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### **The Rise of Turkey and Impact Towards Regionalism: An Analysis**

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#### **Abstract**

President Erdogan took office on 2014 after won election. Since then, Turkey has changed a lot from moderate country in 1980 to a developing country in early 2000. Erdogan has shaped new foreign policy as he wants to turns Turkey as a global player. More than that, he also develops a lot of economy and social facilities to attract other investors to come. The research was conducted to analyse The Rise of Turkey and Its Impact towards Regionalism. The objectives of this research namely 1) to identify the factor contributed to the rise of Turkey and 2) to examine the impact of the rise of Turkey on the region. The theory used in this study is neoliberalism. This research used qualitative approaches where the secondary data collection accumulates in library study. The sources had included books, journal articles, newspaper and online sources from government web. The findings of this research were; 1) factor that contributed to the rise of Turkey were political stability, strong economy, structured social community and progressive security and 2) the rise of Turkey has given dominant positive impacts as it became one of the strong Muslim country.

#### **Key words**

Economy, Regionalism, Politics, Security, Turkey

## Introduction

Turkey had significantly formed the transition in the world profile since early 2000. In addition to the doctrine of neoliberalism and western direction, Turkey had set the foreign policy that leads to the world's most dynamic engagement and becomes a regional economic powerhouse (Soner, 2014, para. 2). Modern Turkey had been filled with the energy of youth and system of education has been very realistic and remarkably democratic. Turkey was considered the 21st-Century's First Muslim Power, a threatening concept for many in the current geopolitical climate (Chang, 2019, p.2). The aspiration to be regional leadership in Muslim society had a major impact on regionalism in both the Western and Middle East regions as the global economic environment faced a radical change, illustrated by fall of the West and the rise of new powers with major potential, long unperceived, witnessed growing economic growth, increased influence on global GDP, and played a vital role in important international structures. Turkey was the only European country that had grown in power since the financial crisis and the start of the Arab uprisings. While European economic fortunes have contracted, Turkey is one of the fastest-growing global economies (Burns, 2012, p.7). New regional conflicts spilled out near the Turkish borders in the Caucasus and the Balkans. In Azerbaijan, Crimea Tatars and Central Asia, the emergence of independent Turkish-speaking states gave the Turkish political and bureaucratic elite the illusion that dropping Kemalist isolationist concepts would bring new potential for Islamic power and leadership between east and west (Angelo, 2013, para. 3). Turkey made its first attempt at international expansionism, half a century ago, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Balkans, 2015, p. 32). The ruling elites of the Turkey Soner (2014) also stated that "Turkey has served different roles: the region's natural leader', a historic 'big brother,' and the Muslim community 'protector' (p.7). Turkey has also played the role of 'facilitator' and 'mediator' via attempting to convey an arrangement with other developing power such as Brazil to try to resolve the controversial Iranian nuclear issue (Arne, 2019, para. 4). Turkey has sought to strengthen its long-awaited position as a "rising power" by enhanced its community and indulged in certain emerging powers through advancements. A notion of scope is the concept of 'regional power.' In other words, the location and geography approached are contentious and divisive. Despite the fact that constructs such as "place" and "energy" are socially constructed facts, this research analyses the idea of "regional power" as a "power" subcategory (Dick, 2019, para. 3). This research was discussed the context in analysing the power capacity of Turkey in the region and "role concept" were required for the "regional power," and that it should had material control. It should also have the potential for both economics and diplomacy and organization. It's strength, even if it's 'soft power' (appeal to one's concept and the ability to manage the policy agenda in such a mechanism which forms certain actors' preferences) or 'hard power' (physical power which be determined military power and economic) must be recognized by several other players in the

area. The major powers and rising powers that were crucial in the global system should also take this into account. Nonetheless, regional power or others power required control, so its projection of force must prove effectively. The position theory of neo-liberalism was used as a theoretical framework to examine the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) foreign policy actions.

After the AKP has come to power, Turkey's presence as a regional power has increased (Selcuk, 2019, para. 7). The governance of the AKP desired to become ever more regional power, and moreover be a reliable partner. The AKP's leadership, therefore, aimed to become a regional power and also a reliable partner. Therefore, Turkey has played a variety of roles: the region's good communicator; an established big brother; and the Muslim minority's saviour. Turkey works in line with the EU, U.S, and Israel to provide a requisite foreign policy funding. In addition, Turkey shared its geopolitical benefit with Russia, China, and Iran. Turkey's improving relations with prominent Asian powers such as Russia, China, and Iran are, all things being equal, a natural outcome of the local dynamics of the region (Manisal, 2019,p.10).

