



CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

In the studies of international relations containment and engagement are often understood as strategies of foreign policy. This article seeks to explore containment and engagement through a less frequently applied theoretical perspective: to find out what features of containment and engagement allow them to be called middle-range theories.

The article presents the main features of meta- and middle-range theories, draws attention to realism as meta-theory and then distinguishes the most characteristic features of containment and engagement in order to find their matches in the attributes of middle-range theories.

The article concludes that containment and engagement can be called middle-range theories, since they are power balancing theories that analyze the phenomenon from a specific point of view (individual approaches to the instruments, regions, targets), they are comprehensive, and they stay within the field of power balancing analysis.

KEYWORDS

Containment, engagement, middle-range theory, meta-theory

INTRODUCTION

In the studies of international relations containment and engagement are often understood as strategies of foreign policy aimed to balance the power of potential adversaries: containment strategy seeks to limit the power of adversaries by all means, engagement seeks to change foreign (and domestic) policy of an adversary and to bring it into its sphere of influence.

However, containment and engagement can be explored through other, less frequently applied theoretical perspectives: they can be explored as middle-range theories – i.e., theories that examine one (or more) aspect(s) of a certain phenomenon in detail.¹ In this article the assumption is made that containment and engagement as power balancing strategies fall into the frames of realism that analyzes international relations through the prism of power. Realism examines many aspects of international relations (the scope is very wide); therefore, it can be treated as a meta-theory: „a set of interlocking rules, principles, that both describes and prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory in a scientific discipline.”² Thus, such treatment presupposes that containment and engagement can be analyzed as middle-range theories.

The purpose of this article is to find out what features of containment and engagement submit to definition as middle-range theories.

The article consists of four parts. The first one is devoted to the concepts of meta-theory and middle-range theory and to describing its main features. In the second part of the article attention is focused on realism as meta-theory – the main features of this theory are identified and explained as meta-theory. The third and fourth parts are devoted to the analysis of containment and engagement as middle-range theories: the concepts of containment and engagement are covered, and the most characteristic features of containment and engagement are distinguished to find their matches in the attributes of middle-range theories.

1. MAIN CONCEPTS: THEORY, META-THEORY, MIDDLE-RANGE THEORY

Before analyzing containment and engagement as middle-range theories (not as strategies) the concepts that will be frequently used in this paper must be defined: theory, meta-theory, middle-range theory.

There are various definitions of the concept “theory”. This article focuses on definitions within the fields of social sciences, political sciences and, of course,

¹ Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, *Middle Range Theory and the Study of Organizations* (United States of America: Springer, 1980), p. 20.

² Encyclopædia Britannica, “Metatheory,” (2009) // <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/378037/metatheory> (accessed December 20, 2009).

international relations. N. D. Thomas states that theory is "a safe conceptualization, a packaging of experience and ideas into circumscribed form and language."³ Theorist of international relations Edward Carr asserts that "theory" should be regarded as "structured reflection".⁴ Fred Kerlinger claims that theory is "a set of interrelated constructs, definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relationships among variables, with purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena."⁵ In the context of international relations, concept of "theory" is best described by Kenneth Waltz, who says that theory is "a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and the connection among its parts."⁶ According to K. Waltz, theory should be understood as notions that describe something.⁷ Summing up the ideas of theorists of international relations and social sciences it is true to say that theory constitutes of such elements:

1. Organized set of propositions that specifies how particular phenomenon should be analysed;
2. General principles encompassing key factors that help researches to describe particular phenomenon;
3. Explanation of regularities in particular phenomenon;
4. Predictions.⁸

Even though the concept of "theory" is described in various fields of science (international relations, sociology, psychology, archaeology) stressing its different aspects, there are not many attempts to define the concepts of "meta-theory" and "middle-range theory". In social sciences meta-theories and middle-range theories are thoroughly analysed by sociologists, whereas there are hardly any studies of meta-theories and middle-range theories in the field of international relations. Famous sociologist Robert Merton has contributed most to the contemporary interpretation of the middle-range theory concept – he was the first who made an attempt to define the concept of middle-range theory in late 1940s in his work "Social Theory and Social Structure" that later became the main starting point for exploring the concept of middle-range theories⁹. Talcott Parsons, who spoke of "Grand theory" in its work "The Structure of Social Action" in 1937, can be regarded as the initiator of meta-theory (although R. Merton later also wrote about meta-theories).

³ Richard J. Torraco and Elwood F. Holton III, "A Theorists Toolbox," *Human Resource Development Review* 1(March, 2002): 130.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Ole Waever, "Waltz's Theory of Theory," *International Relations* Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2009): 206.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ David F. Chernoff, *Theory and Methatheory in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 38.

⁹ Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, *supra* note 1, p. 19.

The prefix "meta" is used in the sense of "after", "about" and "beyond". Stephen Turner points out that "meta" emphasizes "occurring later" and "in succession" to previous activities, Paul Furfey understands the term "meta" in the sense of "beyond", "transcending", Lee Harvey – in the sense of "coming after".¹⁰ And hence the term of "meta-theory" is generally understood as "a theory whose subject matter is some other theory", "a set of interlocking rules, principles, that both describes and prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory in a scientific discipline."¹¹ C. Wright Mills understood grand theory¹² as "the form of highly abstract theorizing in which the formal organization and arrangement of concepts takes priority over understanding the social world."¹³ Such an understanding of meta-theory came from T. Parsons' ideas about grand theory that he defined as "an effort to grasp the most abstract, fundamental, and universal features of society."¹⁴ T. Parsons can be seen to be attempting to integrate values, power, structure and action in a single frame of reference. Thus, the difference between theory and meta-theory could be defined as follows: if the theory theorizes about a certain phenomenon, meta-theory theorizes about theories of these phenomena or realms. Therefore, sociological understandings of meta-theories leave the perception that meta-theory is the theory of the highest level, that meta-theory is the broadest and the most sophisticated theory.

In the sociological sphere middle-range theory is generally understood as "a set of propositions that bridge the gap between the empirical observation and broad, often abstract and untestable, general or high lever theories"¹⁵. Thus, this is an approach integrating theory and empirical data. The need for middle-range theories was determined by two extremes in sociology – the collection of data without any attention to a theory and the abstract theorizing of scholars. For R. Merton, initiator of the concept "middle-range theories", middle-range theories rested between "the minor but necessary hypotheses that evolve in abundance during the day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities."¹⁶

R. Merton also stresses the particularity of middle-range theories and the fact that such theories analyse restricted phenomena. Speaking about middle-range

¹⁰ Shanyang Zhao, "Metatheory, Metamethod, Meta-data-analysis: What, Why and How?" *Sociological Perspectives* Vol. 34, No. 3 (1991): 377.

¹¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, *supra* note 2.

¹² In this paper the terms "meta-theory" and "grand theory" are understood as synonyms.

