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The Position of Militarism in Trump's Foreign Policy

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Abstract

The following article investigates the relationship between Trump and militarization. The position of militarization in Trump's policies and his approach considering how to use this component in US foreign policy is an important issue that has not received much attention. The key question that has been raised in this regard is that how militarism plays a role in Trump's foreign policy and how he uses it in American foreign policy. The present article is a descriptive-analytic one and the library method is used to investigate the raised questions. The results of the study indicate that Trump has paid precise attention to militarization, and Trump's militarization approach is largely based on threat and coercive diplomacy as well as sanctions. In fact, Trump has been working to bolster US military capability while at the same time trying to use the military as an important element in forcing other countries to supply the US interests. Base on his foreign policy approach, Trump, of course, is not willing to directly use American military power. He is primarily trying to use the US military capability along with sanctions as means of force and pressure.

Keywords

Trump, Militarism, Coercive Diplomacy, Sanctions

1. Introduction

The article is going to investigate the relationship between Trump and militarism. Militarization is the belief that war and being ready for it are always one of the most important tasks of all the nation and the highest form of public service. (Shokhi Azar & Gyvki, 2011: 182) It should be noted here that militarism is a thought and behavior that is militarized first in the face of events and crises. Considering the works and ideas of the founders of the United States in the field of foreign policy, it can be inferred that their political-military strategy was based on four principles: 1. Military force is the principal instrument and also the instrumental way for resolving international political disputes and is the final arbiter of international conflicts; 2. United States behavior in the field of global disputes should be based on the country's "vital interests"; 3. In the light of divine providence, the United States has a special task and a liberating mission for humanity . 4. Turning to war as a predestination. Since the end of the nineteenth century, US foreign policy has focused on the use of power; (Nairi, 2005: 9). With the increased military capabilities in the United States, the government of this country has resorted to more military intervention to repel other powerful states, along with political-diplomatic interventions. After two world wars, the United States topped the capitalist camp economically, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it gained unquestionable military superiority. Militarism has meant strengthening the foundation and military power of one of the fundamental tenets of American foreign policy, especially after World War II. The United States is in the top rank considering military power and is located far away from other countries like Russia. (Baluji, 1394: 68) It has always used military power to advance its interests. With Trump's presidency different views on the approach and nature of his foreign policy has been raised. Based on what has been said, the key question raised in this regard is what is the role of militarization in Trump's foreign policy? And on what is Trump's militaristic approach based on? In order to examine and answer the question raised, first, the role of militarization in Trump's foreign policy is analyzed, and in the following, there is an overview of how Trump's approach to militarization is based and how he uses this component to advance US resources.

2. Owners of militarism and military weapons factories in US foreign policy

To convince public opinion, military arms manufacturers relate military budget to matters such as national defense, technology development and economic stability. After convincing US public opinion, billions of dollars of defense funding are approved by congressional delegates and delegates who were the proponents of this project will be rewarded because of the election conflicts after approving the

budget. After the budget is approved, billions of dollars are poured into the Department of Defense and from there to military factories, arms companies, military bases and research institutes. (Shahnazi, 1394: 4) From 1947 to 1990, US military spending totaled \$ 8.7 trillion and, despite the Soviet collapse, military spending not only did not decline, but increased. The level of US military spending has grown 81 percent in 2010, compared with 2001. The US military budget has grown by 5.3 percent each year annually over 2001 to 2010. However, the overall US budget has grown 1.6 percent over these years. Military budget share of GDP from 2001 to 2010 years has grown from 3% to 4.7%. The US military budget reached \$ 690 billion in 2010, which is 67 percent more than in 2001. Most of the increase in military spending during 2001 to 2010 is due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These two wars cost \$ 165.3 billion in 2010 and \$ 1.1 trillion over the past decade. (2011: 5 Pollin & Garret-Peltier)