### **Political Aspect**

Could Turkey do even further and become the major power, gaining political influence in its region, and probably throughout the world? And how it will become of the western political influence of the region, a major concern for the sultans and Atatürk, after just a decade of dominance by a group with an Islamist talent? It all relied on how their roles are played by the political elites in the capital of the country, Ankara. Today Turkey was faced a series of stress tests that attempted both its capacity as a global player and its obligations to Western interests and values. Turkey was faced a crisis in Syria, which turmoil were pouring onto Turkey and generated a gap with the Washington at the frontline of these challenges. These trust has been in a core of Turkey's new foreign policy theory called "strategic depth." Introduced by Turkish-educated political scientist Ahmet Davutoglu, the ideology claimed that it is essential for Turkey to rise as a major power. This concept was demonstrated by Professor Davutoglu back in 2004. The AKP had just came to government at the time, and then only a certain people in Washington had known of Davutoglu or believed the group would question Turkey's centuries-old foreign-policy strategy to conform to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey had reformed its Middle East strategy across the past decade to work closely with Syria and Iran just to discover both the Tehran and Damascus was a partner of Ankara. New regional geopolitics combined with domestic transformation inside the country has led to the rise of close relations between Turkey and Iran (Bayram, 2019, p. 3).

The ruling party obtained 49.9 percent of the vote in the elections in 2011, showed that the Turks were evenly split over the influenced of religion in politics, while the protests in Gezi Park in 2013 crippled the state for months. The repercussions and reverberations of this election will be deeply felt across the

political spectrum in Turkey (Galip, 2019, p.1). Political polarisation might hold Turkey stuck and looked internally. AKP supporters and opponents alike been on their way to reconstitute a Turkey where individuals from all walks of life can thrive. Such global trends kept presenting the AKP and the emerging Turkey it has controlled as a strategic threat. Until lately, Davutoglu and the AKP had found hope in the economic success of Turkey and were empowered to embrace an independent foreign policy, often criticized the United States and split Middle East problems such as Iran and Syria policy with Europe. In reality, however, Turkey's political growth tolerated a very unique lesson for the AKP as an emerging political Islam-majority.




Figure 1.1: The Political Rise of Turkey  
 Source: Edited from Financial Times Ltd (2019).

Based on Figure 1.1 above, stated that the vote shared parliamentary election was increased since 2002 when AKP takes power after the global financial crisis that impacted to Turkey. The vote shared parliamentary was continued increasing in 2007 election remarked that the AKP got full support from the supporters and the highest point of popularity period was from 2011 until 2014 where Turkey's economy was thriving. But in 2015, the support was decreased


where voter backlash against Erdogan's which bid to enhance the power. In the same year in Nov, the majority of supporters regained after Kurdish conflict that reflected the action by the military. In 2018 after parliamentary system abolished and electoral pacts introduced, the support was back increased gradually where pact with ultranationalist props up the AKP. Ankara replicated trend of global politics celebrated its Muslim heritage and confirmed political constancy in its region, improved strong connections with Europe, Western countries and the United States. As such a foreign policy practiced would create Turkey worthy of its eastern and western neighbours.

For the Muslim states, the importance of Turkey kept laying in the fact that Turkey has imparted its Western overlay of culture and organisations while preserved its Islamic character. However, for the West, Turkey was important because it served as a strong partner as a Middle Eastern country. The foundation of the development of Turkey was the capacity of the state to promote sustainable political growth conditions. These policies had enabled the AKP to secure three straight elections, with more majority voted. The AKP had an impressive election and its administration wants to maintain this trend in presidential and parliamentary in future. In domestic politics, the transition to the presidential system of governance settled down gradually (Yasar, 2020, p.1). This election victory was driven by tremendous political growth, which was made possible in return, by image as a sustainable and regionally stable country and a perception that attracted record-breaking funds to Turkey.

### **Economic Aspect**

Turkey could do well to examine the results of the last decade's remarkable economic prosperity. Turkey had risen as an economic hub according to the productive mixing of traditional country relations with European and other OECD-based economies with cohesion of evolving markets, particularly Muslim communities in neighbouring countries. Since 2002, Turkish economic development has been based on two assumptions. Turkey has remained open to Europe, drew large continental investment. On the other hand, Turkey has diverted its business to develop markets and Islamic countries systematically in order to leverage the production. Meanwhile, Turkey had the finest of both blocs, reaped the benefits of its closeness with Europe and solidarity with Muslim communities at the same time. This has been facilitated by the AKP government's decade of unparalleled political stability. And it was noticed by global investors. Recovering domestic activity led to a surge in imports, and the external sector consequently weighed on the economy (Focus economic, 2020. p.3). The large international investment banks had improved Turkey's investment status within a couple of percentage points. Nevertheless, this had come at a cost of virtually one-party rule and increased liberalism since 2002 by the same term. This trend was particularly evident in comparison to the years of political stability and economic growth under administration of the Democratic Party (DP) in the 1950s.