¹³ Gordon Marshall, "Grand Theory"; in: *A Dictionary of Sociology* (1998) // <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-grandtheory.html> (accessed January 2, 2010).

¹⁴ Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge – Social Theory Today* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), p. 79.

¹⁵ Herbert Maschner, "Middle Range Theory"; in: *The Oxford Companion to Archaeology* (Oxford University Press, 1996) // <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t136.e0289> (accessed December 20, 2009).

¹⁶ Brian Rappert, "On the Mid Range: An Exercise in Disposing," *Science, technology&Human Values* 32(6): 696.

theories R. Merton emphasizes the scope of such theories - it is like a dividing line between the different levels of theories. R. Merton understands scope as "the quality of a theory that refers to how many of the basic problems in a discipline are handled by the same theory. The more problems handled by a given theory, the greater is its scope."¹⁷ There are two extremes in his scale of theories: empirical generalizations and grand theories. Understanding of empirical generalizations does not cause any major problems, while it remains unclear what theory, according R. Merton, must be seen as a grand theory. According to this sociologist, it is just such a theory which analyses more events than the previous theories. R. Merton divides theories by the scope of tested problems - middle-range theories, according to R. Merton, are in the middle of the scale - that is, middle-range theories are specific enough to be used in the evaluation of observed phenomena, yet general enough to be incorporated into broader theoretical statements. Grand theories are perceived negatively by R. Merton - he characterizes them as too broad and too vague.¹⁸ However, R. Merton did not leave any detailed description of middle-range theories, except for the definition and the exact location in the theories' scale. Thus, any theory which is more than empirical generalization, but the scope of which is less than the most general theory, may qualify as middle-range theory.

Meanwhile, another famous scholar of sociology C. Wright Mills noted such characteristics of middle-range theories as simplicity (such theory should make understanding possible) and comprehensiveness theory should permit it to include the range and depth a variety of events). C. Pinder and L. Moore expect that emerging middle-range theories compete with one another (because they stem from the need to represent different views on the phenomenon).¹⁹ So, to describe the characteristics of middle-range theories, it is necessary to highlight the scope of tested problems (the scope, according to R. Merton, should be limited), simplicity (according to C. W. Mills), and the specific approach to particular phenomena.

To sum up the sociological perception of middle-range theories, it can be assumed that middle-range theories are the theories that examine specific and more restrictive phenomena than meta-theories, give precise interpretations of the noticed regularities and predictions, but they are also able to give full explanations and to analyze the issue completely. If these observations were transferred into the sphere of international relations, it could be said that meta-theory is a theory explaining international relations (such as realism, liberalism), while middle-range theory is a theory that analyzes a particular aspect of international relations.

¹⁷ Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, *supra* note 1, p. 20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21, 34.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

2. CLASSICAL REALISM AS META-THEORY

Classical realism is one of the international relations theories which has a rich history and is traditionally dated from 1939, when the publication "The 20 Year's Crisis" by Edward Carr appeared. According to the definition of international relations, which states that international relations are "political and other dealings between two or more countries", ²⁰ it is true to say that the scope of phenomena analyzed by classical realism as international relations theory is very broad. This theory attempts to explain international relations in general, with all of their constituent expressions and the players. On this basis, classical realism can be attributed to a meta-theory category – that is, the theory that analyzes more events than the previous theories.²¹

Many academics contributed to the development of classical realism, which in this article is treated as a meta-theory. International relations from the position of states were analysed by Edward Carr, Shuman, Nicolson, Niebuhr, Schwarzenberger, Wight, Hans Morgenthau.²² The work "Politics among Nations" (1948) of the latter theoretician is considered to be the most influential in the sphere of classical realism because of its understandable, systematic, theoretical evaluation of international relations.²³ William Olson argues that it is H. Morgenthau's "Politics among Nations" that made international relations studies to become realistic.²⁴

Therefore, H. Morgenthau's famous six principles are the best starting point for the analysis of the main ideas of classical realism. With the first principle of classical realism H. Morgenthau contends that policy is ruled by objective laws, which lie in human nature and have not changed from the ancient times of China, India, and Greece. This principle of H. Morgenthau's also expresses an attitude that while shaping foreign policy and taking decisions related to this process people act rationally - that is, they are guided by specific national interests, consider the circumstances, available resources and alternatives, and select the most appropriate.²⁵ In reaching such assumptions H. Morgenthau, and thus the theory of classical realism, implies that classical realism as a theory can explain foreign policy and international relations, since it alleges that there are certain regularities in

²⁰ Encarta World English Dictionary, "International Relations" // http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861692562/international_relations.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

²¹ Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, *supra* note 1, p. 21.

²² Martin Griffiths, *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: an Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.12.

²³ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971), p. 12.

²⁴ John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics* (University of Cambridge, 2004), p. 37.

²⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knoff, 1978), p. 4.

international relations, foreign policy and human behaviour, from which objective conclusions can be made.

With the second and third principles of the theory H. Morgenthau argues that the principal category of international relations is power – an objective and universal category. According to the theoretician, power in international relations is the main target: “state actors think and operate in terms of power”.²⁶ From the first three principles of classical realism it is apparent that this line of representatives (in particular, H. Morgenthau) believes that the nature of international relations and foreign policy can best be clarified taking for granted the fact that the individual nature is static and selfish, and that within it pursuit of power is coded, in order to survive. Therefore, the analysis of international relations should focus on the analysis of pursuit the power.

The field of analysis proposed by classical realism is further narrowed by the fourth, fifth and sixth principles, which state that while analyzing international relations the sphere of policy must be seen as autonomous from other potential spheres of analysis (economics, law, etc.) and considerations of the moral behaviour of actors in international relations should be left open: classical realism “refuses to identify the moral grounds of a state”²⁷. The basic principles of classical realism show that this theory of international relations makes a world view simpler in order to manage the field of analysis and focuses its attention on international relations.

Thus, H. Morgenthau and classical realism in the analysis of international relations focuses on such key issues as states (as actors in international relations) and their struggle for power. This international relations theory argues that states (geographically defined units) are the main actors in international relations, and other actors (such as international organizations, transnational corporations) are treated as less important.²⁸ This choice of classic realists can be explained on the basis of the fundamental categories of this theory. (International) policy is a struggle for power. It follows that in order to be a political actor a group or a person should have considerable power. Since in international politics only states can achieve considerable amount of power, they are regarded as key actors in international relations.²⁹

For purposes of analysis in classical realism states are viewed as unitary actors – the country manages foreign policy affairs as a single body. According to representatives of classical realism, single actor in foreign policy is that who

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4-15.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Charles W. Kegley, *Controversies in International Relations Theory* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1995), p. 37.

²⁹ John Vasquez, *supra* note 24, p. 48.

expresses only one position on a particular issue at the same time³⁰, which means that political figures publish foreign policy decisions unanimously, and discrepancies of opinions are regulated within the state.

