Defence Economics In Indonesian “Semesta” War Strategy

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Abstract:
The strategy of the Semesta War is part of an Indonesian National Defense System. The purpose of this study is to show that the strategy of the Semesta War was not a total war and was not just a guerrilla war, although guerrilla tactics were part of it. It is also different from the People’s War from Mao’s Strategy. So, what is Semesta War looks like? We can understand this strategy from Indonesian History. A Trikora operation was the largest military strike Indonesia had ever planned and titled, with the aim of a massive attack on the Dutch military forces in the land of West New Guinea. But rather than showing the Semesta War Strategy succeeded, The studies will show the impact of the Semesta War strategy from a Defense Economics perspective. The writing employs historical methods of heuristic criticism consisting of internal and external criticism and the historiography of history in which interpretation, exposition, and presentation from a literature study of the writings of the perpetrators of Trikora history. The results suggest that operation Trikora is one of the implementations of the Indonesia Semesta War Strategy, it was successful to achieve its strategic goal, but, with expensive sacrifice.

Keywords; Defense; Economics; Semesta War Strategy; Trikora Operation; National Defense

Introduction
"It's the people who are at war, not just the armed forces. It was the people who declared war, determining peace, and gave birth to its armed forces. The armed forces are the spearhead of the people, directed by the people as well "so stated General A.H.Nasution in his book on Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. Furthermore, it is stated that the present war is no longer between the army and the army alone, now the people who fight are the people, the people as a whole. The turbulent war is not only in the battle area, the war is semesta (universe)-turbulent, although the final decision is determined by the lose-win of the two opposing armed forces. Therefore, the science of war is no longer just a science of war that is specialized in strategy, tactics, and logistics, but also about politics, military, psychology, and economics, anything else (“A.H. Nasution,” 1954)

The term semesta war is unique and uniquely Indonesian that cannot be searched for the equivalent of the word in English. Some are trying to translate it into "Total War". Lexically it seems to be the same, but it turns out to have different meanings (J.S.Prabowo, 2016). Total
War is a terminology used to refer to the war in the 3gw (Third-generation warfare) era while the Semesta War Strategy was born in post-modern warfare (4gw), to deal with the next-generation warfare. The Semesta War is also different from the People's War developed during the Chinese war by Mao Zedong, who deployed the people as an armed militia (Putranto, 2016). The same thing will happen if we force it with a translation of Universal or universe War. In this paper, the author continues to use the term "Semesta War" Strategy even though it is in English because of its peculiarities that only exist in Indonesia. So, what is Semesta War look like?

The doctrine of the Semesta War was born from the experience of the struggle of the Indonesian nation itself. Starting from the War for Independence from 1945 to 1949, the 1948 Madiun PKI insurgency crackdown operation, the RMS Crackdown Operation in Maluku 1950, The August 17 Operation in the PRRI Crackdown in West Sumatra, the Permestra crackdown in North Sulawesi, the DI/TII crackdown and several other military operations. One of the largest Operations ever titled was the Tri Komando Rakayat or Trikora. From these experiences, the Semesta War Strategy was born in the Indonesian Semesta Defense System. This strategy originated from the Doctrine of the Indonesian Army "Tri Ubaya Cakti" which was formulated in the Second Army seminar at Seskoad Bandung on August 25-31, 1966. The doctrine of Semesta War was then raised at the National Defence and Security Seminar on September 21 to October 17, 1966, with the results of the TNI Doctrine "Tjatur Darma Eka karma". Currently, the Semesta Defense System has been contained in the amendments to the UUD 1945 Constitution in 2002 article 30. And UU RI (Republic of Indonesia Law) No.3 of 2002 concerning National Defense, UU RI No.34 of 2004 concerning the TNI which states "The National Defense System is a Semesta defense system that involves all citizens, territories and other national resources, and prepared early by the government and carried out in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the safety of the entire nation from all threats" (J.S.Prabowo, 2009)

From the perspective of Defense Science Philosophy, from an axiological aspect, Defense Science has the benefit of giving birth to National Doctrine and Strategy. The existence of Defense Science is "A science and art that studies national resources (potential national resources) owned by a country to be used as a national power (national power) in times of peace, used during war (armed conflict), and during post-war, to deal with threats from outside and from within the country, both in the form of military and non-military threats to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the safety of the entire nation and state in the framework of realizing national security." ('Supriyatno, 2014) In the Indonesian National Defense System, there are three main characteristics of defense, namely democracy, universality, and territoriality. These three characteristics must have an element of being prepared early, implemented, directed, and integrated (RI Law UU No. 34 of 2004). For a country, of course, a national commitment is needed. The Semesta war strategy is part of the Semesta Defense System.

