming to this conclusion. The thing Ludwig was trying to emphasize was, that daLam fact politics is always concerned with critical conditions, those with great instinctive tendencies can generally be more successful than those who do a lot of consideration.

as well as the PKI, the party he protected. When facing Both Sukarno and the PKI, General Soeharto's choice was only two, namely fight or flight and he chose the first one.

Thus, from an ethological point of view, cultural aspects (*nurture*) such as laws and regulations are only temporary in curbing human natural instincts. For this reason, various rules and ethics of political behavior – which are *nurture* – must continue to be created and modified to curb the tendency of human behavior that appears to be biased towards *the* nature of the innate results of the evolutionary process.

Another biopolitical exponent in ethological studies is Johan M.G. van der Dennen who pretty much observes the behavior of large groups of primates directly within their natural habitat.<sup>28</sup> He also stated that the inheritance of the genetics of the behavior he found to be a kind of "burden inseparable" during the process of human evolution.<sup>29</sup> The dominance in the group of animals in a certain degree also takes place in the human group. Domination and what impact it has on species in biopolitics described Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson as follows:<sup>30</sup>

"... *dominance is normally defined as a relationship, among members of the same species, in which there is a high probability that the dominant animal will have preferential access to some good to which its fellow species also aspire. The desired good may be of almost any sort --- food, shelter, a reproductive partner, a territory, a preferred seating place and, by no means least of all, deference.*"<sup>31</sup>

Dominance is the relationship between members of one species where the most dominant individual (*alpha male*) always has privileged access to social commodities of value and desirable *contenders*. At the end of 1965, of course, Sukarno was still more dominant than Suharto. However, the momentum of the G30S/PKI opened up opportunities for Suharto to seize dominance. As a first step Suharto removed the PKI (a supporter of Sukarno's rule) and then together with his coalition formation he carried out domination over Sukarno. With Sukarno giving a submission, Suharto managed to access the power that was once in Sukarno's hands so that his position now has the status of a new *alpha male*.

The next issue was how Suharto seized the dominance. Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson explains those ways:

"*Dominance is achieved in a variety of ways, depending upon the species and the specific situation. Taking the animal kingdom as a whole, actual physical*

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<sup>28</sup> Johan M.G. van der Dennen, "The Biopolitics ..., *op.cit.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Albert Somit completed his Ph.D. from Chicago University and then served as president of Southern Illinois University offering master's and doctoral programs in Biopolitics. He was the first chairman of the 12th Research Committee in 1973 for the study of Biology and Politics in *International Political Science Association (IPSA)* until the formal recognition of this study in 1975. He also is *editorial board* journal *Politics and Life Sciences*. He died on August 2, 2020, aged 100. See also Steven A. Peterson, 2021. "In Memoriam: Albert Somit, PhD." *Politics and Life Sciences*. Spring, Vol. 40, No. 1) pp. 133-4.

<sup>31</sup> Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, *The Failure ... Op. Cit.*, p. 11. The most dominant individuals are called *alpha-male*. See also *Appendix* on Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, "From Human Nature ..., *Op. Cit.* Pp. 13-15.

*combat is perhaps the least common method, since it carries with it the danger of serious injury or death to one or even both of the contestants. More frequently, dominance is established by threat and display, with the smaller of less formidable looking individual yielding to a larger and more fearsome opponent. This outcome benefits both participants: for the dominant, there is no physical risk; for the subordinate, the short-term loss of status and/or access to a desired good may well be offset, in the long run, by the opportunity to grow older, stronger, and more fearsome --- and perhaps eventually to reverse the relationship ... alliance with one or more fellow con-species is yet another technique for achieving a more dominant status. "*<sup>32</sup>

There are three ways to achieve dominance, namely through physical combat, show of strength and threat, and building alliances. Physical combat can have an impact on maximum losses for both the *alpha male* and his challenger. The results of observations made on the primate group showed that *display* and threat were the preferred way. In dibecause the losses for both parties tend to be more minimal. Another way of achieving dominance is through the building of alliances that are often observed to be built by individual challengers.<sup>33</sup>

In dominating Sukarno, submissions were obtained not through physical battles but through threats, shows of force, and coalition formations formed through alliances due to equal interests. Just like the tendency of the primate group, this method is less risky to loss while the profit will be maximized.<sup>34</sup> Suharto showed his strength through the formation of a coalition that was built through his various alliances in the form of student demonstrations, Islamic groups, and radical TNI-AD officers. The threat against Sukarno was demonstrated by General Soeharto through a series of arrests of PKI leaders, arrests of Sukarno's bonders,<sup>35</sup> and physical attacks on PKI cadres and their affiliated organizations. Suharto wanted to show the *alpha male the status quo* that he was able to disband the PKI that had been protected. The reason why Suharto dominated Sukarno was with threats, shows of strength, and the establishment of alliances that materialized into the coalition formation was due to the relative support of Sukarno.<sup>36</sup>

In contrast to his dominance over the PKI, which was relatively weaker than Sukarno, Suharto chose physical combat.<sup>37</sup> Suharto ordered a series of arrests and perhaps even the assassination of leaders and members of the PKI and

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<sup>32</sup> Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Failure...*, *Op. Cit.* p. 11-2.