Another presumption about states as international actors made by supporters of classical realism is that states are rational actors, as well as individuals whose rationality H. Morgenthau emphasized in the first of the six principles of classical realism. According to classical realists, states are guided by the logic of national interests (survival, security, power). For example, for H. Morgenthau rational foreign policy is a policy which "reduces threats and increases the benefits."³¹ In other words, the rational states are states that seek to achieve their national interests and do so in light of objective circumstances and available resources.

Arguing that states shape the international environment in which they act, the representatives of classical realism underline anarchic nature of international system: in international relations sovereignty belongs to the state, there is no higher power than the state itself. This anarchic structure of international relations constrains the actions of foreign policy decision-makers and affects the distribution of power between different actors.³² It is the anarchic nature of the international system that encourages countries to fight for power – that is, for survival.

As already mentioned, power is a central concept in the theory of classical realism. Power is generally defined as the ability of one player to force another player to do something what the latter usually would not do. For classical realists it is difficult to calculate power, because it has many different components. As stated by Richard Lebow, "power is the currency of international relations, but, unlike money, it could not be given can numerical value and counted."³³

International policy for classical realists is synonymous with power politics – the main goal of any political activity (including foreign policy) is power. According to H. Morgenthau, "international politics, like all policies, is a struggle for power. Whatever the final aim of international politics is, power is always the immediate aim."³⁴ Representatives of classical realism states' need to obtain power explain by human nature. Desire for power, according to H. Morgenthau, is inseparable from human nature. Therefore, the struggle for power is "constituent element of all existing human associations <... > including the state."³⁵

Classical realists argue that the quantity of power in the international system is limited – i.e., not all get more power at the same time. As the part of the foreign

³⁰ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory. Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (Allyn and Bacon, 1997), p. 55.

³¹ Hans Morgenthau, *supra* note 25, p. 3.

³² Karen Mingst, *Essentials of international relations* (London: W.W. Norton, 2008), p. 84.

³³ Richard N. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 233.

³⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *supra* note 25, p. 5.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

policy states participate in a kind of “zero-sum” game – trying to withdraw power from other states and increase their own. Classical realists believe that the anarchic structure of international system (the absence of a higher power) makes states to achieve maximum power so that they can build their own security, because only the balance of power can effectively prevent the war.³⁶ Power balancing, according to realists, defines the situation where the power of one or more states is used to counterbalance the power of other state or group of states.³⁷ From the perspective of classical realists, the state’s survival in the international system depends on how much more power it has compared to other countries.³⁸ Thus, the power balance is the most important qualitative characteristics in the international system.

Because of a fixed quantity of power on the international scene, states, according to the classical realists, seek to balance the power in two ways – trying to maintain the status quo or implementing an imperialistic foreign policy. By implementing status quo policy states try to maintain power, while the implementation of imperialistic foreign policy seeks more power.³⁹

While both trying to maintain the status quo and get more power, according to representatives of classical realism states use a range of power balancing strategies, which can be defined as plans to develop and to use certain components of its power to achieve their objectives (to maintain power and increase it).⁴⁰ Those can be: reciprocity, deterrence, containment, engagement.⁴¹

In summary, classical realism fits both in categories of theory and meta-theory. The classical realism coincides with the concept of theory because it includes theory describing parameters: interpretation of certain phenomenon(s), the mapping of regularities and predictions. Classical realism explains international relations and describes regularities of the international relations through categories such as states-key actors in international relations, unified and rational actors, an anarchy of international system, pursuit for national interests and the struggle for power as a permanent state of international relations, classical realism predicts that the wars and conflicts will be a permanent state of international relations, because every actor will want to ensure their safety. Classical realism falls in research field of a meta-theory, as it aims to explore many aspects of international relations – actors of international relations (state), their properties (rationality and unity), the nature of international relations (anarchy), purposes of international relations

³⁶ Steve Smith, *Tarptautiniai santykiai: aiškinimas ir supratimas (Explaining and Understanding International Relations)* (Vilnius: Tyto alba, 1998), p. 114.

³⁷ Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (Pearson Longman, 2005), p. 77.

³⁸ Karen Mingst, *supra* note 32, p. 66.

³⁹ Richard N. Lebow, *supra* note 33, p. 227.

⁴⁰ Joshua S. Goldstein, *supra* note 37, p. 64.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

actors (security) and means of achieving the objectives (power and power balancing).

3. CONTAINMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORY

In the context of international relations, „containment“ refers to foreign policy strategy conducted by the U.S. during the Cold War.⁴² Thus, containment strategy is a power balancing strategy aimed to limit the spread of influence of adversaries on the international stage. In the context of international relations the concept of containment was first used by American diplomat George F. Kennan in 1946 in a telegram in which he described U.S. strategy to combat the threat posed by Soviet expansionism.⁴³ Since then the theoretical framework of this strategy has begun to shape. G.F. Kennan’s ideas were further developed by officials of U.S. President H. Truman’s administration: H.F. Mathews, C. Clifford, D. Acheson.

The analysis of containment’s theoretical framework is complicated because a singular concept does not exist. Opinions of the persons mentioned did not match on a number of matters (see Appendix). However, containment can be analyzed as a theory because the officials that created containment explained the regularities of the US-Soviet relations, as well as suggested, and predicted.

Containment meets the criteria of the middle-range theories as well (scope of analysed phenomena, simplicity, specific view towards particular phenomenon – that is power balancing): theorist that developed the ideas of containment had specific view towards the balancing of the USSR’s power (the spread of the USSR’s power had to be contained by any means), their ideas about containment were easy to understand, but also they analysed power balancing essentially – instruments, regions, evaluation of an adversary (although their views on the implementation of containment did not always coincide). Thus, creators of the concept of containment discuss power balancing. Its scope is narrower, but they attempt to fully discuss the power balancing: means, regions, adversaries. It is not the lowest category of theory according to of Merton.

G.F. Kennan’s ideas about containment

U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan is justifiably regarded as the father of containment.⁴⁴ It is he who first carefully analyzed the Soviet Union as an actor in

⁴² Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, „Containment“ // <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-containment.htm> (accessed January 1, 2010).

⁴³ Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 191.

⁴⁴ G. F. Kennan’s ideas were expressed in several sources: George F. Kennan, „The Long Telegram‘ from Moscow,“ February 22, 1946, the National Security Archive // <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm> (accessed January 3, 2010); X (G.F. Kennan), „The Sources of Soviet Conduct,“ *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947) //

international relations and as a threat to the United States, suggested using containment in the U.S. relations with the USSR, and outlined the potential application of the instruments of containment in such way making the start for formation the of concept of containment and for its continued evolution.