**Pie Chart 1.1: Contribution to the Economy of Turkey by Sector**



Source: Edited from MacroEconomyMeter.com report (2017).

Pie Chart 1.1 above explained that the two pie charts above show percentages of the performance of the industrial sectors to Turkey's economy in 2000 and 2016. The sector of agriculture had the top contribution ratio with 24 percent in 2000 but a 14 percent decline in 2016. Nevertheless, even several other sectors of industry related to economy, such as Education and Healthcare, Commerce, Energy and Transportation, Hospitality and Leisure and Government with 17%, 14%, 17% and 12% respectively, and only the segment of Education and Healthcare stayed constant at 17% in 2016. Generally, the facts showed the agriculture played a main role in Turkey's economic growth in 2000, while education and healthcare became the largest part in 2016.

The government had functioned a prominent model in the development of the long term development, over the transformation of financial structure, infrastructure development and an ambitious economic reform program, sponsored from the International Monetary Fund and aimed at improved a conditions of the economy also setting a stage for constant and rapid growth. The central bank governor subsequently said the bank had used a significant part of its leeway for loosening monetary policy (Murad, 2019. p. 4). The international crisis has exposed some of Turkey's vulnerabilities, such as dependence on the European market and an industrial sector based on minimal-value added products. However, by looked to increase jobs, decreased the trade deficit through foreign countries, government set out the directions of economic strategy for three years, help growth and facilitate an improvement in the country's economic and financial resources. To


meet those goals, it has dedicated itself to promote the manufacture and exported of top margin added goods, countered informal economy, making community policy further effective and efficient, and improved the economic outlook. The Turkish economy expanded every quarter in the past few years, by the exclusion of the fourth quarter of 2008 and 2009. Turkey had not only become more competitive but by a decade-long, almost unbreakable climb, this development has reached. And all this time, in the midst of economic uncertainty, Turks had seen Europe, their historic cornerstone. Therefore, it was no doubt that today's Turks felt more positive about their partnership with the West and the Europe than they always had in decades.

In the summer of 2012, the Turkish rulers distributed a directive on foreign investment opportunities aimed at decreased progression gap between different regions of the state, promoted the development of industrial areas on the Italian model by encouraged the manufacture of top-tech products. The policy offers various opportunities whose strength was linked to geographical regions in which businesses wish to invest form of investment and the commercial sector. In addition, the largespanning privatisation program initiated by the administration in the mid-eighties had given substantial resources to the Treasury and helped make the economy more efficient and diverse. The country left valuable industries and started divested its interests in varies sectors such as iron, and steel also tourism. The economy recovered faster than expected from last year's currency crisis, supported by a large fiscal stimulus and strong growth contribution of net exports (Saeed, 2019, p. 2). The Turkish economy's outstanding performance had not solved the uncertainty of some foreign observers who see the Anatolian country in the risk of a new conflict on the surface.

Turkey maintaining its position as the second-largest recipient of FDI in West Asia, behind Israel (Santander, 2019, p. 1). Generally, Turkey had a foreign investment attitude of tolerance. Private investors were produced comparable to domestic investors in terms of legal rights and protections with the 2003 Foreign Investment Law, but limitations persist, particularly in relation to strategic fields (e.g. defence, telecommunications, and energy). The state had implemented significant reforms and initiatives in the past decade, often motivated by EU accession negotiations, to strengthen the business environment, countered bribery, decreased the volume of the normal sector by accelerate privatization program. In July 2012, a different Commercial Code was released and came into effect. This contained legislation intended to improve democratic processes and incorporates principles of international accountability and transparency. The new framework also gave companies the chance to set the Economic Interest Groupings, thereby reassured SMEs to participate in wide scale plans. Therefore, some complexities existed for the economic players working in the state. The fragility of justice structure, a bloated bureaucracy, and shortcomings in corporate authority and constant changes in the regulatory and legal environment that can be a constraint on foreign investment.

### Social Aspect

In the European definition, is Turkey a socialist government? Does the government believe all people collective social accountability? Since 1961 until today, in its statute, Turkey had portrayed itself as a welfare state. Actually, more than one third of the federal budget was dedicated to social programs. But somehow usually the country was not viewed as a welfare state. According to the World Bank (2018), Turkey has experienced a large reduction in poverty and a substantial increase in shared prosperity (Bertelsmann, 2019, p. 3). Social policy had shifted to the context of public debates behind the current conditions, but it continued to have a profound effect on people's lives. With this background, the research study located the interaction of Turkey in the wider world of welfare states in the context of social stability. Social welfare systems were core organizations of "modern" societies, shaped fundamental social mechanisms such as labour markets, social and cultural-economic inequality, gender, state, market, and civil society interactions. Social policy was about basic conceptual social awareness, comprised a social contract and underlying social stability.