The above-mentioned statistics show that not only the military spending has not fallen since the end of the Cold War, but it has also risen intensively and accounts for a significant proportion of US annual budgets. Owners of military weapons factories, with the help of their study and propaganda forces, have been able to persuade decision-makers in the United States, including Congress and the Senate, to convince people of the United States that these costs are beneficial to the US economy and industry. In addition to weapons manufacturers, defense, engineering, and welfare companies also will achieve a significant benefit. According to a survey in March of 2011, the number of private contractor forces in Iraq was 155 thousand, which was a higher number comparing to 145 thousand official military forces. In Iraq, more than 60 percent of contractors are involved in services such as food preparation, cloth cleaning, machinery maintenance, and energy and equipment relocation. Some are also working to protect embassies, important personalities and also infrastructures such as oil pipelines and some are trying to train Iraqi forces. Or, for example, the most well-known contractor of rebuilding and support is Clog-Brown & Root company, which was part of Halliburton company until 2007. Halliburton contracts increased by more than 10 times from February of 2002 to February of 2006, in order to reconstruct Iraq's oil infrastructure and provide logistical support for US troops in Iraq (Hartung, 2011:2).

In this respect, the owners of the military arms factories also have a strong alliance with the oil industry, which is often located in unstable areas. Dick Chin's career path showed that he had a very close relationship with oil companies and owners of military weapons factories. He was Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton Oil Services and previously Secretary of Defense. Also, he was a member of Congress in the 1980s and one of the prominent members of the Congressional Intelligence Committee that was involved in covering up Reagan's covert operations. It should also be noted that his wife, Lynn Cheney is one of the leading directors of Lockheed Martin company which is one of the largest arms manufacturers in the world, a company that has benefited greatly from military

contracts during the war on terrorism (Sadeghi, Rahimi, 1394: 24) Interestingly enough, these contracting companies are often subsidiaries of major and well-known American companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Reighton and General Dynamics and in addition to focusing on weapons, missiles, aircraft, tanks, aircraft, etc., they are significantly active in oil, security and welfare.

The Pentagon-centric decision-making structure within the US military-owned plant is known as the Steel Triangle. This triangle on one side identifies civilian agents including the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the armed forces committees in both the Senate and the Council, intelligence agencies and US military policy research centers. The second side of the triangle, US military entities, including Army Joint Chiefs of Staff, top Air, Land and Naval Generals and Marines, Regional Commanders and former military personnel, including the American Legion and former participants in overseas wars, serve as their second supporters. On the third and third sides of the triangle are some 85,000 private companies that have a lot to gain from contracting with the US Department of Defense. Around this triangle, there is also a vast network of institutions funded by the Ministry of Defense or the private sector, working to research, advise, or activate political lobbies or pressure groups (Hosseinzadeh, 1389: 42).

In the early years of the 21st century, the United States has pursued more militaristic policies than ever before, and to justify this, policies based on confrontation constitute a major part of the reports of US government agencies. In these policies, many countries in the world are at the forefront of what can be a challenging future for the United States. For this reason, during the 1990s and in the early years of this century, various lobbies, representatives, groups and reports have called for US military action against China, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, critical regions of Africa and some other places and in some cases this action becomes practical. With the victory of Bush and the arrival of the Conservative faction in power, most of those who start theorizing about the necessity of US military action in various parts of the world and most of their views, could be of great concern to the United States and have practically carried out all military and political tasks. Most of these individuals also, with the change in the group experts, introduced those into the executive and study sectors who had strategic views and were more threat-oriented than peace-oriented, or opportunity-based. Such thinking is not the result of the cautious views of foreign policy-makers, but it is the military-minded ones (Shokouhi Azar, Gyuki, 1390: 12).