G.F. Kennan paid much more attention to the approach to the USSR as a risk assessment than any other U.S. state officer or theorist of containment. In G.F. Kennan's view, the USSR had a neurotic view towards the international arena, was convinced that the conflict between socialism and capitalism is inevitable – that is, in G.F. Kennan conviction, had no idea what was happening in the real world beyond the Soviet border, and was unaware of "objective truth" but did not want to know it either.⁴⁵

According to the diplomat, the Soviet dislike of the West was the result of historical and ideological circumstances: hostility towards the world was set on the basis of Russian history, and Marxism only encouraged these trends.⁴⁶

G.F. Kennan's documents give the impression that this U.S. diplomat perceived the USSR primarily as a political and ideological threat rather than a military one. Militarily G.F. Kennan treated the USSR as the weaker actor of the international system: "Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker force".⁴⁷ Meanwhile, he paid particular attention to the prevailing ideology of the Soviet Union – Communism, which he described as "malignant parasite" – and its trend to spread quickly. And although G.F. Kennan underestimated Soviet military capabilities, its documentation gives the impression that he treated the Soviet Union very seriously as a threat to United States. In the "Long telegram" (1946) just this fact confirming G.F. Kennan's argument can be detected: "Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face."⁴⁸ First of all, in G.F. Kennan's view, the USSR was seeking an expansion in both the ideological and geopolitical context and was prepared to mobilize all their resources to achieve this objective. He warned that the Soviet Union's efforts to increase its power will be routed to its neighbours (Iran, Turkey) and the USSR will attempt to exploit the UN for these purposes, to weaken Western influence in post-colonial space, thus creating a power vacuum that could be taken by communism, as well the USSR will attempt to entrench strategic points through which it could resist Western power centers - in Germany, Argentina, the Middle East.⁴⁹

<http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html> (accessed January 3, 2010); in lectures for students of the University of Chicago.

⁴⁵ George F. Kennan, *supra* note 44.

⁴⁶ X (G.F. Kennan), *supra* note 44.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ George F. Kennan, *supra* note 44.

Therefore, it is not surprising that G.F. Kennan noted that the United States must perceive the USSR as an adversary rather than a partner because in the near future no political friendship between the USSR and the USA, in his conviction, is possible. G.F. Kennan was the first who proposed a containment strategy for U.S. foreign policy. In the fight against the Soviet expansionary aspirations G.F. Kennan advised to use "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."⁵⁰ G.F. Kennan believed that the USSR would withdraw from confrontation, if the U.S. will have enough power and show that it is ready to use it.⁵¹

In "The Long telegram" and the article in "Foreign Affairs" magazine G. Kennan did not say clearly what means of containment he recommended to use, only hinted that the U.S. should do more to combat Soviet propaganda (Communist ideas), to promote its vision of the world because if the U.S. will not achieve this, the "russians really do so".⁵² Later, in 1948, of G.F. Kennan pointed out three steps to contain the Soviet threat (which he saw as the psychological): 1. Restoring the balance of power by promoting people at risk from the USSR confidence (through economic and political support). 2. The reduction of Soviet's influence in the world by exploiting tensions between Moscow and the International Communist Movement (the maintenance of U.S. troops at strategic points, economic reconstruction of Western Europe). 3. Transformation of the Soviet approach to international relations (under pressure from the USSR).⁵³

If G.F. Kennan's proposals about containment's realization instruments lacked specificity, the regions in which the U.S. should take note of the USSR through containment were stated precisely by the U.S. diplomat. According to the G.F. Kennan, a principal goal of U.S. is to prevent the Soviet Union to unify with other power centers which he named four (without US) – Germany and Europe, Russia, Japan, the British Isles. According to the diplomat, the U.S. security depended on whether the U.S. will be able to prevent the spread of the adversary's influence in Europe. G.F. Kennan in particular feared that the USSR would unify with Germany, so he called for the integration of Germany into Western society. G. Kennan also supported the Marshall Plan, as it strengthened Western Europe. In Japan G.F. Kennan recommended transforming the occupation policy to the provision of assistance – i.e., the former adversaries into allies.⁵⁴ G.F. Kennan acknowledged that U.S. interests are not limited to previously listed the power centers – for the U.S. it is important to have access to the industrial centers,

⁵⁰ X (G. F. Kennan), *supra* note 44.

⁵¹ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 596.

⁵² George F. Kennan, *supra* note 44.

⁵³ John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 36-49.

⁵⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Remembering George Kennan. Lessons for Today?" *United States Institute for Peace*, December 2006 // <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SRdec06.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2010).

sources of raw materials, defence points, therefore, Mediterranean and Middle East countries, the Philippines, the countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean are also important to the U.S.⁵⁵ It may be noted that G.F. Kennan recommended to pay attention to those areas in which the USSR sought to expand its influence.

H.F. Matthews' ideas about containment

In the context of the theoretical framework of containment, the contribution of Freeman Matthews, who has served in the United States Department of State for European Affairs in 1944-1947 as Head of the Unit, is no less important. He specified the concept of containment, submitted recommendations on how to implement containment in practice of U.S. foreign policy more effectively. The most important ideas of H.F. Matthews about containment were set in April of 1946 in his prepared memorandum.

H.F. Matthews' evaluation of the USSR is similar to that of G.F. Kennan, but also unique. H.F. Matthews as well as G.F. Kennan emphasized the Soviet Union's posed threat to the balance of power in the international system. He named the Soviet Union as the main threat to the U.S. and stressed the need to make containment the central instrument in U.S. foreign policy. The statements of this U.S. official on containment are unique in the context of the conception of containment because of the idea that the Soviet's disagreement with the United States must be seen as an integral part of the Soviet system.⁵⁶ So the only solution, according to this international relations specialist is to destroy the Soviet system and to halt the spread of Soviet influence outside the Soviet Union because the spread of Soviet influence in the international arena is equivalent to the spread of U.S. opposition. In the Memorandum of 1946 H.F. Matthews pointed to specific regions and countries (as well as G.F. Kennan) who are in danger from Soviet influence: Eastern, Central and South Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Manchuria.⁵⁷

The Soviet containment measures offered by the U.S. State Department official are very specific, although not always feasible to implement. According to H.F. Matthews, to realize the strategy of containment Moscow must be persuaded "first of all by diplomatic means and, at worst, by a military that its current foreign policy Soviet Union can only lead to disaster".⁵⁸ So H.F. Matthews offered a wide range of instruments of containment, which particularly focused on the use of military force (suggested in the fight against the Soviet turn all U.S. military types)

⁵⁵ John L. Gaddis, *supra* note 53, p. 30-31.

⁵⁶ H. F. Matthews, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies; Memorandum as of April 01, 1946": 1169; in: *Foreign Relations*, T. I. (United States, 1946).