Graph 1.1: Benefit Generosity Index

Source: Blickwechsel (2015). (Available at [https://www.blickwechsel-tuerkei.de/en/projects/current/Social\\_System/Research.](https://www.blickwechsel-tuerkei.de/en/projects/current/Social_System/Research.))

Graph 1.1 explained that the first findings showed that throughout the last years, Turkey's social security system has been more closely related to European welfare states. During that timeframe, the welfare state of Turkey widened, with greater coverage and new regulations, such as for unemployment benefits program that began paying unemployment benefits in 2002. These was also expressed in improved ratings for the Benefit Generosity Scale. Turkey remains a straggler of healthcare in the same category as European nations. The score showed data comprised of composite and Generosity Benefit Indexes. Such indexes were each



comprised of approximately twenty different indices, each contained comprehensive and useful social security statistics. The plan used cluster analysis to fully analyse the data. This allowed for the position of the Turkish welfare system in the numerous welfare worlds. The work thus helped to explain how far the welfare system in Turkey actually matches the welfare system in Southern Europe, as was widely believed.

A new social contract would, in return, enabled Turkey to focus its energy overseas. The Turkish social system had undertaken extensive reforms in recent years with the aim of improving its efficiency, sustainability and services to citizens. (ISSA, 2019, p.1). Gaziantep was one of a great place watched this process of complexities. Ibrahimli, a middle-class community with vibrant private schools, tree-lined streets and cafes offering New York-style cheesecakes and sushi, lied to the west of the vibrant capital of this city. To the south, near the campus of Zirve University, a new Gaziantep was emerging, inhabited by million-dollar villas, surrounding a man-made lake large enough to accommodate sailboats. Not only Turks, but wealthy Syrians who would like to save their money from the instability of that country buy a home in the growing district of Kucukkizilhisar in the mountains surrounding olive groves and Syria in the distance.


Education at least in relative terms, a similar success story. The adult literacy rate had risen by 5 percent since 2000 and now stands at more than 91 percent. This was an impressive figure compared to other nations in the Middle East or majority Muslim. By the starting of the next generation, Turkey may become the first major Islamic-majority country to achieve universal literacy with its high youth literacy (among Turks under the age of fourteen, the literacy rate was already at 98 percent). Turkey's higher education was also above its rivals, with eight of Turkey's top ten is OIC universities. Turkey also implemented giant steps in the area of connectivity and transportation, making life better for normal Turks: in 2002 there were about 7.5 million Internet users, and now there are 31 million. This means that roughly 89 percent of the people, a vast majority, own a mobile phone, while only 36 percent owned a mobile phone in 2002. In short, life has become a little easier for regular Turk on the street. And these Turks at the ballot box rewarded the AKP. The increasing quality of education accompanied by reduced inequality in student performance has contributed to Turkey's comparatively strong results in Program International Student Assessment (PISA). (Hassan, 2013, p. 5).

### **Security Aspect**

Security was strongly linked to the three-fold level of self-defence by ensured the survival of the community; maintained territorial sovereignty and protected a nation's fundamental identity as formed by political, economic, social and cultural factors. Two key interlinked foundations of basic principle of security were national defence and collective protection. The existed security climate in a period marked by globalization had indeed reinforced this connection and affirmed

that security was really unchallengeable. As reaction to the emerging security issues of today, world community required to actively update its approaches of using them. Overall objectives to be reached are still to prepare the basic for the organization of a peaceful and secured setting to encourage worldwide stability, security, global development and social progress. On top of that, it all about to safeguard territorial sovereignty that contributes collective security and crisis managing efforts such as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The consideration needs to be given to avoiding the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their method of delivery and to promoting disarmament. The Turks have a legitimate security concern (Pompeo, M, 2018, p. 1).

National security and collective security are the two main interrelated pillars of the general concept of security. (Ministry of Foreign Affair, 2011, p. 1). It is important for its large military presence as the basis for Turkey's defending forces. Malatya was the moderate, Sunni Muslim, and Turkish-dominated heartland in Turkey's "Koran Belt," extended from Afyon in central-western Turkey to Erzurum in North-eastern Turkey. Carried in the influence of Alevis, who profess a radical branch of Islam, and then it becomes obvious how the military involvement in this rather conservative Anatolian city works as a signed of the position of the military that forms Turkey. A prominent building that had risen to serve as a sign of the dominant role of the military in the Turkish community as well as its attentive place over the military system and government as the protector of Turkish secularism and Kemalism, like others in cities along Turkey. Turkey endured the emergence of military power in the late 2000s, the dominant character of the military had come to the end, the paradigm of laicite had broken, and the military had become a collaborator of the government of Ankara, which was absolutely under its control. The Ottomans had historically been military superior to Western Europeans and viewed them as oppressors in diplomacy. Consequently, following the model of Russia and touting the following case of Japanese reform, the Ottoman dynasty stepped forward to suit Europe with military westernization.