<sup>33</sup> Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" ... *loc.cit.*

<sup>34</sup> In the primate world a show of force is carried out by straightening the body, pulling out and throwing branches of plants, or patting the chest. Threats are carried out by modifying the facial mimic, straightening body hair, or maneuvering body movements as if to injure the opponent.

<sup>35</sup> They are for example Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh, or Jusuf Muda Dalam.

<sup>36</sup> Sukarno was still quite popular in parts of the Javanese population and officers, especially the KKO, AL, AK, AU, as well as a number of army officers in the Brawijaya and Diponegoro Divisions.

<sup>37</sup> The term battle may not be suitable because most PKI members are unarmed. However, in some areas, communist groups carried out armed resistance as was the case in Operation Trident and a number of other military operations on the island of Borneo against the PGRS/Paraku and the Rewang-Wijayasastra faction.



leaders of its affiliated organizations. It can be briefly stated that Suharto dominated Sukarno through show of strength, threats, and alliances, while against the PKI he did so through physical force.<sup>38</sup>

The next issue is what the benefits of having a dominance for the species are. Somit and Peterson stated that dominance would be able to create predictability so that the opportunity for species to reproduce si was more likely:

*"Dominance relations yield predictability. Individuals soon learn where they stand with one another with respect to access to valued resources. As consequence, there is no need constantly to dispute who is to get what, disputes that, at best, would entail repeated and possibly substantial investments of energy and, at worst, repeated risks of injury or death ... Dominance furthers predictability and predictability, in turn, benefits both the dominant and the subordinate. The former gains the desired resource... at no greater cost than a possible threat or two; the subordinate, by yielding, escapes a clash that might otherwise reduce or literally end his/her reproductive possibilities."*<sup>39</sup>

According to Somit and Peterson, dominance results in predictability. Species predictability is the certainty of each individual's position in accessing resources and reproductively. Each party tends to understand their respective positions as well as their feasibility in terms of access to valuable commodities, including reproduction under clear hirarchys conditions. With the predictability of the species, there is no longer a protracted dispute, the continuous waste of energy, the risk of physical injury, and even death.

The advantages of domination for species in general, or in this context the success of Suharto's domination of Sukarno for the political system and the Indonesian people, are explained through the opinions of Somit and Peterson as follows:

*"A society beset with continuing turmoil is not conducive to reproductive success. The more orderly mode of life generated by the type of predictability ... a stable, peaceful society is more apt to lead to individual reproductive success than one in continuing upheaval as a result of constant fighting over status and resources."*<sup>40</sup>

Dominance allows for the implementation of reproduction, both for the dominant individual in particular and for the species in general. By following the somit and Peterson's mindset, the conditions of upheaval in society are believed to never benefit species in a population. Species need predictability and predictability can only be created if full dominance is successfully established. Without Suharto's dominance, Indonesia will continue to be in a state of upheaval (*turmoil*) so that it is difficult for the Indonesian people to access resources (food, clothing, and shelter) as well as reproduce (work for a living).

The short-term problem that Suharto has been trying to solve since 1966 is

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<sup>38</sup> This includes murder, sending to concentration camps, or imprisonment with or without trial.

<sup>39</sup> Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Failure...*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>40</sup> Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Failure...*, *loc.cit.*

*economic resuscitation*.<sup>41</sup> Under Suharto's dominance, the economic technocrats he had known since studying at SSKAD sought to overcome four economic problems.<sup>42</sup> To ensure that this problem is resolved, stable political conditions are needed so that the cabinet can work to make improvements.<sup>43</sup> With the work of these economic technocrats, the spike in inflation, which has increased since mid-1961 and every year commodity prices have doubled, began to show a slowdown.<sup>44</sup>

From 1968 to 1971, the reproduction for Suharto's rule seems more complicated. Pro-Sukarno elements in both civilian and military political power were assumed to still exist plus the rupture of the Soeharto coalition formation of 1965-1968. On the other hand, there was a revival of the old Masyumi and the PNI, while the PKI continued to carry out sporadic resistance in a number of areas. New hierarchies emerged that challenged Suharto's rule.