⁵⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatija (Diplomacy)* (Vilnius: Pradai, 2003), p. 436.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

and stressed the importance of allies. In the light of the fact that, according to him, the USSR is superior on land, and the U.S. at sea and in the air, H.F. Matthews advised to use the military force against the Soviet Union only in Europe and Asia regions, where it is possible to resist to the Soviet Union "with the help of U.S. potential allies' naval, airborne and air forces."⁵⁹

Perhaps because of the continuing tradition of geopolitics H.F. Matthews in his proposed version of the USSR containment paid special attention to Britain as the best variant of the potential U.S. allies in the fight against the USSR. H.F. Matthews was convinced that Britain was able to serve the U.S. balancing the power in Europe, which was affected by the USSR. Therefore, according to H.F. Matthews, "it is required that the United Kingdom would remain the main European economic and military power."⁶⁰

Another piece of H.F. Matthews' advice expressed in the memorandum is to act only with UN approval. Most likely, such advice for U.S. foreign policy makers came from logic of earlier proposals – the need for allies. H.F. Matthews, however, failed to see that the necessary condition for UN approval for military action was difficult to implement because the USSR was on the UN Security Council and had a veto. Technically difficult to realize was his proposal to use military force in the strategically important regions – the U.S. forces would not have been able to reach any of the regions or countries.

Nevertheless, H.F. Matthews' contribution to the conception of containment and the formation of U.S. foreign policy-making is significant because he noted strategically important regions (not necessarily accessible to military force – one can take other steps of foreign policy on them to expand U.S. influence and to limit the influence of the USSR), said that the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet system is imminent, and stressed potential U.S. allies (who, as history has shown, were the correct choices).

C. Clifford's ideas about containment

U.S. White House special adviser Clark Clifford, worked in that position in 1946-1950, provided new ideas on the Soviet Union as an international actor, described in more detail the possible instruments of containment, provided the new assessment of strategically important regions for U.S. and was the first who did not reject the possibility of using nuclear weapons in relations with the USSR while implementing containment. C. Clifford's advice on U.S. foreign policy course in its relations with the Soviet Union was set out in a secret memorandum for President

⁵⁹ H. F. Matthews, *supra* note 56: 1169.

⁶⁰ H. F. Matthews, *supra* note 56: 1170.

Harry Truman "American Relations with Soviet Union" on the 24 September, 1946.⁶¹

In the memorandum for U.S. President C. Clifford, as well as G.F. Kennan, paid much attention to the Soviet foreign policy. It seems that in assessing the Soviet Union as an actor in international relations and its foreign policy C. Clifford took over a number of G.F. Kennan's thoughts (in some places of the memorandum, for example on pages 5-6, he even quotes G.F. Kennan)⁶²: he stresses the negative Soviet attitude towards capitalist countries, the unawareness of situation beyond the Soviet borders, the influence of historical circumstances to the Soviet antagonism, the Soviets' need to increase its power in order to prepare the ground for a conflict with the Western countries. C. Clifford, as well as G.F. Kennan, claims that the Soviet leaders are convinced that the conflict between the USSR and the capitalist Western world is inevitable, notes that the Soviet sense of insecurity is inherited from the past.⁶³ USSR as a threat to the United States C. Clifford treats in the same way as G.F. Kennan: warns that the USSR is dangerous, that it seeks to increase its power, but nevertheless, in terms of power is weaker than the Western countries (at least in the short term): "Western states are still too strong, Soviet Union is still too weak."⁶⁴

As with G.F. Kennan and H.F. Matthew, in the prevailing situation in the international arena C. Clifford saw a risk for the U.S. because of the USSR's rising ambitions to divide power in the international system. This is reflected in his statements in 1946 that the Soviet Union seeks to conquer the world using military force and subversion. C. Clifford even argued that because of this situation the U.S. must prepare for global war.⁶⁵

Recognizing the USSR as a serious threat to the U.S., which seeks to increase its strength and prepare for a conflict with the West, C. Clifford says that at the same time the Soviet Union was trying to postpone the inevitable conflict, according to the Soviet leadership, because it wanted "to prepare for the collision with the Western democracies properly."⁶⁶ C. Clifford also claims that it would never be possible to agree with the Soviet leadership (because of the communist ideology), therefore, the U.S. should not make any concessions to the USSR, since it will be understood as a sign of U.S. weakness.⁶⁷ From these observations it

⁶¹ "Russian Report in Clifford to Truman and attached memorandum 'American Relations with Soviet Union'," (September 24, 1946): 66-68; in: Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis, *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy. 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) [hereinafter – Russian Report].

⁶² Clark Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet Union," Report as of September 24, 1946; Subject File; Conway Files; Truman Papers // <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/4-1.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2010).

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Russian Report, *supra* note 61: 68.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 9.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*: 72.

follows that the only reliable way to neutralise the Soviet threat once and for all would be to change the prevailing ideology in it (the main enemy is the ideology, rather than state) and to convince the Soviets that Western countries are more powerful.

C. Clifford's evaluation of the USSR and the warning for a possible total war perhaps conditioned his recommendation to realize the USSR's containment on a global scale. In the documents C. Clifford mentions strategically important regions for the U.S. – Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan (as well as G.F. Kennan, F. Matthews), and China, stressing that for these countries and regions it is important to remain united and economically stable.⁶⁸ However, in addition in his 1946 report C. Clifford also said that in order to contain Soviet expansion the U.S. should protect "all the democratic countries to which the Soviet Union poses a threat or danger in some way"⁶⁹. So, compared with the previous U.S. officials who contributed to producing the concept of containment, C. Clifford expanded the perimeter of containment.

The means of containment recommended by C. Clifford probably were influenced by the particularly serious treatment of the USSR as a threat with attention to its military capabilities. If H.F. Matthews stressed a wide range of instruments of containment, C. Clifford in 1946 September report said that "main thing that will deter the Soviets from the United States or from other vital parts of the world, will be our country's military power."⁷⁰ C. Clifford pointed out specific instruments of containment. In his report such recommended military means as development of military arsenal, military capacity (in particular, the military aviation), preparation of military bases abroad can be detected.⁷¹ C. Clifford even did not rule out the need to use nuclear and biological weapons by saying that "the U.S. must be prepared to nuclear or biological war, if necessary."⁷² He was against any limitations of U.S. weaponry until there remains possibility of the Soviet aggression because, in his opinion, "the military power is the only language the USSR understands."⁷³

C. Clifford pointed out other potential measures of containment – economic support for the strategically important countries for U.S. (trade agreements, loans, technical assistance), and the fight against the USSR's and the Communist propaganda (distribution of Western books and films in communist countries, the promotion of tourist flows).⁷⁴ However, C. Clifford did not think that other potential

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*: 72, 76.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*: 67.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*: 66.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Clark Clifford, *supra* note 62: 74.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: 75-76.

means of Soviet containment can be as effective as military tools his opinion supporting by idea (by the way, very similar to the previously expressed by H.F. Matthews), that a conflict between the U.S. and the USSR was not caused by opposing national interests, but by the Soviet system.⁷⁵

Summarizing C. Clifford's ideas about containment of the USSR expressed in September 1946, it can be argued that this U.S. White House special adviser added to the containment concept a proposal to expand the perimeter of containment to the international arena and to refuse other foreign policy tools other than military, as underperforming, proposed nuclear and biological weapons to make the instruments of containment. He called on to refrain from negotiating with the Soviet Union and not reduce the weapons of U.S. and put in further the idea that appeared in memorandum of H.F. Matthews that the US-USSR conflict stems from the Soviet system failures (i.e., the conflict is encoded in the Soviet ideology). According C. Clifford, U.S. efforts should be directed, in particular, to change the Soviet regime into democratic.