Like the Semesta War Strategy, Indonesia's Defense Economy is also directed within the framework of the Semesta Defense System. Defense Economics is a branch of science that applies economics to national defense issues. Sandler and Hartley in McGuire, explain more specifically that defense economics applies economic principles to issues related to defense. (McGuire, 2009) Issues related to the defense economy include the level of defense spending, the impact of defense spending on products and employment at home and abroad, considerations regarding the existence and size of the defense sphere, the link between defense spending and technological change, and the implications of defense spending in the defense sphere in the framework of international stability or instability. In another explanation, according to Yusgiantoro, Defense Economics is a branch of science that applies economics to national defense issues. This discipline will be useful for finding the best way in terms of allocating various national resources to meet security needs and from all threats that affect national sovereignty. (Yusgiantoro, 2014)

Previous research on the Semesta War Strategy included, among other things, KONFRONTASI MILITER PEMBEASAN PAPUA BARAT DALAM PERSPEKTIF STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA (Mulyadi et al., 2021)., PERTEMPURAN SURABAYA TAHUN 1945 DALAM PERSPEKTIF PERANG
SEMESTA (Kusuma et al., 2021). ANALISIS KARAKTERISTIK PERANG SEMESTA PADA PERTEMPURAN SURABAYA 1945 (La Ode Hasyim et al., 2021) and KAJIAN LITERATUR: PENERAPAN STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA DALAM PERANG ASIMETRIS YANG DILAKUKAN OLEH INDONESIA (’Tanjung, 2021). Some researchers have also linked regional struggles with the strategy of the universe war, such as STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA DALAM PERANG ACEH 1873-1912(Sotardodo et al., 2021). STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA: PERTEMPURAN PANGERAN DIPONEGORO MENGHADAPI BELANDA 1825-1830(Ariwibowo, 2021). Although it may still be debatable whether all the strategies taking place in the area include the Universal War Strategy, or are they just guerrilla tactics that are spontaneously supported by the people, without any element of being prepared early, and implemented in a directed and unified manner? Of all the examples of successful implementation of the Semesta War Strategy, the most obvious is the Trikora (Tri People’s Command) confrontation because the Semesta War Strategy in the confrontation has been planned for its operation in its Doctrine of Strategy.

Operation Trikora was different from the attempted confrontation with Malaysia through Dwi Komando Rakyat or Dwikora (1964-1965). Dwikora's military operations also used the strategy of the Semesta War, but the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was one of the political forces at the time, had directed the Dwikora Confrontation to a People's War Strategy such as China with a plan to arm the Workers and Peasants as the 5th Force with small arms weapons promised by Chinese first Premier Zhou En Lai. This was strongly opposed by the Minister of Army Commander, General Ahmad Yani. Until finally General Ahmad Yani became one of the victims of kidnappings and murders by the PKI in the G 30 S / PKI incident in 1965, which triggered a retaliatory action by the Army with the people, clerics, and students to clean up Communism in Indonesia. So in this study, researchers prefer to analyze the Semesta War Strategy in Trikora.

Trikora or Tri Komando Rakyat was the culmination of Indonesia's struggle to liberate West Irian (West New Guinea) since the Netherlands reneged on the articles of the KMB agreement, where the West Irian problem should have been resolved in 1950, so since then, the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands has continued. The purpose of this study is to show, the main principles of the Semesta War Strategy that succeeded brilliantly in Trikora from the Defense economics review and how was the Strategy used in mobilizing all National Power. The focus of the research will be more directed at the confrontation of Economic and Defences Economics.

The theory of no economic advantage of wars
One of the theories about the causes and consequences of wars in society is Norman Angell (1911). The thesis of the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize laureate is that war does not bring economic benefits to the victors. The use of military force to resolve disputes between countries and/or groups does not bring economic benefits. Some researchers, for example, Prof. I. H. Jones of the University of Glasgow in 1915 and Prof. Corrado Gini de Sapienza University of Rome (1921). Today, however, this approach of Norman Angell can be true, because the societies of humanity and geo-economic regions are increasingly interconnected, forming a world system with integrated economic relations between different countries, based on the development of banking systems, communication, and information technology(Coccia, 2019.)