For Somit and Peterson, hierarchy is a tendency to stratify various groups of large primates, including humans. But for both, hierarchy in a population has a number of variations, namely simple (*dyadic*) and complex (complex), with the following explanation:

"... in simple, small primate societies, dominance usually lead to 'linear' hierarchies, with each animal ranked from up (alpha) to bottom (omega). But in more complex societies ... several animals may unite in an alliance or a coalition so that they wind up on top --- even though some of them might otherwise rank much lower purely on the basis of dyadic (one to one, simple dominance) relations. Dominance hierarchies in these societies, consequently, are not simply the sum of all dyadic relations ... whether a society is characterized by a linear hierarchy or by a more complex coalition structure, the net result is essentially the same."<sup>45</sup>

In the 1965-1968 phase, Suharto's problem was in the context of *the dyadic hierarchy*. Suharto focused on the issue of how to dominate Sukarno by first dominating the PKI. After the problems in the *dyadic* hierarchy were resolved,

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<sup>41</sup> It consists of resolving the stagnation of clothing-food production such as food, clothing, including basic necessities of life (perhaps such as basic necessities). In addition, another effort is to intensify exports while handling the occurrence of *Bottlenecks* in these activities due to inadequate export infrastructure. The improvement of export infrastructure includes the provision of raw materials, *spare-parts*, and the authorized capital is minimal for the sector. Included in this urgent issue is the provision of *Shelter* or a place of residence for residents.

<sup>42</sup> SIn addition to inflation, the four most critical problems of the Indonesian economy are food supply, rehabilitation of economic infrastructure, improvement of export facilities, and the sufficiency of clothing supply. See Mohammad Uzair, Economic Development of Indonesia. 1970. *Pakistan Horizon*. Vol. 23, No. 2 (Second Quarter), pp. 123-137, p. 127. See also Hong Lan Oei, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Rehabilitation Program: An Evaluation. 1968. *Indonesian*. Vol. 5, Apr., pp. 135-174., p. 140-141.

<sup>43</sup> See Government Budget on Its Relationship with National Income, 1960-1977 in Hong Lan Oei, Indonesia's Economic ..., *Op. Cit.* p. 143. i.e.: 173.7% (1965); 617.8% (q-1 1966); 411.3% (q-2 1966); 68.9% (q-3 1966); 55.4% (q-4 1966); 7.7% (q-1 1967); and 14.3% (q-2) 1967.

<sup>44</sup> In 1964 it was 118%; in 1965 it was 380%; in 1966 it was 860%; in 1967 it was 170%. In 1966 the percentage of inflation soared due to the political turmoil of the transition of the old regime to the new regime. See K.D. Thomas and J. Panglaykim, Indonesia's Development Cabinet, Background to Current Problems and the Five Year Plan. 1969. *Asian Survey*. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Apr.), pp. 223-238., pp. 223-225.

<sup>45</sup> Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Failure...*, *loc.cit.*

his previous coalition formations built new hierarchies that challenged his rule.

His former alliances now create their own hierarchies complete with their own dominant individuals and followers. Suharto's choice was not to eliminate all the increasingly prominent hierarchies but to dominate them. Somit and Peterson explain that anek hierarchy in complex societies cannot be simply expressed as the sum of the overall number of *dyadic relationships*. As a result, it was difficult for Suharto to create a single hierarchy which was simply expressed as the result of the sum of all existing *dyadic* hierarchies. It is impossible for hirarki Masyumi, NU, PNI, to be united into a single hierarchy by the way That Suharto disbanded them first and then led them.<sup>46</sup>

The issue of why Suharto needed to create a dominant hierarchy in the midst of a complex hierarchy, can be explained through the opinions of Somit and Peterson as follows:

*"Hierarchy leads to social stability, and stability – on balance – is conducive to more successful reproduction among members of that society. Hierarchy, an outgrowth of dominance relations among a social species, functions to enhance the likelihood that the individuals who constitute that species will optimize their inclusive fitness. The direct benefit is to the individual – but the group and, ultimately the species may itself also gain thereby."*<sup>47</sup>

Same with the attempted domination in hirarki *dyadic*, jawabannya is to create political stability. However, Suharto's scope is not only his own hierarchy but other hierarchies that are different from his own hirarki. The phase of upheaval (*turmoil*) will subside if a dominant hierarchy is successfully implemented. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how Suharto created the dominant hierarchy in the midst of complex hierarchy.

### Writing Methods

This research is included in the Qualitative research methodology, which is a research procedure that produces qualitative descriptive data in the form of written or spoken words from people and observed behaviors. This methodology was chosen because the researcher will interpret the data found in the <sup>48</sup>writing process, in accordance with the efforts to answer the research questions. This methodology was also chosen because of the nuances of objectivity, that is, the assessment of data according to the research flow, will have an impact on the interpretation of the data collected. In addition, this methodology was used because the element of depth of interpretation was needed in analyzing Suharto's power in the Biopolitical Perspective of the period 1965 – 1971.

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<sup>46</sup> If it is done then resistance will be high and civil war is not impossible.

<sup>47</sup> Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Failure...*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup> Steven J. Taylor, Robert Bogdan and Marjorie DeVault, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Guidebook and Resource*. 4th Edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2016. Pp. 7 – 11.

## Discussion

Roger D. Masters identified seven human political behaviors, some of which are a combination of *aspects of nature* and *nurture* that are indicated both among large nonhuman primates (gorillas, bonobos, or chimpanzees) and humans. Masters' findings – as well as the views of other biopolitical experts – around the primate's political behavior are interesting to formulate a research problem in this article, which, in his explanation, will be attributed to Suharto's behavior while in power.