Dean Acheson's ideas about containment

Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary's of State in 1949-1950, contributed to U.S. foreign policy and the concept of containment by stressing containment's compliance with U.S. national interests, stressing military as foreign policy instruments and the focus on a number of practical suggestions on containment's realization. D. Acheson set his proposals about containment in his speeches in 1950s. They were also reflected in the 1950 report prepared by the U.S. National Security Council (NSC).

The USSR's aggressive intentions at the end of 1960s (USSR made an atomic bomb, then the hydrogen bomb) probably largely contributed to the fact that D. Acheson evaluated the Soviet Union and its foreign policy in the international arena very seriously. D. Acheson claimed that after the Second World War the situation on the international scene was unstable and posed a threat to the U.S. because, according to this U.S. public official, "after Rome and Carthage-time power on this earth has never been this way divided".⁷⁶ D. Acheson regarded the USSR as the main factor in disrupting the status quo in the international arena. It was from the USSR he saw a major threat to the U.S.: the USSR he treated as the death dangerous opponent to the United States and argued that the United States

⁷⁵ Melvyn Leffler, *A Predominance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 132.

⁷⁶ Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), p. 141.

found itself in a situation where “may lose even without a firing a shot.”⁷⁷ U.S. Secretary of State related the Soviet threat with the Communist regime of Soviet Union (i.e. the Soviet system) that made a risk for U.S. imminent and programmed in nature of the USSR (in this aspect the thoughts of Acheson are similar to those expressed by G.F. Kennan in the telegram of 1946 and to C. Clifford as well): according to D. Acheson, the Communists in the Soviet government, are operating under unacceptable principles many for many states and believe that “the aim justifies the means”, that “the individual’s human dignity is not important for state’s interests.”⁷⁸

D. Acheson’s vision of the Soviet containment in the context of containment’s conception is distinguished by its militancy – in particular in the field of containment’s instruments. If G.F. Kennan called for diplomatic measures, H.F. Matthews advised the use of military force in the worst case, so D. Acheson’s position is similar to C. Clifford’s who stressed military means. While the arguments for military force are characteristic to D. Acheson throughout his U.S. Secretary of State career (1949-1953), the U.S. military strategy was revised in the context of foreign policy and established for the time being in 1950, when NSC document -68 (National Security Council, NSC) was adopted by the National Security Council. NSC-68, to which D. Acheson made a significant impact, proposed the creation of U.S. military force “much superior than any other in the world.”⁷⁹ Military force in this document was highlighted as a key element of power and had to “deter the USSR, if possible, from the expansion, and the combat, if necessary, the Soviet aggressive actions of limited or global character.”⁸⁰ NSC-68 document gives the impression that D. Acheson did not rule out the possibility to use not only conventional weapons but also nuclear forces, which indicates that the USSR was perceived as fatal and serious threat.

It seems that changing trends in the international arena influenced the distinction of strategically important regions for the U.S that should become the part of USSR’s containment’s realization. D. Acheson, like other makers of containment’s concept, among geopolitically important regions for the U.S. primarily distinguished Europe (focusing on Germany’s situation and NATO) and also drew a U.S. defence perimeter indicating strategically important areas for the U.S. that was new in the concept of containment. D. Acheson’s career as U.S.

⁷⁷ “‘Total Diplomacy’ to Strengthen United States Leadership for Human Freedom,” Summary of Remarks by the Secretary of State (February 16, 1950): 6; in: *American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1950-1955*. Vol. I (New York: Arno Press, 1971).

⁷⁸ “Tensions Between the United States and The Soviet Union,” Address by the Secretary of State (March 16, 1950): 1930; in: *American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1950-1955*. Vol. II (New York: Arno Press, 1971).

⁷⁹ “National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68),” (April 1950): 127; in: Stephen J. Valone, *Two Centuries of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Documentary Record* (Westport: Praeger, 1995).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Secretary of State shows his focused attention on Germany, which also relates to the USSR containment. Most likely, predicting the likelihood that Germany may find itself in the Soviet sphere of influence, D. Acheson called for Germany to be integrated into the Western community and structures rather than a separate unit because then it would be in a situation where it "will have to choose between East and West".⁸¹

In the context of containment's conception, D. Acheson is unique because he devoted considerable attention to the Asian region while implementing containment. He set the U.S. defence perimeter – strategically important regions for U.S. in Asia – which prescribes the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Philippines.⁸² Paradoxically, however, South Korea, which after several years (1950) was attacked by North Korea (who had been pushed by the Soviet Union), was not included in the perimeter, which illustrates the limitations of D. Acheson's containment concept.

D. Acheson contributed to the conception of containment, bringing such principles as a consolidation of military force in containment (in the official document), Europe's increasing dependence on the United States, the development of the U.S. defence perimeter, and the gradual formation of containment according to the circumstances in the international arena.

4. ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORY

The concept of engagement has different interpretations in the sphere of international relations. Manager of „Brookings Institution“ Richard Haas and his colleague Meghan O'Sullivan defined engagement as the provision of incentives for a particular state in order to shape its behaviour in the desired direction.⁸³ Professor of Georgetown University Victor Cha describes engagement as "strategic interaction process to encourage an adversary to co-operate."⁸⁴

The general theoretical concept of engagement as a power balancing strategy for the bilateral relations between countries does not exist. Also it is difficult to single out the specialists of international relations that could be described as theorists of engagement, since the concept of engagement did not develop as consistently as the concept of containment – in studies of international relations only the analysis of a certain state's foreign policy during the particular period, when engagement dominated, can be detected.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*: 132.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 2000), p. 2.

⁸⁴ Victor Cha, "Engaging North Korea Credibly," *Survival* 42, 2 (Summer 2000): 137.

By examining the theoretical concept of containment it is possible to focus on its evolution through the time and on attitudes towards Russia (or USSR), since it was created precisely to balance Soviet power. In the analysis of engagement as a means of foreign policy attention the focus falls on the study of its possible types (in accordance with the instruments and the approach to the target country), since it is through such a prism that engagement is analyzed. However, engagement can be considered a theory, as it interprets and predicts how to approach the problem of balancing out the behaviour of an adversary.

As in the case of containment, engagement also falls into the category of middle-range theories, since it explains one of the aspects of realism, power balancing; but it also has a specific approach to this phenomenon, as it stresses different tools of power balancing, and their implementation situations.

In the study of bilateral relations between states it is generally possible to detect such theoretical approaches to engagement: an approach to engagement as hawk, realistic, economic, unconditional and conditional engagement.