Map 1.1: Turkey Expanding Military Reach

Sources: Bloomberg (2019). Available at (<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-07/mapping-the-turkish-military-s-expanding>)

Map 1.1 showed that The Turkish military had a large global presence. Turkey was sends soldiers to Libya whereas retained a troop presence in Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia also supported the Balkan peacekeeping forces. Also, the Turkish navy exercises the Aegean seas and Mediterranean to protect rights, interests, resources and territories. For Syria, in 2016, Erdogan directed the military went to Syria to battle with Islamic State militants and the Kurdish fighters. Also, Turkish troops seized cities in North-eastern Syria in an effort to set up a safe zone and allow some of the over 3.6 million Syrians fled to Turkey and back to home and prevent a new flood of refugees. For Iraq, Turkey sent border-crossing warplanes and soldiers to northern Iraq to threaten PKK outposts. It also retained military bases which were originally established in the 1990s for a peacekeeping mission. For Qatar, since allied in 2017 Turkey had constantly built a base in Qatar with the gas-rich Gulf State in its heated exchange a regional coalition headed by Saudi Arabia. Turkey and Qatar were committed to support the Muslim Brotherhood, a political organisation which has threatened the Saudis and several other rulers of the Region.

Turkey has continued to be a crucial strategic member of the Atlantic Alliance after the end of the Cold War, through its strategic geographical location and its valuable contributions to the Alliance and military transformation (Hanbay, 2015, p. 85). In 1773, the caliph founded a modern Western military academy, the Royal Naval Engineering School (Muhendishane-iBahri-iHumayun), to build a Western navy, the foundation of all European powers in the region. The project has proven successful; the New Army had 22,700 troops and 1,600 officers in the early nineteenth century. With its strong Westernization history began in 1773, the experience of been Western by the Turkish military surpassed the memory of become a republic by France. The Turkish military appeared loyal to being Western and democratic, fully secularized by Ataturk.

The Turkish Armed Forces were essential for "holding and protecting the Turkish Republic as defined by the government." In 1997, the military acted on this nature appointed legal obligation, successfully ousting the government of the Welfare Party.

### The Impact of The Rise of Turkey



Map 1.2: The Neighbouring Countries of Turkey  
Source: Edited from Pinterest (2019)

Figure 1.2 showed that was a nation in western Asia on the Anatolian peninsula with a slight area in Thrace in the Balkan part of South Eastern Europe. The Turkish state's largest part was on the peninsula of Anatolia, also known as Asia Minor, the western most part of Asia. Turkey was bordered by western Aegean Sea, southern Mediterranean Sea and northern Black Sea. The state was bounded on the east by Iran, Azerbaijan and Armeni, (an exclave of Nakhchivan), on northeast by Georgia, on the northwest by Bulgaria and Greece, and on Iraq and on the southeast through Syria. Turkey retains Egypt, Cyprus, Romania, Northern Cyprus, Ukraine and Russia maritime borders. In north-western Turkey, there been two narrow channels, the Bosphorus that links the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea and the Dardanelles.

#### **a. Positive Impact**


The rise of Turkey had positive economic, political, social, and international impacts on the region. Regional development aims at building and maintaining a balanced economic structure around regions that has benefited both western and eastern theatres. The Turkish government had adopted a wide array of macro prudential policies to strengthen and overhaul the economy to find a workable progression direction after being struck by economic crisis in 2000/2001. A successful debt-swap in June 2001 prevented a sovereign default. Partially thanks to far-reaching structural reforms the economy quickly recovered (Brinke, 2013, p.14). The Turkish economy has shown a firm reflex in the face of multiple geopolitical consequences and developments over the last year. After changing direction in the second half of 2018, the Turkish economy started rebalancing the year before due to uncertainty and steady growth in exchange rates that driven up interest rates and inflation whereas local consumption ran down. The state has developed financial infrastructure designed to reduce the impact of outside significant risks.