The first behavior is *bonding* or social ties that is the tendency of human beings to form bonds with other members who are considered close within a group.<sup>49</sup> The second behavior is competition (*competition*) and aggression (*aggression*).<sup>50</sup> The third behavior is dispute resolution (*dispute settlement*), provision of guarantees (*reassurance*) and sharing. The fourth behavior is dominance and social control. The fifth behavior is subordination (*subordination*) and avoidance (*flight*).<sup>51</sup> The sixth behavior is *coalition formation* and *strategic behavior*.<sup>52</sup> The seventh behavior is individual "personality", social roles, and sex.<sup>53</sup> These differences in personality encourage the creation of differences in their social roles as mentioned earlier, including in their reproductive problems.<sup>54</sup>

Suharto's personality allowed him to confront Sukarno, and other individuals such as Nasution, Sukendro, or H.R. Dharsono could not necessarily do so. Suharto's social role as the "second man of Yani" allowed him to lead the TNI-AD without much protest from other senior officers. Suharto, who tends to be considered a minor officer and reluctant to engage in polemics, makes himself difficult to guess. With his individual personality and social role that was considered calm, cold, and full of calculations, it turned out that later Suharto was able to reproduce power in the direction that his instincts wanted.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> This behavior encourages individuals to identify themselves more only with other individuals who are considered close only to then show an attitude suspicious against individuals who are perceived as "outsiders." See Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" in *Primate Politics*, Glendon Schubert and Roger D. Masters, eds. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991. p. 234.

<sup>50</sup> See Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" ... *loc.cit.*

<sup>51</sup> Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" ... *Op. Cit.* p. 235.

<sup>52</sup> Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" ... *Op. Cit.* p. 235.

<sup>53</sup> Roger D. Masters, "Conclusion" ... *Op. Cit.*, p. 234-5.

<sup>54</sup> A full review of individual tendencies in primate species can be seen in Franz de Waal, *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes*. Revised Edition. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998. Especially in the First Chapter "Personalities" and Chapter Four "Sexual Privileges."

<sup>55</sup> In the natural world, each individual in the species exhibits different characteristics in terms of individual personality and social role. For example *alpha male* the silver-backed gorilla is different from *alpha male* bonobos in attracting the opposite sex, with similarities in the presence of attempts to attract potential partners. Male bonobos are more subject to female herds than masculine silver-backed male gorillas. A variety of social roles, particularly those related to gender and age, can be filled with a variety of individuals with different 'personalities' or response styles. Senior individuals in the group focus on the upbringing of young individuals while young males in the territorial guarding of the group habitat. Many varieties of human behavior that were originally considered unique are now found in a number of primate species so that it is stated that there are *biogrammar* which is co-owned.

Based on the biopolitical perspective that has been elaborated, the problem can now be narrowed down. As a *contender*, Suharto tended to build bonding to face Sukarno as the most dominant individual (*alpha male*) at that time. From a biopolitical perspective, this needs to be done considering that Sukarno was the dominant individual that he could not face alone. *The bonding* that Suharto built was based on the similarity of views between them that the predictability of species in Sukarno's hierarchy, that is, a stable social order as a condition for species to survive, was insignificant. Indonesia's political life is colored by ideological conflicts that affect the mass level marked by various clashes between pro-communist and anti-communist elements.

The construction of this *bonding* was also in accordance with the *individual personalities* that were innate in Suharto, who from the time he left the military and until he became the Commander of mandala, tended to build small groups in his efforts to face various physical battles. Thus, when facing Sukarno in the *dyadic* and complex hierarchy afterwards, General Soeharto also showed a similar behavior, namely relying on the performance of his *bonders* and building coalitions with the alliances with interests that are in line with him.

In addition to his *bonding*, Suharto also formed a coalition formation with individuals and groups outside of *bonding* based on common interests. However, if Suharto's *bonding* is relatively the same when he is competing in a *dyadic* and complex hierarchy, then his coalition formation tends to change. The formation of the coalition when Suharto was in the stage of power competition in *the dyadic* hierarchy (facing Sukarno) was with Islamic groups both affiliated with NU and Masyumi, students, as well as Army officers such as Kemal Idris, H.R. Dharsono, as well as Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. This formation changed when Suharto was in the context of competition within the complex hierarchy with which his coalition formation was formed between the Seskoad Civil-Military Circle, Lingakaran Soeharto Centric, and Pater Beek Circle.

In the stage of competition in a complex hierarchy, Suharto tried to reproduce his power to make it even bigger. The most important reproduction is carried out within the core base of its own power, namely the Army.<sup>1</sup> Other reproductions more broadly took place in the body of the armed forces so that they could be at the top of the Indonesian military. In addition, General Soeharto needs to ensure that two civilian political forces that have great potential to challenge him, namely The Islamic and Nationalist groups, are willing to give him political submissions. On the other hand, Suharto reproduced power at the civilian level through the empowerment of the Golkar Secretary as a basis for political support for his needs in the face of elections.