Methodology of Study
This paper uses the historical method, namely the heuristic of criticism consisting of internal and external criticism, and historiography, namely historical writing that combines interpretation, explanation, and presentation (Sjamsuddin, 2007). The process of studying literature on historical sources in the form of documents, decrees, and the content of the speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, signed by President Soekarno, Mandala Command documents including Planning Guidance (February 6, 1962), Commander Strategy Ideas (February 24, 1962), and a report on Operations signed by the Commander of the Mandala Command, Maj. Gen. TNI Soeharto. All Documents were assembled by the West Irian Pioneer Family Contact Agency Foundation.
Results and Discussion

Indonesia's economic development in the early years after the Round Table Conference (KMB) of December 1949, actually increased slightly with the existence of the Indonesian-Dutch Union, Dutch companies were still operating in Indonesia, and development began to be carried out in various regions. Dutch’s Shell Oil Company, which was born in Pangkalan Brandan, carried out the construction of a large office building known as the shellfish building in the city of Medan starting in 1951 and was completed in 1953 (now the Zidam I / BB office on Jalan Letjen Suprapto No. 1 Medan). even the Netherlands sent an Assistance Team to the Indonesian Military in the NMM (Netherland Military Mission) Program which was part of the KMB agreement. To train Indonesian military personnel to become professional and be able to operate military equipment ex KNIL and KL which are handed over to the Republic of Indonesia. This Common Prosperity was soon lost, as the first reaction to the Dutch attitude of including Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea as part of its territory in 1952, then in 1953, the Netherland Military Mission was abolished by Indonesia, followed by other political actions.

After various political efforts were made through diplomacy and the Dutch ignored the problem of bringing back West New Guinea to Indonesia, economic actions were taken that could suppress and harm the Dutch interests in Indonesia a lot. Among those efforts was a movement to boycott the economy and trade of Dutch-owned companies. The West Irian (West New Guinea) Struggle Agency in Makasar announced a national boycott, by refusing to serve the daily needs of Dutch nationals as a result of which Dutch businessmen pressured their government to cede the territory to Indonesia. A statement was issued by the Wef & Hbrecht Company in Amsterdam because the Dutch economic interest in Indonesia is worth thousands of millions of Gulden more valuable than remaining in control of the West New Guinea region. Pressure also came from Dutch scientists and researchers, 97 Dutch scholars signed a political manifesto stating "The Government of Nederland, on the issue of Nederland-Niew-Guinea, has carried out Politics that are not based on existing reality, for various reasons not included in the recognition of sovereignty to Indonesia, since then Nederland has been burdened with the rest of a colonial empire and does not know what to do with that burden".

Indonesia canceled the Dutch Indonesian Union which also terminated all agreements related to economic finances, including Indonesia's debt to the Netherlands of 3,661 million guldens which was the content of the KMB for Indonesia which paid all Dutch expenses during the colonization of Indonesia. A general strike was carried out on 2 December 1957 against all Dutch companies. It then placed all Dutch companies under the Supervision of the Indonesian Government. Through the Law on the Nationalization of Dutch-Owned Companies, namely Law No. 86 of 1958, its content regulates the right of compensation to the owners of Dutch companies that are nationalized. In another effort, the Dutch airline KLM was prohibited from carrying out activities in Indonesia, and to close the possibility of the company's profits flowing to the Netherlands, the Decree of the First Minister of the Republic of Indonesia no. 485 / MP / 1959 was issued on September 17, 1959. All Dutch capital that was nationalized amounted to 700 companies including Plantation Company, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, Electricity Company, Petroleum Company, and Hospital (CBZ) with a total value of 1,500 million US dollars. Indonesia also moved the tobacco market from the Netherlands to Bremen in West Germany, to completely cut off the economic benefits that the Netherlands could get. It can be seen below in Figure .1 of the Netherland GDP from 1957 to December 1960. Although there are many influencing factors in the Netherlands itself, what happened to the Dutch business in Indonesia certainly contributed to influencing it.
The economic confrontation with the Netherlands turned out to be quite large pressure on the Netherlands although it would also have a negative effect on Indonesia's economic growth. The instability of the domestic political situation in Indonesia due to regional uprisings and the nationalization of Dutch assets in 1957-1958 caused foreign exchange receipts in the agricultural sector which in 1958 reached US$ 442 million to continue to decline. To cover the budget deficit, the Government is printing money which creates new problems. Issues related to the circulation of money, so that on August 25, 1959, the government conducted a devaluation to cut the value of money. Paper rates of Rp.500 and Rp.1000 were lowered to Rp.50 and Rp.100. In addition, 90% of current accounts and more than Rp25,000 of bank deposits were frozen and exchanged for government bonds. At the same time, the rupiah depreciated from Rp11.4 to Rp45 per US dollar. Even though the free-market rate reaches Rp 150 per USD, The policy did not have a significant impact, instead, conditions continued to deteriorate. This is because the fundamental problem is that the budget deficit is not resolved, and at the same time money printing continues.