#### **i. economy**

Turkey has tried to develop its economic relations with countries which it has historical links (Gurzel, 2014, para. 3). Therefore, driven with economic cohesion, political consistency and a modern European dream, Turkey has ranged future and wide to create soft power on areas that previously overlooked like Middle East as well as extensive states such as Mongolia and Vietnam. This agenda was driven by the private sector, universities, and NGOs, forming the new supra-European Turkish nationality pattern was best seen in middle-class towns in Gaziantep, the sixth largest city in the country, along with other middle sized cities like Malatya, Kayseri, Denizli and Konya. These cities had provided valuable funding to the AKP when connecting to the Middle East onwards, pushing the country's score-breaking growth rate. Gaziantep, close to the Syrian border, has factories that produce a multitude of goods, selling products to over 70 countries. The pasta

of the region ends up on Italian dishes. In this way, (Soner, 2014) has mentioned that "Gaziantep is much like a Guangzhou from Anatolia, the Chinese market known for selling its goods to the most remote and unlikely locations (p.21). Yet Gaziantep was developed soft power towards Turkey, unlike Guangzhou. The University of Zirve in the area was a testimony funded by the Nakiboglu family of local billionaires who recently made their fortune in international trade, the new university has a brilliant campus that rises in the midst of the popular pistachio groves of Gaziantep. Most students came from the Middle East, mainly close to Syria, besides from the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, even from Western Europe.

Graph 1.2: Turkey's Economy Indicator



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2020).


Graph 1.2 showed that Turkish economic environment has continued to grow in recent times from 2010 until 2018 but, as per the OECD, a wealthy-country think-tank, the prospects for the future are undetermined. In 2017 Turkey was the quickest developed economies in the world. It was largely due to a wave in government spending following a coup attempt in 2016. The present-account deficit was huge especially in 2011 which making the market exposed to outside shocks. A credit increase, together with the falling lira and high oil prices, has helped drive inflation into a double figure following this year's debt-rate rises. Throw in a possible stimulus cut, and it's no shocked that the OECD expects development to decline next coming. Turkish GDP growth has been keeping up with the much more developed economies of the OECD. Regarding a series of unfavourable shocks which included severe political uncertainty at the south eastern border and solved coup attempt in 2016, GDP growth averaged at least 7 per cent over 2010-17. Following consumer price growth of over 3 percent per year, this also illustrated the good performance of a dynamic, though splintered of economy sector.

Macro-economic policy has mostly aimed to offset shocks to growth and to buy votes by offering consumer, credit and investment incentives (Mina. T, 2017, para. 3). In the long run, the newly found economic complexity, creative energy, and cosmopolitan culture of Turkey, as embodied by the modern Gaziantep, all

point to Istanbul's former imperial city. The new Turkey anchored these regions in Istanbul which safeguarding in the Middle East. Istanbul once again reclaimed its supremacy as an international capital as the hub of the Ottoman, Byzantine, and Roman Empires. Accounting for more than one-third of \$1.3 trillion economy, the prosperity of Istanbul was surpassing all the neighbours of Turkey, excluding oil-rich Iran. Istanbul as a main capital of Turkey extends beyond the nearest neighbouring state. Ten years ago, on Turkish Airlines, the flagship airline of the world, one could fly directly from Istanbul to a certain 75 worldwide destinations, many of them in Europe. Today Turkish Airlines had more than two hundred international destinations providing direct flights from Istanbul. Many recent destinations, including Dar es Salam, Dhaka and Damman, the Middle East and Asia. Bloomberg Turkey's journalist reported that in the first ten months of 2011, as much as \$6 billion flowed from Syria, Iraq Iran, former Soviet and Lebanon contributing to fund the state's deficit.

In the Hatay region of Turkey, where borders of Syria, bank deposits grew by \$1.1 billion in 2011, thanks to rich Syrians in Turkey. Hatay bank deposits increased by 33.7 percent between 2010 and 2012. In regard to the capital from not European neighbours, Turkey was drew huge influxes by European as well as other banks that saw Turkish investments as a rare safe in these challenging times. That's why it was important to be a responsible global player for the new Turkey.

Graph 1.3: Turkish Private and Foreign Banks: Lira Loans vs. Deposit (Monthly Data. TRY Billions)



Source: Council on Foreign Relations.org (2019). Available at (<https://www.cfr.org/blog/turkeys-stretched-public-banks>)

Graph 1.3 explained that the Turkish financial system had high deposit-ratio lends in Turkish lira. This was due in part to the banks holding their capital in lira, although much of their income statement is in foreign currency. It also illustrated the readiness of the central bank to allow banks to fulfil part of their lira reserve ratio by keeping foreign currency at the central bank (this so-called reserve choice

system) and banks' ability to earn externally if they deposit dollar or euro funding via the exchange market. Commercial banks and international banks were more assertive in loaning money out lira than the state banks in part since they have more significant exposure to the exchanges market. And, after Turkey appeared under economic pressure last August 2018, the private banks had dragged back a bit on their lira loans.