3. The place of militarization in Trump's policies

Donald Trump came to power as the Forty-fifth President of the United States and one of his top priorities at election demonstrations has been to portray the failure of the US military and the failure of its foreign policy. The resurgence of military power and the restoration of military authority were obvious in his electoral slogans as well as his warlike positions. Trump's slogans, and in particular the

decision-making forces in the United States, which include intelligence, security and military officials with particular approaches, mostly frustrated by the approaches they call contrite, call for decisive military action. One of his first steps after coming to power was to rebuild and strengthen the military US bases. On January 7th, a week after his inauguration, Trump signed an executive order to rebuild the United States' conventional, nuclear and cyber weapons capability. The order also explicitly emphasizes the more active role of nuclear weapons in future US foreign policy, including modernizing nuclear arsenals and missile defense systems and enhancing their role as tool to "deterrent of 21st century threats" and "achieve the presidency in the event of a deterrent failure". The stockpile and modernization of weapons should be adopted by 2020. Trump tweeted this expansion of nuclear arsenals: The United States must enhance and expand its nuclear power so that the world can come to its senses (Hessler, 2017).

Trump views military power as a deterrent. He also emphasizes the importance of the power of the state and it can be considered that Trump is the result of the globalization of liberalism. The globalization of liberalism has had consequences such as the weakening of the national government and sovereignty. However, on the whole, Trump appears to be opposed to the military option simply because of its high costs and no achievement and also his isolationist tendencies in the economy. In fact, it is "the economic outlook and the calculation of profits and losses that justify the continuation of this approach in the new US foreign policy" (Yazdan Fam, 1395: 151).

Trump's foreign policy is the destruction of "internationalism", an idea that has been the ideological basis of American foreign policy since the 1950s. Trumpism is a political and intellectual trend that has been supported in some liberal societies (such as Marie Lupine in France and Great Wilder in the Netherlands). Trumpism is in fact an isolationist approach against liberalism (Alili 3:2017,3). This isolationism places particular emphasis on enhancing US military capability. According to Trump, the Obama administration's decline in military spending has undermined US military power and has given other governments inappropriate messages because of their inability to use military power and also it has made them more aggressive toward America. The United States alone pays the cost of the security, and others have advanced in the shadow of it, disregarding the United States which made it (Yazdanfam,2:1). "My government is rebuilding the military," Trump said in a speech in 2016 during a series of voter appreciation trips in Fayetteville, USA. "We do not want to have spiritless forces by going and fighting in places where we should not fight," he said. (2016, The Netherlands).

Obama wanted America to be powerful enough to shape global affairs, but Trump seems to want a powerful American to sell the security goods to others in a frightening and unstable environment (Yazdan Fam, 1395: 153) Trump, through scaring enemies, for example scaring the East Asian nations from North Korea and the Middle East governments from Iran, and on the other hand, allows them to buy and acquire sophisticated US weapons to address their concerns. This way it sells the security product to others.

The military-security field seems to be a good place to pursue "revival of America" strategy. "Increasing US military funding will allow the Trump administration to guarantee both America's first place in the world and sell its manufactured security to others, also it will help them to restore US lost credibility by exercising power and show the dire consequences of ignoring America." (Yazdan Fam, 1395: 150). From the realists' point of view, war is not the only way to impose will for a strong government, but it can compel them to accept their desires by frightening others. According to many experts, the Trump cabinet has been the most radical American cabinet in at least the last two decades, with the Republican Party's most militant and extremist people gathered. In this group, the majority is with the generals, and in the mental background most of them there is a prominent military option on any issue." (Yazdan Fam, 1395: 144). In the past few decades, no high-ranking military has held the key positions of power so high as in the current US administration. General McMaster heads the US National Security Council, General Jim Matthews heads the Pentagon, and John Kelly heads the White House. In the past, these three key positions were often held by civilians. From this point of view, the logic of US foreign policy approaches realism. Logic of realism is very militaristic... and attributes military power and the use of force because of the inevitable consequences of the nature of world politics (Callahan, 1387: 238). Experience from past approaches shows that regional integration of realism and isolationism is possible. For example, George W. Bush was initially an isolationist, but because isolationists tend to be unilateralist, he became a spectator of the militants after the events of, 2001 and organized a costly and extensive war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The impact that the September 11th events had on Bush's foreign policy.