The reproduction of Suharto's power into various existing hierarchies is also supported by the existence of an *inclusive fitness* mechanism which is an instinctive human impulse to survive in the midst of the environment that changed. The changing environment is a new current in national politics. If in the Sukarno era the current was anti-Neocolonialism and Imperialism, then in

the Soeharto era the current was the Trilogy of Development. The Development Trilogy became synonymous with Suharto's power politics because he emphasized that the current (The Development Trilogy) must also be understood and supported by all forces politics in Indonesia, which includes equitable development, economic development, and national stability. Thus, if every political force is to continue to survive in the era of Suharto's rule, then every existing political hierarchy along with the dominant individual in it was voluntary or forced to accept the Development Trilogy emphasized by Suharto.

Finally, Suharto's success in reproducing his power into various other hierarchies was able to create *political obedience* which was well manifested by a series of laws relating to with elections, the campaign practices of the Golkar Secretary supported by Suharto, as well as the results of the 1971 elections that succeeded in confirming the victory of the Golkar Secretary as well as a form of Suharto's dominance in national politics. *This political obedience* was then also used by Suharto to ensure the predictability of species in the group (Indonesian people). To summarize the problems in this article, an analysis framework was created as contained in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3. Scheme of Thinking

Source: Writers

This article answers three research questions. First, how Suharto built power between 1965 and 1968 is associated with the concept of bonding, coalition formation, and dyadic hierarchy. Second, how Suharto's efforts to dominate national politics are associated with the concept of reproducing power in complex hierarchies, and inclusive fitness mechanisms. Third, why Suharto's asymmetrical dominance of the various political hierarchies that existed allowed him to create a political obedience that allowed the 1971 elections to support his power to ensure the predictability of the species.

To answer the first question, researchers have put forward a proposition stating that from 1965 to 1968, Suharto dominated Sukarno using his *bonding* and coalition formations to end the dualism of the national leadership in the *dyadic* hierarchy, which before obtaining the submission of Sukarno and his supporters, Suharto first dominated the PKI and its affiliated organizations. This proposition has not been so precise in the attempt to answer the first question so it should be given a number of more detailed notes. First, the dualism of the national leadership did not immediately take place since October 1, 1965 between Sukarno and Suharto. After the outbreak of the G30S/PKI, the main problem faced by Suharto was the leadership in the TNI-AD. There are still rivals such as General A.H. Nasution who is of higher rank and has experience. In addition, Sukarno was still able to intervene in the Indonesian Army, for example appointing Pranoto Reksosamudro as *Yani's caretaker* even though he was later rejected by Suharto. Thus, Sukarno-Soeharto's *dyadic* hierarchy was not immediately created after October 1, 1965. Dualism only began to surface after mass movements by a number of action groups demanding the dissolution of the PKI, and thereafter, stepped into efforts to reduce Sukarno's authority. The fact that most corroborates the dualism of the national leadership was after Suharto received a Warrant of March 11, 1966 from Sukarno.

Suharto's important bonding in this phase was Yoga Sugama, Ali Moertopo, and Sudjono Hoemardhani. Yoga Sugama was *bonding* with special competence in intelligence matters, and even became the first Suharto subordinate to dare to conclude that the September 30th Movement involved PKI leaders. Yoga's understanding of the configuration of officers' political orientation, coupled with his analyses of the Chusus Bureau's infiltration of middle and high-level officers, gave Suharto an overview of how to easily decide on post-G30S/PKI actions.

In addition to Yoga, Ali Moertopo, who was quite adept at understanding civil political movements, greatly assisted Suharto in monitoring the public reaction to the PKI and to Sukarno. Ali was able to enter political penetration to the radical mass power figures at that time who began to take issue with Sukarno's leadership such as Pater Beek's circle and radical politicians from NU, namely Subchan Zaenuri Ershan, as well as of course the Indonesian Student Action Unit (KAMI). The mappings carried out by Ali Moertopo then greatly helped Suharto in deciding which civilian group he should cooperate with and who his opponents were. Meanwhile, Sudjono Hoemardhani's role, in addition to his religious beliefs, also provided the necessary funding for the movement of Suharto's forces as well as facilitating groups of civilian demonstrators.

During the elimination of the PKI, Suharto did so not without obstacles. Soon after the party was declared banned by Suharto, who was in charge of Supersemar, the

PKI changed their movement pattern to underground. After D.N. Aidit and other Politburo Daily Councils were successfully overthrown, new PKI leaderships soon emerged such as the Rewang-Ruslan Wijayasastra faction which emphasized armed struggle in the Central and East Java regions. In addition, the PKI also formed various new organs to adapt the party structure according to repressive conditions due to Suharto's military pressures. In addition, at least until 1966 Sudisman himself as the Daily Council of the Politburo succeeded in implementing a new political strategy for the PKI in the "underground" to prepare for the opening of opportunities for the resurgence of the party. During Suharto's time, the PKI's power continued to move, for example by holding sporadic attacks, both on the island of Java and outside Java, to prove that the existence of their party was still a reality.