The Diplomacy struggle through the United Nations continued until 1957 and was always met with failure. Triggered by the presence of the aircraft carrier HRMS Karel Doorman and other warships on 4 April 1960 under the pretext of holding a Flag exhibition in West New Guinea, Indonesia sees it as a show of force for the Netherlands to challenge and belittle Indonesia. Trikora was officially inaugurated in Yogyakarta on December 19, 1961, by President Soekarno, followed by the establishment of the High Command and the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West Irian. Beginning with the statement begins Confrontation in all areas, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means" as Clausewitz famously stated(Carl Von Clausewitz. 1977)

(1) Trikora’s “Semesta” War Strategy.
The grand strategy of the Liberation of West Irian is contained in the Trikora decree signed by
President Soekarno.

1. The Liberation Struggle in West Irian was a confrontation on all fronts against the Dutch. Military confrontation is equated and aligned with the struggle in the field of Diplomacy supported by foreign circumstances in the fields of economics, psychology, and society.

2. 70% of the National Power was deployed for war operations and undertakings to liberate western Irian in support of the Struggle through Military, Diplomacy, and Economy (Ways). By using all armed forces, people's resistance ranks, and other elements of national potential, mobilized all national power, Military Power, Economic Power, and Psychology power. (Means) by taking into account both the risk of life sacrifice and economic sacrifice (Risk)

Strategic issues in Trikora (Source: The Mandala Command Planning Guidance Document on February 6, 1962, and the Commander's Strategy Ideas Document on February 24, 1962, signed by the Commander of the Mandala Command, Maj. Gen. Soeharto);

1. The Own arm Forces were held with the main military objective of Biak Island, Sorong, and Fak-fak, the Political Targets of Hollandia, and the Psychological Political targets of Merauke.

2. For Enemies/Opposing Forces. Contains the possibilities of the Enemy's Course of Action.

3. The Plans for Infiltration Operations, the Plan for the Development of the Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, the Plan for the Defense of 14 Air Bases, and Even in the Strategy Document, also plans to break Netherland to West New Guinea traffic by optimizing foreign relations "Good Neighbor policy", Asia Africa Solidarity, "Non-Aligned Country", thus forcing the Dutch to look for other further and expensive lines of navigation, if necessary, coupled with paid efforts or voluntary labor.

(2) Analysis of Defense Economics (Spending levels, the impact of defense spending, and Technology)

- Analysis of defense spending levels

To prepare for the Military Confrontation against the Netherlands, the Government allocated most of the State Expenditure at the time to the Defense economy. The defense budget reflects how strong a country is in building its military strength. On 15 May 1959 Colonel A, Yani signed an arms purchase with the British at the Indonesian embassy in London. After the Karel Doorman Aircraft Carrier Show of Force, the purchase of defense equipment was carried out more with the Soviets, the Soviets welcomed this, although Indonesia was a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement that did not favor any Bloc, however, since Indonesia was so determined to sink the Dutch aircraft carrier, it would be a strategic advantage and a triumph of Soviet technology from the Western Bloc if it happened. At the end of 1960 the Minister of National Security, General A.H. Nasution, signed the purchase of arms based on long-term credit. The purchase was the largest ever made ("A.H Nasution," 1966).