## ii. politics

The new global perspective of Turkey's developments was affected its foreign policy and became more competitive. Like the national airlines of the state, its diplomats seem to pursue and reach even more to the entrepreneurs of Turkey. Turkey made its first attempted in foreign expansionism, since the inception of the Turkish State, half a Century ago (International Global Affairs, 2018, p. 26). Turkey has managed to open 135 Embassies, 13 Permanent Representations to international organizations and 86 Consulate Generals around the globe (Ministry of Foreign Affair, 2019, p. 4). This has included positions in Latin America and in Bogota and Santiago which has diplomatic control. The dream pushed Turkish ambassadors in the Middle East, Africa, and Muslim countries to create influence for Turkey. Soner (2014) also stated that "Turkey has established 11 new missions in OIC member states and increased its diplomatic presence in the Middle East, opening, for instance, three new consulates in Iraq since 2007. However the most drastic growth was in Africa, where Turkey tripled its missions, opening fifteen embassies alone in 2010–2011, including missions to Abuja and Banjul and Turkish peacekeepers, are currently present in five African countries, while the Turkish navy is engaged off the Horn of Africa in antipiracy operations" (p. 58).

Map 1.3 Turkey's Geopolitical Vectors



Source: Geopolitical Intelligence Service (2019).

Map 1.3 elaborated that the Turkish Straits that consisted of the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles were all parts of the dominant sea

territory of Turkey. These gave control of the maritime area from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and further on to the oceans. Turkey was the land connection from Europe to Middle East, Africa and South Asia. It was a regional power in many cases in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East. In the period of the Ottoman points of time, the empire from Turkey territory that was dominated most of the above mentioned area located therefore many was remaining parts of North Africa. It lies in a Mediterranean natural centre where 1,000 year land and sea trade ways converge and intersect. Nevertheless, the position exposes Turkey also to various geopolitical threats. Few of them pose serious threats to its stability and threaten its foreign policy.

The growth of political awaken throughout the Middle East was both an incentive for Turkey and a threat that could lead Turkey to separate itself from its Western values. Likewise, the still weak relations between Turkey and Israel also Cyprus took place of nearer integration with Western neighbours. In the coming years, meeting these obstacles were decided the future of Turkey. This may indicated an unsettling inference about the "Turkish model of success": the political system of the country produced prosperity when governed by single party rulers which Turkey encountered economic and political cramps once controlled by alliances. That was because Turkish leaders tend to avoid a horizontal inequality of labour (a must for effective coalition governments) in preference of a hierarchical division that promotes single-party systems, not unlike several other political cultures. Nevertheless, during times of coalition government, Turkey had frequently undergone political outbursts, as was the event in the 1970s and the 1990s. "The sources of party financing, how parties generate revenues and spend money, and whether party accounts are effectively audited are all indicators of the quality of democratic governance."(Seda, 2015, p. 93).


### **iii. social**

Physical and social infrastructures contribute domestically to the income growth of Turkey (Saygili & Ozdemir, 2017, p. 2). The signs of Turkey's new soft power founded throughout the Middle East, from Turkish goods filling dealer lots to Turkish soap operas and movies ' massive success. Forty-two Turkish TV programs in the Arab world were on air today. Gold, the first series to reach the Arab airwaves, shattered popularity rates in Arab nations with 85 million viewers. The amount of tourists visited Turkey was tripled over past few years; Turkey had become the sixth most visited place, and Istanbul was the world's 10th most visited city. This was a concerned of built capability, a factor in the economic growth of the state: in 2011, some 117 million international visitors travelled through Turkish airports, and even the hotel industry in Turkey catered more than 1 million visitors at one time. Europeans made up a significant portion of these tourists, but for its Middle Eastern neighbours, Turkey seems had become a major tourist attraction. Whereas only 7% of Turkey's tourists were from the Middle East a century ago, today more than 12% came from the area, contributed more than 3 million Middle



Eastern visitors a year. The number included 175,000 tourists from Saudi Arabia, UAE 48,000, Iraq 533,000, and Lebanon 144,000 in 2012. Indeed the rise in visitors from the Middle East was a consequence of the Arab Spring and collapsed of a few dictatorial regimes throughout the world. Besides a huge increased in Arab tourists, Turkey was the favourite destination for Iranians, who are Turkey's third-largest tourist nation.


Graph 1.4: Numbers of Foreign Visitors Arriving in Turkey per year and Quarter in thousand



#### iv. international relationship

Turkey's leaders were taking advantage of used their soft power by built relations with international society and the state by set up a presence in a variety of international meetings. The aspiration of Ankara was to participate in any international relation where almost no boundaries. Turkey has defined the role of observer in the Arab League and was involved in almost every meeting. A Turk, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, was appointed by the OIC as secretary general in 2005. Turkey via Raci Kaya Chair of the Board of Director of Turkey's Vakif bank has been appointed as Executive Director of the IMF for 2014 and was hosted the 2015 G20 Summit. Turkey was a dynamic international actor situated in the centre one of the world's most fluid regions (Chr Michelsen Institute, 2019, para. 1). Turkey even ran for the 2020 Olympic Games, the 2020 World Expo, and a place in the 2015 United Nations Security Council. It even participated in more far-reaching forums, such as those of the organisation of AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation and the Caribbean States Organization. At that same period, Ankara remains firmly committed to its long-standing involvement in classic and strong Western establishments such as the NATO, the Council of Europe and OECD as well as international non-Middle Eastern and non-Muslim organizations such as with the Black Sea Forum. But apart from the regional level, Turkish diplomats were optimistic. Turkey was searching for a position and a membership card at each level.