Second, the fact arose that Suharto had never directly positioned himself diametrically with Sukarno to seize power, except in the matter of the existence of the PKI. Suharto himself tended to still accept Sukarno's leadership. Leadership dualism was not raised by Suharto personally, but as a result of the attitudes of various civil action groups as well as groups of officers who were categorized as radical factions such as Sarwo Edhie, Kemal Idris, and H.R. Dharsono. *Bonding* Soeharto certainly saw this political opportunity to then enter the vortex of discourse on the change of national leadership from the hands of Sukarno. It can be likened that Suharto is like a watersurfer who will certainly not be able to maneuver if the position of the sea waves is not too high.

This article argues that Suharto's moderate rebuke of Sukarno was triggered by the fact that at that time the attitude of the military group was not yet solid in viewing Sukarno's political position. There are at least three military factions in this regard, namely the *status quo ante* faction, the moderate faction, and the radical faction. The first faction consisted of officers who were counted as Sukarno's although they tended to claim that the PKI was the source of the problem. Police Force Commander Sutjipto Judodihardjo, Navy Commander R. Muljadi, and KKO (elite TNI-AL force) commander Hartono are among this faction. In addition, it can also be mentioned that those who entered into this first faction were TNI-AD officers such as Ibrahim Adjie, Mursyid, as well as officers in the Sunarijadi-led Brawijaya Family who signed support for Sukarno in 1967.

The moderate faction considered Sukarno himself to be unnecessary to step down from the presidency, as long as he was willing to disband the PKI and modernize his procedures for coming to power, for example by enforcing the constitutional rules of statehood as stated in the 1945 Constitution. This faction is identical to the Diponegoro-Brawijaya faction, with which Suharto himself entered into it. In addition, Nasution himself was also included in the faction that Sukarno did not object to continuing to rule, although in later political developments, Nasution somewhat shifted his position according to existing political developments, as did Suharto.

The radical faction was the most progressive in promoting a change in national leadership, in addition to being firm on the PKI and communism issues. This faction is mainly represented by the Siliwangi Division, with their figures such as Isaac Djuarsa, H.R. Dharsono, Kemal Idris, A.J. Witono, as well as the commander of the elite RPKAD unit led by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. This faction was



the closest to cooperate with student demonstrators in demanding the dissolution of the PKI and the ouster of Sukarno.

In the context of the existence of the three military factions in responding to Sukarno, Suharto took a cautious stance. He tends to observe political rhythms and tendencies of public opinion before taking a stand. However, Suharto also veiledly took advantage of the attitude of the group of officers in these units over Sukarno. In the context of facing Sukarno, it can be explained that Suharto's original position was to take advantage of all the existing tendencies to then decide what kind of position was most advantageous for him. In other words, it can be said that Suharto was positioned as an opportunist party in the context of the transition of national leadership at that time.

The most obvious thing in Suharto's political stance was the political position that opposed the rise of Islamic political power. This is related to the primordial nature element of Suharto which can be categorized as *abangan Islam* plus he is also a fairly good *kejawen* believer. Nurture Suharto was in the circle of The Javanese Traditionalism which regards Islam, both modern and traditional, as a threat to the survival of the Javanese tradition which is part of its primordial element.

Third, if it is to be emphasized around the issue of leadership dualism, in fact it has only officially come to the fore since the issuance of the Warrant of March 11, 1966. The presence of the letter certainly did not take place in a vacuum, but rather due to the daily political dynamic movements after the G30S/PKI. The issuance of the warrant also began with a series of discussions between Sukarno and a number of warlords, Sukarno with M. Jusuf, and Sukarno with Suharto himself, which was later ended by the granting of the Warrant to M. Jusuf, Basuki Rahmat, and Amir Machmud at the Bogor Palace on March 11, 1966. In these discussions there was no clause to diametrically confront Suharto with Sukarno. The power struggle in the *dyadic* hierarchy only occurred after the March 11, 1966 Warrant was put to good use by Suharto, his *bonding* men, as well as members of his coalition formation who wanted to make the warrant a pretext to make greater political changes.

Fourth, this proposition was also surrounded by a context of the views proposed by the TNI-AD officers, especially the differences in views between the unitary groups of the army who were members of the Diponegoro-Brawijaya and Siliwangi-Kostrad-RPKAD groups, towards Sukarno. Diponegoro-Brawijaya officers were at least able to accept Sukarno's role (although not all his policies), while Siliwangi-Kostrad-RPKAD officers tended to regard Sukarno as an obstacle to Indonesia's modernization process. In these two spectrums, Suharto's position tends to be in the middle (moderate), with a tendency to be closer to the Diponegoro-Brawijaya faction. Nevertheless, Suharto instinctively saw a profit gap for his own position in the context of the general attitude of the Siliwangi-Kostrad-RPKAD group which sought to evict Sukarno's political role.