One of the major issues in the Trump administration is his perception of military policy. It was thought that due to Trump's personality traits and beliefs, one would have to wait for aggressive and militaristic policies during this period of US government. But with Trump's proclamation policies (aside from his policies so far, as well as other factors at the national and international level) it soon became clear that such a judgment was somewhat hasty. One week after arriving at the White House, Trump ordered the rebuilding of troops (Aminian, 1396: 213). We do not want to have spiritless forces by going and fighting in places where we should not fight," he said in his speech in 2016 in Fayetteville. (Soleymanzadeh, Omidy and Barati, 1397:13)

Of course, Trump's view toward US military strengths do not mean to use military power. Referring to Iraq and Libya, Trump described the lack of central power as the reason for the worsening situation in these countries. He believes US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are in favor of the Islamic Republic and have given Iran some opportunity. Trump believes that the opportunity costs of the intervention are too high and impose heavy costs on the US economy. In this regard, Trump said at a news conference that he did not want the United States to engage in armed conflict in Libya and he believes that they are already playing

enough roles in different parts of the world" (2017, Conway). Of course, a military solution, when the US is threatened, may be a useful and only solution, but in other situations it may be a trap that can lead to bad decisions. (Sariealghalam, 1395: 108) Trump's militarization focuses on two important components of sanctions and coercive diplomacy. Trump has shown that he is not ready to enter a military conflict that does not benefit the United States. Trump has relied on controlled conflict and conflict in various areas both for receiving costs of security from his partners and gain huge profits through arms sales. With this approach, Trump will not start a new war unless there are US interests, not economic losses. Clearly, Trump's doctrine of foreign policy has been in place in the Middle East and other security-based regions, and security is seen as a commodity in his view, and any partner who wants security must pay for it. In West Asia, Saudi Arabia against Iran, and in East Asia, countries such as Japan and South Korea have to pay security costs to the United States to counter threats to China and North Korea.

4. How Trump uses militarization

Compulsory diplomacy alongside with sanctions are the most important tools Trump uses to militarize and will be discussed in this part.

4.1. Compulsory diplomacy

The theoretical framework of the general idea of compulsory diplomacy is to support a request made by threatening to punish an opponent in the event of a disobedience, and the threat must be effective and credible enough to persuade the opponent to do what he is asked to do (4;1992,George). Compulsory diplomacy is just one of several civilian strategies that may be employed by the "defender" when confronted with an opponent's attempt to change the status quo in his own favor (George and Simons 1994: 8).

Forced diplomacy is a defensive strategy used in the face of Opponents' efforts and activities. Accordingly, one can come to terms with the concept of Compulsory diplomacy: Compulsory diplomacy is one of the defensive and civilian strategies that provide a substitute for reliance on military action. In fact, Compulsory diplomacy is a diplomatic strategic with a degree of coercion that exerts pressure in a state to persuades it to abandon its action or to return from the act that has done. This is regard it will be achieved by threatening to punish the competitor if he or she disobeys. These threats must also be sufficient, effective and credible to convince the competitor that the costs and risks of disobedience are far greater than the costs of complying with the demands of Compulsory power. To provide a model and analytical framework for the strategy of coercive diplomacy, we need to consider the factors of failure or victory in the application of this civilian strategy. Investigating these factors enables us to bridge the gap between theory and practice and to repair some of the gaps between them. Inspired by the literature on diplomacy, we propose our model in the form of two sets of variables.

The first set focuses on coercive government strategy and the second set focuses on the target state's vulnerability in both domestic politics and the target state economy (Jentleson and Whytock, 50: 2005). Both are critical to the failure or success of Compulsory diplomacy. The most likely success of coercive government strategy, and Compulsory diplomacy in general, is when the costs of rejecting coercion and coercive request, as well as the benefits of accepting them to the government, are greater than the benefits of violations and costs of acceptance. Achieving such a balance in compulsory diplomacy strategy depends on three key factors: "appropriateness", "reciprocity" and "compulsory credit" (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005: 51-3). On the other hand, as Alexander George describe it - but not necessary - diplomacy may go beyond the threat of actual use of force, but if used, it must be fully restricted and controlled in order not to be considered to be a full-fledged use of military force. The inherent limitations of the tools also make the goals limited in order for the goals and tools to fit together.