Defense spending in the form of the most advanced weapons of its time that Indonesia spends, namely; 12 units of Whiskey-Class Submarine, 1-unit Sverdlov-Class Heavy Cruiser named KRI Irian, 8-unit light-class frigate, 8-unit Skory-class destroyer, 16-unit guided-missile Komar-class Fast Attack Ship, 14-unit P-6 Torpedo-class Fast Boat, Kronstad-class submarine-hunting ship 16 ships, T-43 class Minesweepers 6 units, BK 18 units class Cannon Ships. MiG-21 Fishbed supersonic hunter aircraft 20 units, MiG-15 hunter aircraft 30 units, MiG-17 High subsonic fighter 49 units, MiG-19 supersonic fighter 10 units, Tupolev Tu-16 long-range bomber aircraft 24 units, Ilyushin-28 medium bomber aircraft 18 units, B-25 Mitchell tactical bomber 4 units, B-26 Invader tactical bomber 2 units, MI-6 transport helicopter 9 helicopters, MI-4 41helikopter ground attack helicopter (Akbar, n.d.)

One of the weapons that add to the deterrent effect on Indonesia's military strength is the presence of advanced bombers from the Soviets, namely the Tu (Tupolev) -16 long-range strategic bomber. The number of bombers brought home from the Soviets itself also amounted to 24 pieces. In addition to being prepared for the bombing of the Biak strategic target, intermediate targets, and Political targets, this Aircraft Combination, with MiG, surface warships, and submarines was prepared to wait and intercept the Dutch Aircraft Carrier HRMS Karel Doorman especially after Indonesia lost the KRI Macan tutul and Commodore Yos Sudarso who died bravely on January 15, 1962. (Sadhyoko, J. A,2015).

HRMS Karel Doorman never shows in the Area of Operation during the Confrontation. that year, the Netherlands as a NATO reserve must be on standby to anticipate the Cold War situation. Due to budgetary constraints, actors must anticipate the behavior of their competitors and allies
and decide for themselves how to allocate resources to different conflict zones. (Konrad & Morath, 2022)

- **Analysis of the impact of defense spending**
  In the 1960s, Indonesia's economy quickly declined due to debt and in 1962 hyperinflation reached 156%, while exports declined. In addition to infrastructure problems and production disruptions, exports were also disrupted after the nationalization of Dutch-owned companies. The policy outlined through Law No. 86 of 1958 turned out to have a bad impact because there were not enough professionals to take care of the economic problems left by foreign workers. The positive impact that occurs from defense spending is in supporting Diplomacy, it can be seen that the differences in the struggle of Indonesian Diplomacy before and after having a military force that is feared by opponents and reluctant friends.

  American President JF Kennedy, who was concerned with the approach of Indonesia and the USSR through the purchase of weapons, tried to get the Netherlands and Indonesia back to the negotiating table, after President Sukarno's goodwill mission to various countries including the United States in April 1961, the Americans changed their stance from originally supporting the Netherlands to neutral after president Sukarno's explanation.

- **Analysis of the Linkage Between Defense Spending and Technological Change**
  Indonesian technological capability improvement jumped well above the Dutch Military's technological capabilities in West New Guinea, after the procurement of high-technology weapons in 1960. The armament that the USSR offered was the most advanced technology of its time, such as 20 units of MIG 21 Fishbed Supersonic hunting aircraft. The Soviets were not half-hearted in helping Indonesia. even technology that was not intended to be sold out to countries outside the USSR was also given. KRI Irian 201 is equipped with various combat facilities, such as missiles, torpedoes, to long-range bombs. At that time Indonesia had at least 12 frigates, 12 submarines, 22 fast boats with guided missiles, and 4 minesweepers. There is a very different in technological capabilities when compared to 1953 when the last Netherland Military Mission trained Indonesian military personnel to operate equipment from the World War II era.

  Access to this technology accelerates the mastery of Indonesian technology, both military and civilian. such as the Kartika I Rocket Project, the first rocket made by LAPAN, AURI, Bandung Institute of Technology, and Pindad under the PRIMA project (Early Scientific and Military Rocket Development Project), and by paying attention to the development of the utilization of atomic energy for the welfare of the community, then the Atomic Energy Council and the Atomic Energy Institute (LTA) were formed.

- **Money Growth Analysis**
  Bank Indonesia reported that the Money Supply or money supply in the narrow sense (M1) in 1960 was 37%. (YoY), in 1961 to 47% and soared in 1962 to 101% because the Government printed money to cover the budget deficit which consequently affected Inflation.