To answer the second question, researchers have put forward a second proposition stating that after Suharto succeeded in dominating Sukarno, then from 1968 to 1971 Suharto continued to reproduce the power to dominate the complex hierarchy through *inclusive fitness mechanisms* that its dominance was always asymmetrical in the face of the various dominant individuals in each hierarchy, both in cooperation with

its *bonders* and the formation of a new coalition consisting of the Soeharto Centric circle, the civilian-military circle in Seskoad, and the Pater Beek circle. Similar to the first proposition, this second proposition also needs to be given a number of explanations based on the results of the analysis carried out in the previous chapters.

First, it should be stated that Suharto's dominance over Sukarno had actually tended to be completed since 1967, when he was appointed as acting president. However, for Suharto and his *bonders*, the position as Acting President was not a safe position for Suharto's political significance as an executive. If the political dynamics within the MPRS change, this principle may be revoked at any time when there is a political backflow within the MPRS. This is reinforced by the fact that there is an alliance between Islamic political forces and Nasution to empower the MPRS Workers' Body to be given the authority to assess executive performance. The implication is that if the MPRS considers Suharto unsuccessful in carrying out various MPRS TAP, then politically the position as a "presidential official" becomes revoked and transferred to other parties. This concern was in keeping with the fact that Suharto himself was still seen as a high-ranking officer with minor status.

Therefore, Suharto focused on reproducing power, including with the help of his *bonders*, in order to upgrade the status from Presidential To President in 1968. In addition, Suharto's *bonders* in the MPRS also hampered the issue of the re-generation of the Jakarta Charter which may be feared to attract Islamic public support, especially outside Java and Masyumi constituents.

The reproduction of power was important for Suharto to do considering that the previous coalition formation, namely when it disbanded the PKI, had broken out, giving rise to a new spreading hierarchy and began to prepare itself to win the election as it had been scheduled. Suharto needed to ensure that the dominance between his hierarchy and other hierarchies was always asymmetrical, by continuing to carry out the process of accumulating power into his personal position. This was mainly done by reorganizing the armed forces, as its main force base, by decisively positioning itself at the helm. Another thing that was done was to place the *bonding* officers and Soeharto-centric circles in important positions. Suharto also officially abandoned the political forces of Islam to then form a coalition with Pater Beek's circle, a circle that was small in quantity, but militant in stemming the political currents of Islam. Pater Beek's circle was widely used by Suharto to empower the Golkar Secretary and carry out political operations within the DPR-GR and MPRS. Meanwhile, *road* Soeharto's political map in order to lead Indonesia and be strategic in nature was not created either by himself or his *bondingists*, but rather utilized the results of intellectual studies within the civilian-military circle in Seskoad. The main figure who had a lot of strategic influence over Suharto was Suwarto. Suwarto uses many study institutions in the U.S. as a model for curriculum and indoctrination in Seskoad.

Second, other hierarchies formed as a result of the outbreak of Suharto's initial coalition formation need to continue to survive. They had to accept that the national executive leadership was now in Suharto's hands, so that if various other hierarchies wanted to continue to access various resources and reproduce power, then they would

have to adapt to Suharto's power politics. . Soeharto sought that the parties who had the potential to fight him to implement an *inclusive fitness* mechanism that was based on four components, namely Supersemar, Pancasila, Dwifunction ABRI, and Development. These four components are Suharto's requirements for various other hierarchies to be willing to work together if they want to continue to survive. The *inclusive fitness* mechanism implemented by various hierarchies other than Suharto actually made the reproduction of Suharto's power continue to grow so that asymmetrical dominance was successfully ensured by Suharto.

Parmusi under the leadership of Mintaredja and John Naro is an example of those who practice *inclusive fitness*. Suharto also gave a *reward* in the form of access for them to lead Parmusi. Other individuals such as M. Natsir, M. Roem, and other Masyumi elements who did not want to make submissions to Suharto were automatically eliminated from power in Parmusi. Something similar but not entirely the same happened to the PNI. Suharto tended to view the PNI as a potential partner in the face of the rise of Islamic politics, and therefore Suharto emphasized that the PNI needed to be led by individuals who were willing to accept its dominance on conditions that were not as much as he had proposed to Parmusi . For example, Suharto did not object to the PNI conducting a congress before the election was held, which was not allowed for Parmusi. Suharto's pressure on the PNI was only on the party leadership which was no longer left-oriented and did not dispute the role of the TNI-AD in national politics. Both according to Suharto were revealed by both the Osa Faction and the Hadisubeno Faction. Especially for Hadisubeno, financial support was given to him for the rational operation of party activities.