The main source of disproportion is the pursuit of a goal that goes beyond policy change or behavior change and towards regime change. Forced change of target government policies through what Alexander George and William Simmons call Type A compulsion diplomacy (persuading an opponent to give less satisfaction) or type B (forcing an opponent to return work done) could be considered as something hard. This is much more difficult through Type C goals (moderating hostile behavior by demanding a change in government composition, i.e. regime change that is distinct from policy change).

The validity of coercion requires that in addition to calculating the costs and benefits of co-operation, the coercive government persuasively sends this message to the target state that failure in co-operation will have adverse consequences. The combination of fear of coercion and the guarantee of reciprocity creates a complementary situation. The threat of the actual use of force and other means of coercion - such as economic sanctions that play an important role in coercive diplomacy - must be credible enough to increase the government's perceived costs of non-compliance and disobedience. An important point to consider in the context of the validity of coercive actions is the support of other international actors to the coercive state as well as the limited amount of dissent in domestic coercive government policy. In other words, the use of compulsory diplomacy will be more likely to succeed when it can, first, motivate other powerful international actors to support its actions, and on the other hand, there should be a relative consensus within the domestic policy of the compulsory country to respond to the threats of the target state or the amount of opposition must be very limited and controllable. It is necessary to emphasize that the validity of coercion rather than being factual must be authentic in the mind of the decision makers of the target state. So being authentic is completely psychological and metaphysical. Prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States favored a consistent pattern of interventionism, which included: "strengthening the Iranian regime", "supporting the Pahlavi monarchy" and "imposing the prime ministers". But after the victory

of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic State in Iran, the US pattern of behavior also shifted to the point where it was time for the Islamic Revolution to shift power to the American agents (Nawazani, 1383: 316).

The US government's behavioral approach to compulsory diplomacy does not have a long history. In fact, the concept of "compulsory diplomacy" is less ancient than its similar theories. In addition, when using this type of coercive behavior, the United States must have the support for other international actors, and the level of opposition to Washington's domestic policy should also be limited. In general, the use of compulsory diplomacy behavioral approach occurs when the costs of rejecting compulsory, the request of coercive government and the benefits of accepting it to the target state are more than the benefits of transgression and the costs of admission. Trump's approach is the best case for the coercion diplomacy. Iran has always been one of the main topics of US security and strategic policy. Trump's defense secretary, James Norman Mattis, can be seen as the head of the defense against Iran. In the Obama administration, he was trying to persuade the White House to attack Iran militarily. This ultimately led him to dismissal from the head of the Central Command. He calls Iran the biggest supporter of terrorism in the world. Trump himself has come up with a tweet of threats like "Iran is playing with fire" and said that the imposition of new sanctions is the way on the dispute.

When he was asked if there was a possibility of a military confrontation with Iran, he replied: "no option was removed." Like Trump and Mattis, Michelle Flynn is known for his sharp anti-Iranian stances. Prior to joining the Trump group, senior Trump theorist Stephen Bannon was also managing the Breitbart Rightist Newspaper, which regularly published critical articles against Iran. Mike Pompeo, the head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, is also among those who advocate bombing Iran's military facilities. He calls Iranian officials "chain nuclear dealers." (Regencia, 2017) The military option against Iran has always been due to obstacles such as the chaos of the Middle East and American inability to control it, high military cost, raising oil prices, retaliatory actions against U.S. bases and interests in the region, disrupting the global stability and an unwilling break out of the crisis and inability to leave; so as it is mentioned this option has never been implemented.