Hawk Engagement

The theoretical approach to engagement as hawk engagement is unique because, unlike most engagement concepts, it is very strict towards the target of the state and does not assume that the target state may completely change its foreign policy course. This is a concept of tough and „exploratory“ engagement.

This type of engagement can be called „exploratory“ because, as lecturer of Merrimack University’s Faculty of Political Science Curtis Martin remarks, hawk engagement is a way to check whether the target state is non-greedy (in this case engagement will cause changes in the policy of a target state- therefore, is appropriate), or greedy (in this case the use of sanctions will be more effective).⁸⁵ Proponents of hawk engagement assume that the so-called “greedy” states, against which they recommend the use of sanctions, can be identified by their behaviour during the implementation of engagement. A greedy state, according to James Davis; “has no desire or intention to change their behaviour.”⁸⁶ Probably because of the latter feature theorists of engagement recommend the use of it in specific situations where the target state has reliable weaponry and may provoke a military response in advance, rather than capitulation.

⁸⁵ Curtis Martin, “The Many Faces of Hawk Engagement: A Critical Examination of Victor D. Cha’s Strategy for U.S.-DPRK Diplomacy,” A Paper Presented at the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (February 28 – March 3, 2007) // http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/9/3/p178937_index.html (accessed January 1, 2010).

⁸⁶ James W. Davis, *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 31-32.

Objectives of hawk engagement presuppose that this form of engagement is recommended in relations with unpredictable states. According to academics, while implementing the hawk engagement the state seeks a dual purpose (as opposed to other types of engagement): the strategy aims both to help the target state to transform its situation and cooperate with it and sets the stage for possible violence if the target state refused to co-operate. The target state is encouraged to collaborate, demonstrating the benefits of the *status quo*, and promising an incentive in exchange for peace talks, so this form of engagement is often called the option preventive defence.⁸⁷

As V. Cha points out, "today's carrots tomorrow may be the most effective stick":⁸⁸ by presenting the benefits of the status quo to the target state and then threatening to use sanctions, more positive results would be achieved because if the target state had really chosen to adjust its foreign policy course, it will not want to renounce its favourable status quo. In order to encourage the target country to change its behaviour hawk engagement uses both non-coercive and non-punishable pressure measures such as, for example, different levels of inter-state dialogue, information exchange, financial support (positive initiatives), the economic embargo, etc. (negative). Unlike realizing many forms of engagement three sides are included in the the process of its use: not just engagement implementing state, target state, but also allies – "a coalition of punishment."⁸⁹ From the theorists' point of view, for hawk engagement, unlike for other forms of this strategy, a risk of conflict with the target state is acceptable, if the target state refuses to adjust its foreign policy course. According to Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, hawk engagement often does not rule out the possibility of using other policy measures, not excluding the use of force and military, if the cooperation collapses.⁹⁰ For this reason, hawk engagement may be called the concept of strict engagement.

Thus, hawk engagement seeks not only to co-operate with the target country in a variety of measures. In the concept of this strategy scepticism is encoded and its actual aim is to reveal the hidden aggressive plans of the target state using the negotiations with which will subsequently be dealt by other foreign policy instruments.

Realistic Engagement

A vision of realistic engagement that balances between the interruption of risky contacts (or containment) and widely used engagement was offered by

⁸⁷ Victor Cha, „Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,“ *International Security* 27(1) (2002): 40-78.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Victor Cha, *supra* note 84.

⁹⁰ Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, *The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Going Critical* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), p. 184.

professor of Stanford University, Michael McFault. The approach to engagement as realistic engagement looks realistic (rationally and practically) at the key defining aspects of the strategy – the strategy terms, means, using situation, goals.

It can be argued that precisely here is the exclusivity of this theoretical approach to engagement. Having a realistic view to engagement, the state that applies this strategy develops a dialogue with a target country having well-calculated expectations on the realization speed and requirements of the process. According to the representatives of this theoretical approach, the player of international relations, while using a realistic engagement, reduces the short-term expectations and focuses on long-term goals because to change the target state's policy in short term is not realistic – that is behaving rationally because takes into account the possible obstacles and restrictions. M. McFault calls realistic engagement patient and long-term engagement not performed in vain.⁹¹ The main objective of the strategy to transform the target state from the enemy into ally is similar to those of other concepts.

Another unique aspect of realistic engagement are the instruments of engagement. Representatives of realistic engagement call not to take the measures recommended by the majority of other theoretical approaches to engagement – i.e., not give too much hope for the efficiency of economic aid, technical assistance (for example, advice on drafting a new legislative base), and reduction of requirements accessing international organizations. Proponents of realistic engagement focus on such instruments as the arms control regime, engagement of the target state into the Western international organizations on equal terms with other countries, and speeding up political reforms. Arms control regime, from an academic perspective, would show that the state implementing engagement does not seek strategic advantage against the target state – that would help to build mutual trust. However, it is well advised to rely on the principle „trust, but check“-that highlights rational and practical aspect. Integration into Western international organizations (especially economic) would contribute to the transparency of the target state's economy and the in-draught of foreign financial capital but it should be on equal terms with other countries in order to make the target state learn to comply with international obligations. Promotion of political reforms, according to supporters of realistic engagement, would facilitate the integration into international organizations (would include such tools as contacts with political organizations in the target state and its promotion).⁹²

⁹¹ Michael A. McFaul, "Realistic Engagement: A New Approach to American-Russian Relations," *Current History* Vol. 100, No. 648 (October 2001).

⁹² *Ibid.*

Such exclusivity of realistic engagement (a realistic approach to engagement process, tools) indicates that this strategy is suitable to use in relations with specific countries, which, theorists say, "are not friends, but are not enemies"⁹³: that is with complicated but strategically important states (for example, Russia, China). Since the development of relations with such states is difficult, realistic engagement uses well-defined rules for the target countries and strict time frames to implement the requirements that are set out in the light of the circumstances and possible obstacles.

Thus, the state that is applying realistic engagement behaves rationally and prudently, strictly determines time frames, rules (which target state is able to implement), focuses on long-term goals and the final result, uses such instruments as could affect the behaviour of the target state in the spheres of security and policy (arms control, political reforms). Such a state is behaving according to the core principles of the theory of realism.

Economic Engagement

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state's behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.⁹⁴

Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state's run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.⁹⁵ Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective.

Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, "Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 43, No. 5. (2006).

⁹⁵ Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott Kastner, "Assesing the Policy of Engagement with China," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (1998) // <http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/PP/pp40> (accessed January 1, 2010).

focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.⁹⁷

Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state's dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence).

However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state's political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state's forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country's dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.⁹⁸

Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, *supra* note 94.