To answer the third question, the researcher built a proposition that after Suharto succeeded in creating asymmetrical dominance over the various political uncertainties that existed, a *political obedience* was created that allowed the 1971 elections to be able to ensure their dominance in national politics so that predictability for species could be guaranteed. This proposition also needs to be given a practical explanation based on the results of the analysis in the previous chapters.

First, Suharto's asymmetrical dominance of the various political imbalances that existed was related to the second proposition, namely Suharto's ability to effectively reproduce power, both in civilian and military groups. Asymmetrical dominance favored Suharto's political position because it was triggered by the existence of an inherent *inclusive fitness* mechanism as a legacy of the evolutionary process. Every hierarchy that exists tends to maintain its survival, and therefore they must accept that the new *alpha male* that is Suharto has become a political reality.

Second, with the implementation of the *inclusive fitness* mechanism, Suharto was able to create *political obedience*. For example, Soeharto did this that to guarantee Pancasila, Supersemar, Dwifunction of ABRI, and Development, the 1969 elections had to be postponed. This delay allowed Suharto somewhat freely in empowering the Golkar Secretary. The empowerment of the Golkar Secretary was carried out by Suharto through two lines, namely open and closed. Suharto carried out an open line by hiring

Amir Machmud to convert members of Parmusi, the PNI, and the masses of other political parties to be absorbed into the Golkar Secretariat. Amir Machmud built an election organizing machine capable of ensuring the victory of Golkar secretary. It was also through Amir Machmud that the concept of political obedience became real so that it became a bridge for monoloyalty. Konstituen who wanted to find a sense of security from the trauma of past *political turmoil* chose Sekber Golkar in the hope that the life situation would be better.

### COVER

Novelty or novelty to be stated in this article is that in developing his power, Suharto was different from Sukarno. In the biopolitical perspective, Suharto tended to absorb (absorb) various complex hierarchies that existed into his power hierarchy. Suharto did this using his shrewdness in reproducing power both against nationalist political power, Islamic political power, and armed numerals. Sukarno on the other hand tended to centralize power with the focus being on defeating the political forces that opposed him frontally in order to submit under his domination, not by way of absorption as Suharto did. Suharto's ability to absorb various opposing political forces into his hierarchy was his modality in creating *political obedience* and further allowing the 1971 elections to be won by Sekber Golkar as an "army" political organization that was able to secure its dominance in parliament, be it the DPR (up to level I and II) and the MPR.

As a complementary note, the Neo Darwinist Biopolitics used in this article revolves around ethological and neurobiological studies. In ethological studies, Biopolitics takes inspiration from the phenomena of group life prevailing in the animal world that are considered a number of characteristics also applicable in the world of human groups, especially in the political sphere. In neurobiological studies, the locus of study is the human brain as the controller of actions, consisting of a number of parts that have certain functions. There are elements of the genotype and phenotype that determine the performance of the brain as well as limbic structures that have the function of maintaining the basic needs of the individual to live and face problems in sight.

### COVER

The authoritarianism developed by Suharto at that time could have been accepted as a *necessary condition* because Indonesia faced doubts between continuing Guided Democracy or re-entering liberal democracy with political parties holding a leading role. Suharto's choice was to form a political system that more or less reflected what he recognized most, namely military life that relied on hierarchy and decisiveness of the command. This makes it possible to make the statement that Suharto merely perfected the Authoritarianism that Sukarno had first developed.

Unlike Sukarno who came to power on the basis of an ever-shifting balance of power, namely by allowing each political force to compete with each other (TNI-AD and PKI), Suharto tended to absorb all opposing forces under his control. The authoritarianism pursued by Suharto in the period 1965-1971 was the most likely choice in dealing with Indonesia's *turmoil* situation after Sukarno. The average education level of the Indonesian population is still relatively low, the average economic status of the

Indonesian population is still relatively low, and the middle class that is positioned as an agent of democratization is not to mention large. Naturally, if Suharto did not choose democracy to be developed in the period 1965-1971 because if he developed it, then political instability would certainly continue to chasten Indonesia through debates in a long parliament. As a small illustration, that one thing that made Athens lose the war to Sparta was that, the Athenian side because of the democracy they adhered to made the decision to build a war army slow due to debate. This is in contrast to militaristic Sparta where decisions can be made quickly. So did Suharto, who for him the crucial problem of Indonesia at that time was not democracy but the "belly" of the crowd. For Suharto, too, more and more "hungry stomachs" encouraged communism to gain the potential to live. When Suharto began to step into power, the urgent thing was economic development, not democratic development.

Thus, biopolitics is more suitable for use in conducting studies of regime transition situations in a society that is still educationally and economically still in a low condition. Because under such conditions, the most likely choice is Authoritarianism not democracy. Similarly, the biopolitical perspective used in this article will be difficult if used to analyze Indonesian politics since 2000 until now considering that democracy has developed in such a way in Indonesia that an authoritarian power will be difficult if it is to be used as a choice of state power. However, an exception can still occur given that Authoritarianism, not Democracy, corresponds to the *nature* of human behavior.

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