But there is a much more decisive factor in the military-technical-operational context, which would be a major obstacle to a US military invasion of Iran in the medium term. These factors are less prominent in political analysis, and this reflects widespread disregard for US military-political relations. The fact is that until now this military technical factor, known as the technical limitations of the offensive, has played a significant role in limiting the actual options available to the United States. Before anything, the US military must find a convincing answer to the question of whether the US military is capable of a decisive victory over the Iranian military and then at the stage of the invasion of the ground, that is, the stage of the operation, or the possibility of stabilization. In other words, the US military must show its politicians the weapons systems they can deal effectively

with Iran's weapons. And then they must try to persuade politicians that the plans and actions of the Iranian Armed Forces will be in the main phase of the battle and will be ineffective at the stage of stabilization. If the answer is yes, US politicians will have the opportunity to issue a decree of military aggression. Ultimately, the US's doubt and dissuasion from using force against Iran especially after Iran's overthrow of the UAV and the missile attacks on Saudi Aramco refinery, implies that Trump is trying solely on its military capability in a form of coercion diplomacy.

4.2. Use of sanctions as a tool of compulsory diplomacy

International sanctions are punitive proceedings, but without resorting to warfare waged by one or a group of governments against one or a group of the target states. The purpose of these measures is usually to change certain target governments' behavior. Sanction is a coercive act that can signal the creation or intensification of hostilities, without necessarily leading to military action. Although diplomacy has not yet ended during the sanction, it has entered an unfriendly environment and may eventually lead to war. Sanctions take many forms. Among them, the military-weapon type is more common than others. Among them, the military-weapon type is more common than others, and it existed, even if there is a friendly atmosphere between governments. Governments usually refuse to give some of their armaments or high-tech weapons even to their friends. Arms embargo, as seen in treaties like that of the PT, may be a ban on the production of certain weapons despite the availability of their technology. While weapons sanctions can produce tangible effects in wars during wars, they do not have a devastating effect in normal circumstances.

Governments normally use economic sanctions to change the way competitors treat their enemies. Accordingly, the focus of the present study is also on economic sanctions. Given the crucial role of economic indicators in national welfare, economic sanctions can have tangible effects on the national economy and even affect political stability. Thus, economic sanctions can stimulate the target state's motivation to meet the demands of the sanctioned government. It is common in the definition of economic sanctions to say, "It is an act to change the target state's behavior." This is what sanctioning governments emphasize on their declarative policies. But it should not be overlooked that limiting sanctions to this goal may be misleading. It is likely that the sanction's real impetus will go beyond the behavior changing and become particularly a kind of setup to regime change.

There is a great deal of congruence between economic sanctions and economic warfare. Economic warfare as stated in Oxford English culture, economic strategy consists of a set of measures whose primary effect is to weaken the economy of another state, but is usually aimed at achieving more fundamental political and security goals. During a military war between two or more countries, they may use economic warfare techniques such as economic blockade or destruction of the economic infrastructure of the other party as a complement to military warfare and facilitating victory, but any economic warfare is not necessarily

combined with military warfare and may be used as an alternative. When two governments are relatively equitable in military capability or because there is no reason to believe the effectiveness of violent means, the side that has a stronger economy has the incentive to use non-violent means of economic warfare as a cheaper alternative.

In today's world, the tools have become as more varied as the tendency to use a quiet economic war as an alternative to military warfare has increased. (Rosenberg et al, April 2016) Although sanctions, as a civilian measure of deterrence or incitement to particular conduct, have long been in international relations, they have become more important since the 20th century, and especially in the post-Cold War era. The widespread use of economic sanctions has been an important feature of post-Cold War international relations, a group of governments and the United States as the pioneer, play the forefront role of this process. The US government has targeted specific countries under various sanctions, including human rights violations, drug smuggling, terrorism and nuclear extension. Washington has unilaterally imposed sanctions if international entente does not occur. It may perhaps be concluded by economic logic that since sanctions act as a double-edged sword (claymore) in an age of interdependence, it is irrational. But the boycott has a political rationale in which the simplest term can be expressed as "economic hardship in exchange for political gain." (Elliott, 2005: 3-4)

The most important example of sanctions as a tool of diplomacy is the imposition of sanctions on Trump against Iran. Trump not only returned his country's unilateral nuclear sanctions, but also announced that new sanctions would be added. "We will impose the highest level of economic sanctions," he said. " Any nation that helps Iran pursue nuclear weapons may be strongly targeted by US sanctions" (Trump, May 8, 2018). The US government's decision has received widespread negative reactions, including from the Obama's administration heads. Washington's close federations in Europe, rejecting the decision, reiterated that the nuclear deal is a multilateral agreement and that its unilateral cancellation would not be acceptable .