⁹⁸ Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott Kastner, *supra* note 95.

promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state's behaviour.⁹⁹

Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state's foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state's foreign policy objectives.¹⁰⁰

Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

Conditional and Unconditional Engagement

Among the various theoretical attempts to define an approach to engagement, both conditional engagement and unconditional engagement can be detected. If professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and professor of the University of Maryland Scott Kastner are responsible for the concepts of conditional and unconditional economic engagement, manager of „Brookings Institution“ Richard Haas and his colleague Meghan O'Sullivan developed a broader understanding of engagement, since P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner limited the definition of engagement only to economic instruments.

R. Haas and M. O'Sullivan define engagement as a foreign policy strategy which aims to influence the target state's foreign policy (or other policy) with incentives. Depending on what engagement implementing state requires in exchange for offered incentives these theorists distinguish two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional engagement. Conditional engagement, according to R. Haas and M. O'Sullivan, is the type of intergovernmental relations where the target state is offered incentives in exchange for specific changes in its domestic and foreign policy. Meanwhile, unconditioned engagement is less binding as incentives for the target state are offered without any expectations that the target state will react in positive compensatory measures.¹⁰¹ Therefore, it can be argued that unconditional engagement because its soft nature is very appropriate

⁹⁹ Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, *supra* note 94.

¹⁰⁰ Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, *supra* note 94.

¹⁰¹ Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Engaging Problem Countries," *Policy Brief* No. 61 (June 2000) // <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb61.pdf> (accessed January 1, 2010).

instrument of foreign policy to develop environment for reforms in the target country.

R. Haas and M. O'Sullivan focus on the tools and conditions for engagement in the concept of engagement – i.e. what other conceptions of engagement are lacking. Sanctions as an instrument in engagement are viewed with caution (particularly in the conditional engagement), and incentives are more readily promoted. Academics say that sanctions should be seen as a means to seek further goals, as part of the negotiations, and not a definitive finding, because in their view, conditional engagement requires a new approach to sanctions: the imposition of sanctions or their removal in case of the conditional engagement should be part of a broader strategy. Unconditional engagement also calls for more flexible approach: these theorists generally do not recommend sanctions, unless the target country poses a direct threat because sanctions limit inter-governmental contacts – and this reduces the opportunity to negotiate and modify the behaviour of the target state.¹⁰²

As already stated in the definition of engagement submitted by theorists, conception of conditional and unconditional engagement embraces a range of instruments – economic, political and cultural incentives – in order to change the behaviour of the target state of in one or more spheres. In the implementation of unconditional engagement cultural incentives are believed to give the most positive results because they promote adverse regime change the most. Cultural incentives are distinguished as the most effective tool for its accessibility. They are the only available instruments of engagement. Then domestic political groups or many players in the international system favour the isolation of the target regime and therefore prevents any negotiations with the target country, and even more the implementation of engagement. Economic instruments in the concept of engagement are one of the choices: they recommended implementing unconditional engagement, especially when the target state's economy is completely controlled by the government.¹⁰³

Conditional and unconditional engagement approaches give the impression that the implementation of such forms of engagement requires time (these theorists, unlike the others, draws attention to the time factor in the implementation of engagement) and effort. The first condition given by R. Haas and M. O'Sullivan for the successful realization of engagement is the need to create a network of allies and to consult with them. Failure to consult with the other actors in the international system, according to these theorists, increases the chance that

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

another state will stifle the implementation of conditional engagement by offering similar benefits, but without demanding anything in return (in target state's policy).

It is noted that the proposed incentives for cooperation must be accompanied by a precise penalty named in the case of default of the target state. It is noteworthy that theorists raise many more requirements for the realization of conditional engagement than for any other form of engagement. In addition to previously mentioned conditions, theorists have a few more, such as the well established road map, which contains the conditions that the target state is required to meet, and the benefits they both will get when the relationship improves, and preparation of the political climate in their state.¹⁰⁴ It can be argued that a carefully prepared road map increases the likelihood of positive results of engagement because it obliges the target state to develop a favorable foreign policy course. If the target state finds that it can reach the next stage of the bilateral relations without fulfilling certain conditions or implementation of the commitments will not be considered, engagement can become meaningless because it is unlikely that the target state in this case will change its policy. Success of engagement also depends on the political climate in its own state because, as the theorists note, the implementation of engagement often fails when political groups are opposed to engagement.¹⁰⁵

Summarizing the observations of R. Haas and M. O'Sullivan, it can be assumed that the proposed conditional and unconditional engagement model brought detailed description of instruments and situation, and is unique because of the proposed condition factor in relations with the target state.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The most remarkable differences between the meta-theories and middle-range theories are the scope and the investigational level of analyzed phenomenon. If a meta-theory is often described as a theory which theorizes about theories of certain phenomenon (i.e. the most sophisticated theory) and has a broad scope for the test events (examines various aspects of certain phenomenon), then the middle-range theory is a level below a meta-theory (namely meta-theory can theorize about the middle-range theories) and the scope of its analyzed phenomena is more limited. Middle-range theories also have such features as simplicity and a specific approach to a particular phenomenon.

2. Realism can be considered a meta-theory because this theory analyzes international relations through the broad scope of aspects: international actors, the

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

nature of international relations (anarchy), the driving force in international relations (power), the dominant actions in actors' foreign policy (power balancing). Also it includes lower-level theories in its content: containment, engagement, and deterrence, which focus the attention on power balancing (one of the aspects of realism).

3. Containment may be called a middle-range theory because U.S. state officials that shaped the concept of containment stressed that the purpose of containment is the limitation of Soviet power by various means in strategically important spots of the world (i.e., a specific approach to power balancing); they clearly set out the recommended instruments of containment, regions, the approach to the main U.S. adversary (i.e., the simplicity of theory); in the small scope, they focus on only the opponent's power balancing.

4. Engagement can be viewed as a middle-range theory, since, like containment, it meets the essential criteria of middle-range theory: limited scope (attention is concentrated only to power balancing), specific treatment of certain phenomenon (proponents of engagement, contrary to the case of containment, claim that adversary's power may be balanced not limiting it, but trying to change the adversary's foreign policy course and to bring to its impact sphere of influence thus shifting the power balance in its favor), and simplicity (clearly explained views to the tools of engagement and their use in situations).

5. Containment and engagement can be called middle-range theories, since they are power balancing theories (one of the principal aspects of realism as international relations theory), they analyze this phenomenon from a specific point of view (individual approaches to the instruments, regions, targets), and they are comprehensive and stay within the field of power balancing analysis.

APPENDIX

CONTAINMENT AND POWER BALANCING

Table 1

	Power balancing		
	Evaluation of USSR	Instruments	Regions
G. F. Kennan	Adversary. Political and ideological threat.	Economic, political instruments.	Europe, Japan, British Isles, other centers of power.
H. F. Matthews	Adversary. Ideological threat.	Wide range of instruments: from diplomacy to military force.	Europe, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan
C. Clifford	Very powerful adversary. Ideological threat.	Military means (including nuclear weapons)	Every democratic country (special attention to Europe, Middle East, Japan,)
D. Acheson	Very powerful adversary.	Military means (including nuclear weapons)	Europe, Asia

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