- **Inflation Analysis**
  Inflation is the value of the price of goods, especially necessities circulating in the community whose value has increased (‘Nanga, 2001). Inflation in 1959 was still in the range of 22.2%. The government 1959 adopted a policy of monetary tightening to overcome inflationary pressures, for example by issuing a credit ceiling provision for each bank individually on April 8, 1959. Indonesia's annual inflation rate increased to 95% in 1961 from 20% in 1960. Inflationary pressures largely stem from the cost of food, transportation, and clothing. As shown in Table 2 below:
We know that inflation is a gradual general increase in the price level. The inflation rate is the rate at which the price level rises (increases). From the data above, we can analyze that inflation factors occurred a striking increase began to occur in 1961 and subsequent years. Factors that caused the price increase in the period included the influence of the liberation struggle of West Irian, and the depletion of the supply of basic foodstuffs, especially rice, corn, and tree boilers due to the imbalance of the increase in production with demand. This is the influence of mobilization, where the community, especially the peasant youths, leaves their farms to fulfill the call of state defense. Another cause of the increase in inflation is the insufficiency of transportation/transportation equipment, both land and inter-island transportation, which disrupts distribution, because it is prioritized to transport personnel and logistics of trikora operations, increasing transportation costs in the community.

One thing is undeniable, that war costs a very large amount, among casualties, property, and money. Not only casualties, property, and money, but the existence of the military, with all its equipment, is also costly. (Reza A. A Wattimena, 2018). All defense economics analysed above show that Norman Angell’s Theory of no economic advantage of wars was true for both sides.

**Ends of Confrontation**

August 12, 1962, was the Hari-H (H-Day) Indonesia Plan for a military massive attack on the Dutch position in Biak, Sorong, Fak-fak, and Kotabaru West New Guinea, it was estimated that there would be many casualties, but the whole operation will be completed in 5 days, so that Indonesia Independence Day, August 17, 1962, can be celebrated in West New Guinea, later, would be called Irian Jaya. The operation Code Name was Operation Djayawijaya, referring to Operation Order No.PO-10 date 20 Juli 1962, was signed by Major General Soeharto.
This Military Operation was delayed for 14 days as an Order from Highest Command. On 15 August 1962, both sides signed the Treaty of New York, under American supervision, in which the Dutch ceded West New Guinea to the United Nations Interim Mission, which then took control of Indonesia on May 1, 1963. (Kuitenbrouwer, 2016). Road Diplomacy is often long and very tiring. However, it is much better than spilling blood and destruction of property. (Reza A.A Wattimena, 2018)

**Conclusion, Recommendation, Limitations**

Based on the analysis results of the Strategy used in Trikora, show that the Strategy used is the forerunner of the Indonesian Semesta Defense Strategy that has been included in the State constitution. The results of the analysis of the Mandala Command Strategy document and other historical literature on Operation Trikora, it was found that the diplomatic struggle would not be successful and would not have even been heard if it did not have Military strength. The strategy in Trikora "Semesta War" has deployed 70% of national power including the national economy to achieve the goal of liberating the West New Guinea region from the Dutch Colony, which has been determined to support the Struggle through Military, Diplomacy, and Economic efforts by using all armed forces, people's resistance ranks and other elements of national potential. To support the Trikora operation the government manages all national forces and resources, Military Power, Economic Power, and Psychology forces, by taking into account both the risk of life and economic sacrifice.

Analysis of issues in Defense Economics, by analyzing the level of defense spending, the impact of defense spending, and the relationship between defense spending in the face of technological change shows the success of Indonesia's Defense Economy in supporting the Trikora Semesta War Strategy, even though it had to cost a lot of money, most of the economic powers were mobilized to achieve strategic goals.

The phenomenon is currently happening in countries such as Russia, and Ukraine, where economics is used in conflict. It turns out that Indonesia's history has already been carried out in the Trikora conflict with economic confrontation as part of the Semesta War Strategy.

However, the most valuable lesson is that all forms of confrontation, conflict, and war will only bring misery to the people, as in the Indonesian proverb "Winning becomes charcoal, losing becomes ash" which means a fight will not benefit either party, especially for economics. If only the Dutch government listened to their scholar at that time, who knows, how rich the Netherlands and Indonesia are today. However, the Netherlands is part of Indonesian history, and on the contrary, Indonesia is part of Dutch history.

This study is only limited to the Defense Economic Study in the Trikora Semesta War Strategy and is recommended for further studies to align with the whole Semesta Defense System currently implemented by Indonesia. It is also recommended not to insist on translating the Semesta War Strategy into Total War, Universe War, or People's War because the terminology in English already has its meaning which is different from the Indonesian Semesta War Strategy.

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