In a speech explaining the US strategy for Iran in October 2017, the US President emphasized that Iran has always appeared hostile towards the United States over the past four decades and has continued to do so even after JCPOA: "As I have said many times, the Iran deal is one of the worst and unilateral deals the United States has ever entered into. The thinking that created this deal is the one that has been responsible for many years of terrible business deals and has sacrificed millions of jobs in our country for the benefit of other countries. We are going to need negotiators who represent America's interests more strongly. Trump criticized Obama's administration for why he saved it by lifting sanctions just when the Iranian political system was about to collapse. He accused Iran of contravention the agreement and said it could not and would not confirm Iran's commitment to the agreement .

Trump also announced that he will work to reform substantially in Comprehensive Joint Action Plan with Congress while trying to impose new sanctions. (Trump, October 13, 2017) The new US administration took every opportunity to

exert pressure and sanctions on Iran. For example, in January 2008, on the eve of the two-year anniversary of the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan, pursuant the brutal protests that took place in several Iranian cities, the government introduced a new sanctions list in which, in addition to missile and weapons programs, human rights violations were also identified as the new sanctions. Fourteen individuals and companies associated with Iran, including the head of the judiciary, were placed on the sanctions list. The sanctions came as the Trump administration was preparing to announce a 120-days suspension of its nuclear sanctions. A few hours after the sanctions were announced, the US president issued a new warning, agreeing to a four-month suspension, but he insisted that this was the last time the United States would agree to suspend sanctions unless serious reforms were made to the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan .

5 .Conclusion

This article examines the question that what the militarism's place is in Trump's policies. The results showed that Trump came to power while he considered the previous presidents were responsible for tarnishing the US military image and he explicitly said that the United States has failed in all of the past wars and that he sets his goal to bring America back to a glittering era. His military agendas in the first steps and the establishment of the military right-wing cabinet herald the beginning of a period of militarization. On the other hand, all those who have been elected as Trump's cabinet can be regarded as those who have a conservative approach to security-oriented ideas .

Choosing those who have been in the military affairs and has dreamed of military options, as well as Trump's slogans and his initial actions suggest that the United States is entering a period of militarization internationally. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been the target of the group's political-military approach. That's what can be elicited from Trump and his team's thoughts and statements .

Another question in the article was about how Trump uses the military component in his foreign policy. The results show that Trump uses militarism in the form of coercive diplomacy to exert pressure on the opposition and serve the US national interest. In addition, the results of the study showed that sanctions as a complement to pressure diplomacy have gone far beyond a tool and become one of the key pillars of US foreign policy. The Trump administration, for example, has put the option of changing Iran's missile and regional policies on the list of terrorist organizations of the State Department, using the trick of reversing nuclear sanctions and placing the Revolutionary Guards on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. Given the heavy dependence on Iran's annual budget and development plans for oil and gas exports, the US government and Congress believe that Tehran will have to make concessions to boycott supporters, if the cost of sanctions is so high as to cripple Iran's economic and banking arteries. At the same time, the Trump administration, through its European and regional allies, sends signals to Iran that America's priority is to change behavior. In US diplomacy

strategy, the EU's mediating role in managing the tension between Washington and Tehran will be strengthened. Washington acknowledges that maintaining the US market is much more important to the EU than Iran. Investigating the behavior of European companies has shown that they paid US Treasury fines but refused to cut business and economic ties with the US.

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