Map 1.4: Turkey's Bilateral Official Development Assistance in 2017 (Data in Million Dollars)



Source: Edited from Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) Report (2017).

Map 1.4 illustrated that Turkey had always been a significant humanitarian actor in the world. We have indeed been widely active in Syria, Somalia, Myanmar, and Pakistan accommodated the highest amount of refugees worldwide, with even 3.6 million Syrians resided in camps and towns in Turkey. Turkey was the country's fourth highest humanitarian donation (among OECD / DAC countries) when it comes to provide development aid in relation to national wealth. Turkey's humanitarian aid and participation had a derived term of Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) to define its foreign policy formed and inspired by AKP's internal affairs, global aspirations and religious practice. Towards this end, Ankara's innovative "Emerging 8," a forum for rising economies like Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Iran, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia had even founded a voice in politics. Turkey often participated in Western Hemisphere-focused bodies included the Organization of American States and Association of Caribbean States. The foreign-policy rulers of Turkey were assured that the role of Turkey in transforming world affairs expanded outside its geographic location. Foreign Minister Davutoglu best summed up when he said, "This is a new global order in the making, and Turkey is doing its best to help bring this transition period to a successful conclusion."

### b. Negative Impact

Ankara was seriously concerned about the tensivity with Iran and Syria which Iran condemned Turkey's military offensive in North-eastern Syria (Behraves, 2019, p.2). Damascus has permitted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to work within Syria, which had already waged a war towards Turkey since the 1970s. The

PKK and its Syrian branch Movement for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) tried to take over cities across the border with Turkey when the Assad regime's control over its territories collapsed in the summer of 2012. Soner (2014) has stated that "Ankara now has to compete with the possibility of federal states in post-Assad Syria run by the PKK and Iran has also taken action to fight back against the Syrian policy of Turkey" (p.9). In a won of an attempt to attack Ankara, Tehran negotiated a truce in September 2011 with the PKK's Iranian affiliate, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) that previously fought against, enabled the party to concentrate its attention on Turkey. Syrian and Iranian helped for the PKK was a serious risk to Ankara, but Turkey could have turned the tables if it succeeds in maintained its peace negotiations with the arrested PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, achieved a peaceful solution with its Kurds. But widespread uncertainty at its borders and a hazardous current account deficit might immediately send the global climb of Turkey into a downward spiral, particularly if Turkey's leadership fails to obey the formula for the regional rise of Turkey.

### **Conclusion**

Turkey once again may become politically powerful only if it makes use of its neighbourhood's 'strategic depth' by establishing better relations with Islam neighbours, "Turkey's potential power relies on consuming strong relations with its Islam neighbours, particularly close to Iran and Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey was well placed than any other Islam country because of huge size, approximately 75 million people with a \$1.3 trillion economy, to potentially become another major power in the regions. Turkey had hold over the high position as being one of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Directors in 2014, a role that had come as a further acknowledgment of the newly found economic power of the region. Turkey needs to bring its dispersed social parts together if wants to arise as a global and regional actor, particularly in view of the fact that the state is currently negotiating its early civil foundation. The Turkish military has progressively described itself as a stronghold of laicite (European secularism) influenced by the French model of religion-government separation, establishing a barrier between politics and religion in Turkey. Nevertheless, the symbolic power of the military over Turkish society has diminished over the past decade. In the end, Turkey has come to believe that its strategic importance to the Middle East still has challenges due to the fact above. By the way, Turkey has the capacity to become a regional power which many other states have in the region and become a regional power with close ties to the United States and proximity to NATO support. Turkey's new challenge as a liberal democracy will be to prove its credibility. As the debate remains on its first civilian-made constitution, the effect on the region is especially significant. In this regard, a level in the right course is the sensible decision by Ankara for launch Kurdish-language classes in public education. This step might help to mitigate the country's Kurdish issue and make Turkey more diverse. It have also won the battle for democracy at home for Turkey to rise as a

major power in the region and drive for democracy reform. Because it would have to become a more reliable player throughout the Middle East and western countries, it may be difficult for Turkey to transform this understanding into real power by being a model country. Turkey's history of balancing democracy, strong connections with the West, a 'Muslim' foreign policy, capitalism, and Islamism under the AKP over the past decade may not be so easily implemented by Arab communities.

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